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Abstract 
This thesis examines the civil rights movement from its 
inception in 1955, with the Montgomery bus boycott, to its 
decline at the end of the 1960's. It offers an explanation 
of the upsurge in black political activity and the adoption, 
and subsequent abandonment of some blacks, of the nonviolent 
tactic. Investigation of the background of black politics 
illustrates the development of protest from early supplication 
to the strident demands of Black Power. It assesses the 
successes and failures of the campaigns by focusing on black 
leaders and their interrelationships, as well as indicating 
I, 
the diversity and he·terogeneous. nature of the movement .. Special 
attention is paid to the reaction of the governm~nt to black 
activism and to the forces that contributed ·to the passage 
of legislation, which attempted to solve particularly black 
problems. The white reaction to black successes, and the 
part it played in curtailing further advances, is also taken 
into account. The conclusion attempts to dispel certain 
popular misconceptions about the movement and an analysis 
is put forward of the progress made by blacks and of the 
reasons why they failed to consolidate their success in the 
1970's. 
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Preface 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and explain the 
development of the civil rights movement in the United Stateso 
The main focus is on the events of 1955-68, but this will 
involve an investigation of the background to these events, 
and the factors involved in shaping them. The inquiry will 
focus specifically on the evolving strategies, tensions and 
problems of the movement, and on its key personalities. The 
conclusion will draw together a variety of themes of historical 
and contemporary significance. 
The primary approach of this study is historical, but the 
narrative does not stand alone. A narrative account of how the 
civil rights movement flowered and withered, presents a danger 
that the reasons why bl~ck protest began and developed, where 
and when and in the form it did, can be overlooked. Black 
political activity is, therefore, placed in the broader context 
of the political and social environment in which it occurred. 
Thus, the thesis is concerned to explore the exten·t to which 
civil rights agitation was a response to, or an interaction 
with, o.ther social, political and economic changes. Reactions 
to the civil rights movement, and the implications of black 
activism for the Negro are evaluated. 
Before discussion can begin, there must be some clarifi-
cation of my terms of reference. The shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary defines a movement as , ., a series of actions and 
endeavours by a body of persons, tending more or less 
continuously, towards some special end•• • This seems. to: me.et 
the objection that the civil rights group were not closely 
ii. 
linked, or bound together under an unbrella organization. It 
also accounts for the lack of a specific programme of action. 
A more specialized definition is given in A Dictionary 
of Political Analysis by Geoffrey K. Roberts. He states a 
movement is, 11 a collective grouping that seeks to bring 
about major changes in social institutions, or (in the case 
of revolutionary movements, e.g., an independence or separatist 
movement) even an entirely new order, involving the use of 
political means at some stage. A major feature is their 
possession of some very basic common purpose, or even 
ideology, which in turn generates a strong sense of group 
identity, and may encourage the emergence aE charismatic 
leadership 11 • (l) This defini·tion allows for the presence of 
such differing groups as the Black Muslims and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (S.C.L.c.), and the diversity 
of purpose between them. A movement, therefore, need not be 
a structuredf well-defined entity, and so it seems appropriate 
for use in this thesis. 
My objective is to produce an 3ccount which identifies 
and delineates the major catalysts which triggered, sustained 
and eroded the civil rights movement. In establishing a 
proper context, it is necessary to examine both the birth and 
development of the main black organizations and the timing and 
escalation of protest. 
(1) G.K. Roberts: Dictionary of Poli·tical Analysis (1971 
Longman, London); page 129. 
i.:ii. 
Chapter two. assesses the career of Martin Luther King, Jr., 
in view of non-violent mass action in preference to alternative 
strategies and suggests why some campaigns succeeded when others 
failed. 
Chapter three deals with civil rights legislation and how 
it was passed. It. will focus on the content of legislation and 
compare the various approaches of successive administrations. 
This national legislative and executive response is one 
indication of how the civil rights movement was viewed from 
outside. 
Chapter four reflects the growing militancy of the 
movement through a study of another major figure, Malcolm X. 
The development and change in his views and policies and the 
legacy he left to his followers will be investigated. The 
effect of an alternative to the non-violent idea on the 
Northern blacks will be analysed. 
Malcolm X was influential in the formation of the 
ideology of Black Power and chapter five addresses the 
origins and coherence of the concept. It examines the divisive 
impact of Black Power on the movement and assesses its political. 
influence and relevance. 
The final chapter will investigate the white reaction to 
black political activity during the period. The term 'white 
backlash' will be analysed, with particular reference to the 
extent to which this phenomenon was responsible for the 
political success of George Wallace. The effect of legislation 
proposed and passed in .1966 and 1968 and the role of the 
iv. 
administration will be considered. 
The conclusion will assess the overall gains made by the 
movement while drawing together the methods and means by which 
it made them. An analysis of why the movement failed to 
capitalize on their earlier success in the 1970's will be 
undertaken. Assessment will be made of the way in which 
government reacted to the activity of the movement md lastly 
certain myths that have been popularized will be exposed and 
refuted. 
1 
Chapter One 
Background to the Movement 
An investigation of black protest in the 1960's necessitates 
some analysis of the background of the Negro struggle for 
equality. A major campaign, which attacked constitutional 
interpretation and established social and political practices, 
does not spring into life fully formed and articulated. It is 
the result of the interplay of social, economic and political 
trends, which create an environment that is both conducive 
and receptive to certain kinds of political activity. 
It is important, therefore, to show how the major black 
groups began, the different paths they followed and how they 
joined together in a loose alliance in the early 1960's. 
Certain questions must be answered about why Negro protest 
became so widespread in this period, when previous agitation 
had failed to produce such a reaction. What factors and 
pressures were responsible for the beginning of legislative 
action on behalf of the Negro in the 1950's and its continuation 
in l960 1 s? Why did the Montgomery, Al., bus boycott happen 
where and when it did?. 
To assess why the explosion of black activism occurred, 
the different stages of black politics will be examined to show 
how and why the legal approach of the 1950's was later replaced 
by non-violent direct action. This represents only one strand 
of black political history, and so the Marcus Garvey movement 
will alrobe investigated to illustrate the more militant 
ancestry of black nationalism. 
2 
In May 1910, a group of prominent white liberals joined. 
w·ith several middle-class blacks to form the "National 
(1\ Association for the Advancement of Coloured People" (N.A.A.C.P.). ' 
It adopted a programme which included the abolition of mandatory 
segregation, equal education, Negro enfranchisement and the 
enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendmen·t:s. The 
stimulus that promoted its inception was the Springfield, Il.q 
riot of 1908, which resulted in major destruction and several 
deaths. (2) It was understandable, therefore, that the new 
organization would also have as an early priority, a campaign 
against lynching. which was at the heart of many of the racial 
disturbances of the time. The first action taken, by the 
rapidly growing N .. A .. A.C.P .. was the initiation of law suits to 
improve the position of the Negro in society. In 1915, the 
Supreme Court declared "grandfather clauses" (3 ) in state 
constitutions null and void. In 1917, (4} the Court declared 
unconstitutional the Louisville, Ky., ordinance which required 
Negroes to live in certain sections of the city. 
(1} See, Charles.Flint Kellogg: N.A.A.C .. P. A History of the 
&Tational Assoq,.iation for the Advanceme.nt of Coloured People 
Volume I 1919-20, (1967, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.) 
(2) 5,000 soldiers were needed to restore order when a white mob 
atta.cked .. the Negro area of the city. Two Negroes were 
lynched, four white men killed and seventy people injured. 
(3) The 15th Amendment of the Constitution prohibited any law 
explicitly restricting the vote to whites, since this would 
involve a reference to "race or colour". The grandfather 
clauses restricted registration for voting to those persons 
who had vot.ed prior to 1861 and their descendants, or to 
persons who had s:erved in the Federa'l or Confederate. armies 
and their descendants~ The clauses were struck down in 
Guinn vs United States (288 U.S~ 347) 
(4) I.n Buchanan. vs Warley (245 u .. s .. 60) .. 
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In 1911, the 11 National League of Urban Conditions Among 
Negroes" was formed, which later became known as the "National 
Urban League 11 • With finance from white philanthropists, the 
League attempted to open new opportunities for Negroes in 
industry and to assist the growing numbers of Negro migrants 
from the South in adjusting to city life. Programmes were 
started for meeting migrants, directing them to jobs and 
lodging and giving them general information. During World 
War I, the League helped place Negroes in war employment in 
Northern industry and informed them of the resources of the 
social service agencies available. 
Despite this increase in liberal concern for the Negro, 
conditions in the North were detex·iorating.. The end of the 
war had reduced the number of jobs in industry, many of which 
were now being taken over by demobilized white servicemen .. 
Both the League and the N.A.A.C.P. were interracial, but begun 
by white initiative with mainly white leadership. Those blacks 
involved were middle-class intellectuals and they made little 
mass appeal. to the ghetto Negro. 
It was at this point that Marcus Garvey arrived in America 
in 1915. In his birthplace of Jamaica, he had organized the. 
"Universal Negro Improvement Association" (U.N.I.A.) in 1914 .. 
Its purpose was "to unite all the Negro peoples of the world 
into one great body to establish a country and a government 
1 
absolutely of our own". Garvey began a speaking tour of 
thirty-eight states and met black leaders. He was scornful 
of upper-class Negro leaders because of their reliance 
4 
on white philanthropists and denounced them for being ashamed 
of their black ancestry and for desiring to assimilate into 
the white race. Garvey found large numbers of West Indians 
isolated from native Negroes in Harlem and used them to establish 
his organization in America. He travelled extensively establi-
shing branches of U.N.I.A. in most urban centres of Negro 
population. The movement gained. unexpected publicity in 1919, 
when he was wounded in a gun attack by an insane former employee. 
The assault. assumed heroic proportions in the Negro press 
(including his own newspaper) and Garvey quickly became, to 
some, a persecuted martyr, working for the salvation of his 
people. 
Garvey seemed to fulfil a need; someone to organize and 
inspire the blaek masses who had hitherto been uninvolved. 
His ability to reach these people was boosted by the establish-
ment of the newspaper "Negro World" in 1918. In it, Garvey 
pushed his nationalist message that the only hope for American 
Negroes was to return. to Africa, build a new. Negro nation and 
develop their own culture. He emphasized the regal splendours 
of ancient Africa and delighted in references to the greatness 
of coloured civilizations when white men were still savages. By 
exalting everything black, preaching the purity of the race 
and teaching African history, he instilled a new pride of ancestry 
in his followers .. This emphasis on "racism" had the paper cited 
by the Department of Justice in a report on Negro radicalism in 
1919. The paper was published weekly between 1918 and 1933 and 
reached a circulation of 200,000... While this suggests a much 
5 
smaller membership than Garvey',s claim of six million, several 
scholars still estimate the peak at between one and two million~1 ) 2 
Using membership dues and profits from the ~spaper, 
Garvey was able to buy a large auditorium in Harlem, which 
was rechristened 11 Liberty Hall 11 and became the headquarters 
for u.N.I.A. In order to establish business enterpris~s on 
a large scale to try and ameliorate Negro economic problems, 
Garvey formed a steamship company, the Black Star Line, and 
secured a broad charter of incorporation from the State of 
Delaware. To raise further finance the company was capitalized 
at $500,000 composed of 100,000 shares of stock valued at 
$5 each. Sale of stock was limited to Negroes and established 
as a strictly commercial venture not, as his critics claimed, 
to be the vehicle for the transportation of all blacks back ·to 
Africa. However, Garvey, always the master propagandist, 
skillfully exploited this misini::erpretation. (2 ) By 1920 three 
(1) The actual membership of garvey's organisation is the subject 
of some controversy with many writers (E.D .. Cronen, 11 Black 
Moses. The Sto:ry of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro . 
Improvement Association, (1962); T.G. Vincent, Black Power anq 
the Garvey .Hovement, (1971); A.M. & c. Rose, America Divided,. 
Minority Group Relations in the United States, (1948) ·; ·, 
A. Pinkney, Red, Black and Green. Black Nationalsim- in~ 
United States, (1976) and St. Clair Drake and HeR .. Clayton, 
Black Metropol,is, The_ Study of Neg_ro Life in a Norther.n City, 
(1962) .) The majority settle for a membership of nearly one · 
million,or between one and two million 11 followers 11 • The 
major reason for the discrepancy between circulation and 
membership is that very few of Garvey's ghetto followers 
could read and as a res~lt the newspaper was usually read 
aloud to mass meetings. Myrdal describes it as the first 
and, up to this time, (1944), the only real mass movement 
of Negroes on a national scale.4 
(2) Garvey's severe critic Dr~ W.EeB. DuBois said in Dusk of 
dawn 8 (1940) (quoted in Cronan Black Moses (1962); page 
204), 11 Garvey proved not only an astonishingly popular 
leader, but a master of propaganda" .. The rest of tre state-
ment was less complementary. · 
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ships had been bought, and Garvey was able to sell thousands 
of shares by pointing to the rare actuality of a Negro company 
with Negro workers, in contrast to the manifesto and programmes 
achieved by other groups. In February 1920, the line was 
recapitalized at $10 million, and despite N.A.A.C.P. detractors 
pointing out that.this had nothing to do with the actual 
solvency of the company, ·it was excellent sales propaganda. 
Garvey was riding the crest of a wave,,and many poor blacks 
apparently believed he was leading his people to economic 
prosperity and social self-respect. 
Garvey also established the Negro Factories Corporation 
which managed a chain o:E co-operative grocery stores, a 
restaurant, a publishing house, a tailor's shop, a millinery 
store and other businesses. One of the more spectacular 
accomplishments o:E U .N .. I .A. was the first "International 
Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World", held in Ne\.IT 
York in August 1920, attended by some 25,000 delegates from 
25 countries. U.N .. I.A. held a mass march through Harlem, 
including military units such as the African Legion, the 
Garvey militia and the Black Eagle Flying Corps, whose ultimate 
goal was the reconquest of Africa. Garvey told the delgates: 
"We shall now organise the four hundred million 
Negroes of the world into a vast organization, 
to plant the banner of freedom on the great 
continent of Africa ••• the barrier is the White 
man. 11 5 
The speech was cited in the "Lusk Report on Radicalism 
7 
and Sedition in New York State 11 • (l) The delegates also drafted 
a declaration of Negro rights embodying equality, self-
determination and a free Africa. 
This marked the peak of Garvey's influence. The movement 
was built on his personal charisma, rather than the strength 
of the whole organization. Events soured when one ship sank 
in the Hudson River, and a second was sold at the direction 
of a judge to pay for a fine. In January 1922, Garvey was 
arrested on a charge of using the mail to defraud in connection 
with the sale of his stock. Garvey was found guilty and 
jailed pending appeal. He was convicted again and sentenced 
to five years in jail in 1925. After two years, President 
Coolidge commuted his sentence, and he was deported as an 
undesirable alien. With his imprisonment and subsequent 
deportation, U.N~IoA. suffered greatly flDm lack of leadership. 
Garvey had, through lack of trust of intellectualism refused, 
in many case~,to appoint appropriate personnel and had relied 
on less competent:., but more loyal, employees. Even greater 
mismanagement than his own, combined with a severe loss of 
finance, caused by the Depression, which hit blacks even harder 
than poor whites, dealt a death blow to u.N.I.A. Garvey 
travelled abroad, seeking support for the declining organization, 
which '\vas further weakened by a split over where the headquarters 
whould be. Despite a resurgence of interest at the time of the 
(1) This Committee was created to investigate seditious activitier 
in New York State and it devoted 44 pages to Negro press· 
in a report caTled Rev::..,q1ution""~Radi,cal;_i;_sm:· A. Report, 
to the Joint Legislative Committ.ee ·of New York Investigatinq i 
s·editious .Activities, Volume II (1920, J .. B .. Lyon, Albany N.Y .. 
pages 1476-1520 
8 
invasion of Etheopia, the decline continued and by the time 
of Garvey's death in 1940, U.N.I.A. had, to all intents and 
purposes, ceased to function. 
Garvey is often referred to as the "father of black 
nationalism". 6 While he was often unclear as to the scale of 
repatriation and its timing, Garvey was adamant blacks should 
return to Africa with white America•s help. He petitioned 
the United States government and the League of Nations for 
assistance, and even planned military reconquest in the event 
of the colonial powers not giving up land to American blacks. 
Although accused of racism because of his views on racial 
purity, Garvey's concern was the liberation of Negroes and he 
only discouraged interracial breeding to try and promote black 
unity. Despite his widespread popularity, Marcus Garvey left 
hardly anything of oo ncrete permanence to further black equality. 
His lasting contribution was not political gain for his people 
or an organization that carried on after him, but he did more 
than anyone before him to stimulate racial pride and confidence 
among Negroes in America. Although such an impact is impossible 
to quantify it may still be of enduring importance. At a time 
when racism was at its peale, Garvey built a black nationalist 
movement that became the largest ever seen and from a mood of 
hopelessness, created a new feeling of racial pride in many 
poor blacks and pointed to the need to involve the mass of 
black people to make real gains for the Negro. 
The N.A.A.c.P. was pursuing a policy of lobbying and 
litigation during this,, period. It succeeded in 1921 in getting 
9 
Representative L.c. Dyer of Missouri to introduce an anti-
lynching bill which passed the House, but was filibustered 
in the Senate. In 1927, the Supreme court declared void a 
Texas statute which excluded Negroes from Democratic primaries. (l) 
This was followed by the establishment of a constitutional 
right to vote in all primary elections in the 1944 decision 
of Smith vs Allwright. (2) Despite their rigorous efforts the 
N.A.A.C.P. failed to attract support from more than a small 
minority of Negroes. They achieved ends beneficial to all 
Negroes, but failed to capture their imagination and secure 
the following of the people. 
Between the wars, the~ Urban League continued to grow .. 
Since it was concerned with the employment aE Negroes in 
industry, it had to face the problem of the exclusion of 
Negroes from many unions and hence many jobs. It was accused, 
by Dr. Ralph Bunche, of being evasive in its attitude towards 
unionism because of its dependence on white philanthropy and 
7 the "business class structure" of its board. The League 
replied that it was not a mass movement, but an interracial 
undertaking with th~ aim of securing employment for Negroes, 
8 
rather than .. organizing labour11 or leading mass actions. The 
most significant step towards the unionization. of :Negroes 
was the organization of the 11 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters 11 by A. Philip Randolph in 1925. Considerable opposition 
arose from both white and black groups and it was attacked 
(1) In Nixon vs Herfiaon; (273 u.s. 536) 
(2) (321 u .. s" 649) 
------ ---------------· ----------------- ----·----------------
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as a dangerous and radical organization. However, the wage 
agreements in 1926 and 1929 gave it partial recognition and 
it gained full recognition when more than 8,000 employees 
benefited from a large wage increase under an agreement made 
in 1937. 
The Urban League and the N.A.A.C.P. remained the sole 
groups representing the Negro's attempt to win further rights 
until 1942. James Farmer, a former Methodist clergyman, was 
among a group of Negroes and. whites who formed the "Congress 
of Racial Equality" (c.o.R.Eo) ·in 1942, because they felt 
"legalisn" was not sufficient to win the battle against 
segregation. Farmer served as c .. o.R .. E.'s first national 
chairman and led the group in pioneering the use of direct 
action techniques of p:r·otest in the cities of Northern and 
Border states. C.,O .. R.E. chapters conducted picketing and 
sit-ins of public facilities such as lunch-counters, 
restaurants and hotels to protest segregation and won a 
number of importan-t,though limited, victories. In 1947, he 
led c.o.R.E .. members on a "freedomride 11 to test discrimination 
on trains engaged in interstate travel and to discover to what 
ext.ent states had complied with the 1946 Supreme Court:. 
decision, declaring racial regulations illegal on in·terstate 
(1) 
travel. Although the "Journey of Reconciliation"u as it was· 
called, was completed, it was on a small scale and because it 
met only slight resi.stance was given little publicity. 
In the late 1940's and 1950's, c.o .. R .. E. grew considerably. 
Campaigns beg.an in St .. Loui.s and Baltimore to. combat discrim-
------- ---···--.-----· 
(1) In Morgan vs Conu:uonwealth of Virginia (328 u .. s .. 373) 
11 
ination in restaurants. Despite being slow to bring gains 
(the St. Louis effort lasted five years) these campaigns 
were successful at a local level. Although they did not 
start any nation wide reform movement, they did gain concessions 
on the serving of blacks in public facilities in Border States. 
James Farmer summarized the organization pre-1955 as "small, 
Northern, middle-class, elitist, idealistic and predominantly 
white. We had not yet heard the voice of the masses. Nor,for 
9 that matter ,.had. many people heard us ... 
Other factors were at work to bring the racial situation 
in America to the forefron·t, Beginning in ·the years prior to 
World War I, numbers of Southern blacks migrated.northward 
to find work.. With the growing demand for \V'Orkers created 
by the war, the curtailment of European immigration and the 
decline of Southern agriculture as an employer, the movement 
e.Jcpanded rapidly as blacks sought economic opportunity and 
greater freedom in Northern Cities. In 1910, roughly 10% 
of American blacks lived outside the South, but by 1940, the 
figure was nearly 25'%, almost half of \'lhich lived in six 
major cities. The migration continued and even accelerated 
after World War II as Southern agriculture underwent tech-
nological change. Displaced by new machinery and farming 
techniques, Southern blacks continued to move North and their 
numbers there doubled between 1940 and 1960. 
The movement of blacks to the North opened the door to 
12 
practical political influence for them for the first time 
since Reconstruction. Concentrated in large cities and 
allowed the vote, blacks were able to elect their own 
representatives at the state and local level. The New Deal 
brought an abrupt shift in party allegiance as blacks, along 
with the white working-class, voted for the social \V'elfare ·· 
policies of the Democrats and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Northern 
blacks became a crucial component of the New Deal coalition 
that made the Democrats the majority party. The vote began 
to be an important tool for winning small concessions and, 
in later years, for making racial discrimination an issue 
the Democratic party in the North could no longer ignore • 
. The example of t:he limited rights accorded to blacks 
in the North, was noted by the blacks remaining in the South. 
This realization of the inequality of their position in Southern 
society and the fact that it need not be permanent, was 
increased after World war II. American participation in the 
struggle against fascism highlighted the contradictions 
between the na·tion• s international stance against Hitler• s 
racism and its treatment of racial minorities at home. The 
war heightened racial consciousness of blacks, and by 1946, 
the NeA.A.C.Pe had grown to one thousand branches, triple the 
postwar number, and had increased H:s membership ninefold, 
to nearly half a million. President Truman, responding to 
civil rights delegations, established a Presidential committee 
on civil rights to investigate racial conditions and to make 
recommendations. 
The report, issued in 1947 11 TO Secure These Rights," 
13 
catalogued the pervasive denial of basic civil rights and 
civil liberties to blacks, and made the first official condem-
nation of the "separate but equal" doctrine that had been 
(1) 
enshrined in the 1896 Plessy vs Ferguson decision. Truman 
pressed Congress for civil rights legislative action, but met 
stiff opposition from Southern Senators and he retreated by 
not drafting an Administration Bill or adopting a civil rights 
plank in the Democratic platform. However, such a plank was 
introduced to the. convention by a.young Hubert· Humphrey and 
adopted after pressure from the party's moderate centre. The 
extreme Southern segregationist reaction saw the formation 
of the "State's Rights Party" (2) and the nomination of South 
Carolina's governor St:r:om Thurmond as its Presidential candidate .. 
The 1948 Presidential election thus became the first 
in which civil rigJ1ts played a prominent role. Truman, now 
on the offensive, issued two Executive orders aimed at 
eliminating racial discrimination in federal employment and 
in the armed forces.. In the closing weeks of the campaign, he 
spoke out forcefully for racial justice.. Truman won the 
election and took nearly 70% of· the. black vote.. Hopes for 
legislative gains, however, were disappointed when an attempt 
to modify the Senate's cloture rule, to ease the passage of 
a civil rights bill, \vas filibustered. Civil Rights were put 
(1) 
(2) 
(163 u.s. 537) 
Known as the "Dixiecrat\'~,. 'Qthey won four traditionally 
Democratic sta·tes in the"e'iectiono 
14 
aside and priority given to social welfare measures and to 
ratification of the pact establishing N.A.T.O. The outbreak 
of the Korean War, and the splintering of liberal forces under 
the attacks of Senator Joseph McCarthy, pushed civil rights 
further from national view, while the intensification of the 
Cold War dominated President Truman's attention. 
The N.A.A .. c.P. had been supporting a legislative push 
during this period, but at its annual convention of 1951, 
perhaps influenced by the decay of the Truman Presidency,·it 
decided to concentrate on challenging the constitutional basis 
of Sou·thern segregation statutes. Focusing on elementary 
school education,its legal division, under Thurgood Marshall, 
now moved beyond the insistence that black schools should be 
upgraded until they were equal to white schools. Instead,the 
lawyers argued that separate schools were,by their nature, 
inherently unequal. 'I'he N .,A .A .c .P. initiated several suits 
against segregation in elementary school education, and, in 
May 1954 Chief Jus·tice Earl Warren delivered a historic 
judgement on these cases, grouped together as Brown vs Board 
. (1) 
of Equ.cation of Tope."k;a, I<ansas.. He stated that, "in the 
(1) "Brown" (347 u.s. 483), was the final blow to the "Plessy 
doctrine. However, several. prior cases had effectively 
undermined it. In 1938, Missouri ex rel. Gaines vs .. 
Canada (305 u.s. 337) in 1948, Sipull vs Oklahoma (322 
u .. s. 631) and 1950 Sweat·t vs Painter (339 u.s. 629) and 
McLaurin vs Oklahoma State Regents (339 u .. s. 637). Further 
information on these cases can be gained in H.J. Abraham: 
Freedom. and the Cou:r:·t, Civil Rights and Liberties in the 
United States, (1972, Oxford University Press, New York), 
pages 305-10. 
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field of public education the doctrine of •separate but equal• 
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
. 10 
unequal ... 
This was a landmark decision that broke the legal, 
institutional and constitutional back of segregation. It 
marked a watershed in the struggle for civil rights, because 
the weight of constitutional law has since been on the side 
of the black and racial ~quality. In May 1955, the Court 
h d d d ••t . 1 t 1:. d . . (l) d . an e own ~ s ~mp emen a· ~on ec~s~on , or er~ng 
11 desegregation to proceed ylith 11 all deliberate speed", but 
leaving the responsibility for compliance with local.school 
boards and federal district court judges in the South. The 
court v1as probably acting with the best of motives, in the 
hope that the federal district courts would act -vlith firmness 
and speed and a prompt start would be made, while still 
assuaging the white South by not setting a date for compliance. 
It is also probable that even if the Court had ordered immediate 
compliance, similar or even greaterresistance might have been 
encountered. However, it succeeded in arming the recalcitrant 
South with a device. for delay and rESistance. 
Until the Brown decision, most of the pressure for civil 
rights had come from the North~ N.A.A.C.P. chapters in the 
South tended to restrict their activities to litigation. White 
(1) 349 UvS. 294 (1955) 
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racism was too virulent, and the threat of violence too great, 
for Southern blacks to engage in public protest. Rural and 
small-town blacks remained oblivious of any civil rights 
pressure that was growing in the country. However, the Brown 
decision affected every black family with children and aroused 
very many blacks to action. During the summer of 1955, an 
emboldened N.A.A.c.P. filed desegregation petitions with over 
170 school boards in 17 states. Nineteen district court 
rulings on local school segregation laws, delivered in 1955, 
upheld· integration in schools. As c. Vann Woodward described 
it, {l) "previously submissive Negroes were rising" and 
"something very much like a panic seized parts of the South". 
White . supremacists rallied and launched a movement of massive 
resistance against the Brown decision. The Citizens Council 
grew rapidly and vi:r·tually silenced the voices of moderation 
in the South, by ostracizing white liberals and using economic 
retaliation and sometimes violence, against blacks advocating 
segregation. 
Politicians joined the reaction. In January 1956, four 
Southern governors promised to use the power of the sl:ate 
government to prevent desegregation. In March 1956, 101 
Southern members of Congress sighed the .. Southern Manifesto", 
praising those states resisting integration and attacking the 
Supreme Court. In the spring of 1956, two North Carolina 
Congressmen who had not signed were defeated in the state 
(1) In. ';]ZJJ,e St:r;:,.;:~}::tge Care.er of. Jim. Crow, .. (1966, Oxford University 
Press., New York); pag.e 15:4.,, 
I 
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primaries. Under this pressure, desegregation ground to a 
halt. Resistance peaked in 1957-58 with the Little Rock 
crisis. President Eisenhower reluctantly sent federal troops 
to Arkansas to maintain peace and allow black students to 
enrol in the high school. This action was not primarily dre 
to superior motives and support 0f the Brown decisione It was. 
carried out essentially because Governor Faubus, in defying 
a federal court injunction, had directly challenged the 
President's authority. 
The significance of the Brown decision must not be 
understated. It came at a time when other paths had been 
blocked. President Truman, although sympathetic to the 
rights of blacks, realized, after a Southern filibuste.r., that 
there was no realistic prospect of civil rights legislation 
and dropped the ma·tter to concentrate on social welfare legis-
lation which would still benefit the Negro. The power of the 
Southern filibuster in the Senate was still supreme in the 
field of civil rights. 
When President Eisenhower took over in 1953, it marked 
a change whereby executive leadership in the civil rights 
area ended. Eisenhower even refused to speak publicly in 
favour in compliance with Brown and so deprived moderates of 
sorely needed support. Legislation as a way forward was, 
therefore, blocked, poth through Congress and the Executive. 
The victory that the Brown decision represented was widely 
felt in the black community. When white resistance to that 
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decision robbed it of almost all immediate practical effect, 
black faith in the legal-political process was severly eroded. 
The stage was set for another form of action to emerge. 
Expectation had been aroused among blacks that at last second-
class citizenship might be ending. The N.A.A.C.P.'s approach 
had come up against solid Southern resistance and this would 
have to be breached in another way. 
Second-class citizen was a term easily applied to Negroes 
in Montgomery, Ala •• They comprised 40% of the city's 120,000 
population, but their average income was less than half that 
of whites. Two thirds of Negro working women were domestics 
for whites, and nearly half the male Negro population were 
domestics or labourers. Over 70% of bus passengers were 
black, yet only whites received proper service.. The first 
.four rows were reserved for whites and only they used the 
front door. Negroes paid and then exited, to reboard by the 
rear door and they were obliged to yield their seats to whites, 
if so required. This treatment was probably the most constant 
reminder to the Negro of his inferior status in white society. 
For the average poor black, the vote would have been of little 
consequence, since he probably would ham been illiterate, too 
scared to use it or presented with a choice between bvo white 
supremacists. 
The segregation of the buses was a cause much more likely 
to raise the Negro from his apathy of acceptance of the systemu 
In the previous year, several incidents had illustrated the 
growing discontent over the policy. A fifteen-year old school 
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girl had been handcuffed and jailed for refusing to yield 
her seat. This had led to a black committee being set up 
to meet the authorities and complain. Agreements were made, 
but the promises came to nothing. During the year, five 
. . 
women and two children were arrested, and one man shot dead 
as a direct result of disobeying a bus driver's orders. 
Various groups such as the N.A.A.C.P .. (which was all black 
in Montgomery) and the Woman's Political Council had wanted 
to stage a boycott of the buses, and any of these incidents 
might have proved decisive. The defendant would have to be 
of impeccable character if they were to be picked by either 
of these groups as an example of discrimination. 
The opportunity came when Mrs. Rosa Parks was arrested 
on 1st Decembe:r: 1955 for refusing to give up her seat. Since 
she was quiet and dignified in her refusal, she had to be 
charged with the violation of the municipal ordinance governing 
racial accommodation on publicly owned vehicles, rather than 
the more usual charge of disorderly conduct. Her former 
employer, E.D. Nixon, the head of the Alabama N.A.A.C.P .. , 
convened a meeting of the local black leaders, and ·they called 
a one day boycott of the buses by blacks. This was a huge 
success, with less than a dozen of the usual 17,500 Negroes 
using the buses. A mass meeting was held, and a continuation 
of the boycott approved. A new organization was formed to 
be named the "Nontgomery Improvement Association", {N.I .A.), 
and the Rev. Nartin Luther King Jr .. was unanimously elected 
president. The young and articulate minister had, only three 
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weeks earlier, declined the presidency of the local N.A.A .. c.P., 
but now felt he could not refuse this too. Three demands were 
agreed upon which fell far short of integration; courteous 
treatment, seating on a first-come first-served basis, Negroes 
from the back forward and whites from the front toward the 
back, and that Negro operators should be employed on predominantly 
Negro routes. 
During the next year, the boycott remained firm, despite 
mounting white opposition. In January, King's home was bombed, 
and the next week, he and eighty,...eight other leaders were 
indicted on charges of conspiracy to conduct an illegal boycott. 
The defendants were :Eound guilty, but their fines were paid 
from the financial support flowing in from all over the country, 
eventually totalling over a quarter of a million dollars. The 
legal challenge to bus segregation, initiated by the NoAoA~C.P., 
was eventually heard by the Supreme Court in November 1956, and 
was upheld. The court order abolishing·this segregation was 
delivered in December, and the boycot·!;: ended .. 
A major impact had b~en made on the whole national scene 
by the boycott. It was the first successful direct mass action 
by Southern blacks and it made, the new leader, Martin. Luther 
King, a national figure receiving world wide recognition and 
publicity. It pushed the clergy into the frontline of the 
civil rights movement. Indigenous to the area with great 
influence among religous blacks, they were also largely 
independent from reprisal from the white business community .. 
It had established the technique of nonviolent protest as 
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effective and of universal appeal to all sections of the 
Southern black community. The publicity around the world 
that the boycott received put civil rights on to the front 
pages and, therefore, in the minds of politicians. The way 
had been forced open again for the legislative and legal 
process to work. 
In his 1956 State of the Union message, President 
Eisenhower made his first request for civil rights legislation, 
recommending the creation of a bipartisan Commission to look 
into the denial of ·the franchise on the basis of race. In 
August 1957, Congress passed the first Civil Rights Act(l) 
since Reconstruction. The law established a Civil Rights 
Commission and authorized the creation of a Civil Rights 
Division in the Justice Department with power to investigate 
violation of voting rights.. l~lthough ·the new powers were 
reluctantly applied, and little or no progress made on actually 
registering new Negro voters·, the Act was a big step forward .. 
With the appointment of a new Attorney-General, William P. 
Rodgers, in January 1960, more cases were brought, and Congress 
began to act to fill some of the ·loopholes in the Act~ 
Legislative recognition had. finally been made of the Negro's 
position in society. With the formation of the "Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference 11 (S.c.L .. C .. ), in January 1957~ 
led by the Reverend King another organization was added to the 
(1) See J.W. Anderson: "Eisenhower, Brownweli and the Congress. 
Jhe Tangled Origins of the Civil Rights Bill. of 1956-57" .. 
(1964, University of Alabama Press, Alabama) ~ 
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struggle. This would provide-another front of attack against 
the segregation system.. Distinct from the Urban League and 
N.A.A.C.P. because of its mainly clerical leadership and Southern 
base, s.c.L.c. developed a different approach. In the summer 
of 1959, it began to hold non-violent training institutes and 
recruited growing numbers of young blacks to civil rights 
activism. This would form the ground from which the massive 
expansion of the movement would spring in the 1960's. 
The bus boycott had begun in the South because it was the 
scene of the most blatant segregation and discrimination. The 
Northern black was discriminated against in more subtle ways. 
While he was allowed the vote and the use of public facilities, 
he was under-educated and underemployed. As a result, the 
Northern Negro live in the poorest sections of the big cities, 
which had grawn into black ghet·tos.. The Northern education 
system did not specifically racially separate children in 
schools, children attended their local schools, but this meant 
for most Negroes an all-black institution in the ghettoo The 
Southern black, by contrast, was disenfranchised, educated in 
a seaparate syst.em and housed in a separate area, all by state 
law or local ordinan c.e • 
The pressu:re pu·t on government by the N .. A .A .c .. P. and the 
Urban League, and by elected representatives in the North, 
resulting in legal victories and limited Executive action, 
left the South relatively untouched.. National, social, and 
economic development had increased the standard of living~ 
draggi.ng, t:hat. o:E the.: N.egro up with~ :i:t:. and ma:kin.g blacks even 
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more aware of, and dissatisfied with, their position. Negroes 
returning from the Second World War,were more likely to protest 
their position after fighting for "freedom" in Europe, and 
those returning from Korea had experienced integration in the 
Army and found it hard to readjust to the situation at home. 
The United Nations charter on human rights, that the United 
States supported in its foreign policy, pointed clearly to 
the inadequacies in American domestic policy on the race 
problem. The Cold War increased American embarrassment 
since 50% of Russian statements attacking the United States 
. 13 focused on the Southern treatment o:f the black. 
Encouraged by the N.A.A .. c.P. legal victories, culminating 
in Brown, blacks in the South used the only form of protest 
that was, in practice, open to them; non-violent mass action. 
Marches and boycotts were the only form of protest available 
tofue Southern Negro, since he was denied the normal democratic 
channel of grievance; the ballot. Not only did this means of 
protest provide a constructive outlet for impatience and 
frustration, it also fostered a sense of self-respect and 
dignity, so often denied to the Negro. The older_ organizations 
like the N.A.A.C.P. and the Urban League had led the way and 
made the initial breaches in the wall of segregation. The new 
organization, the s.c.L.C .. , with its dynamic young leader, 
the Reverend King, would now take the initiative and enter 
the new decade_determined to change the old system of inequality 
and gain for the Negro a just position in American society. 
----···---------·---
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Social, economic and political factors had all combined over 
the last four decades to make this effort possible. 
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Chapter Two 
Martin Luther King and the Politics of Non-violence 
The Montgomery Improvement Association, (Mei.A.), had been 
set up with the sole purpose of organizing the Montgomery boycott. 
There was, therefore, no local organization to follow-up its 
.success and no obvious new target for blacks to aim for. Martin 
Luther King was exhausted from the long struggle and the violence 
that had ensued, and so his church arranged a recuperative trip to 
Africa for him~ On his return, he devoted himself to writing his 
own account of the boycott and to running his ministry. He made 
only a brief return to politics in May 1957, when he joined Roy 
Wilkins and A .. Philip Randolph on a "Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom", 
during which he addressed a large rally in Washington D .. c ~ demanding· 
the right to vo~e~ 
King spent much of his time thinking through the full 
implications of non~violent involvement. Some of this reflection 
(1) found expression in · .. Stride Toward Freedom. In August 1957, he 
was visited by one of Gandhi's chief leiutenants, Ranganath Diwakar, 
and began to consider ·the relevance of Gandhi's example of physical 
suffering. Several biographers( 2) point to this meeting as the 
( 1) Martin Luther King, Jr. I s·tride Towards Freedom: The Montgomer~ 
Story (1959, Victor Gollancz, London) 
(2) David L. Lewis in King: A Cri·tical Biography (1970, Penguin, 
Baltimore) pages 96-7, and. William Robert Miller, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. His Life, Martyrdom and Meaning for the Word 
(1968, Avon, New York) 
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reason why King decided to first go to jail in September 1957, 
rather than pay a $10 fine for loitering and failure to obey a 
policeman. On that occasion the local police commissioner paid 
the fine rather than suffer the adverse publicity. That experience, 
and the flood of mail congratulating him on his stand, moved King 
closer to the Gandhian example. 
Later that month, King went on a promotional trip to New York 
and was autographing copies of his book in Harlem, when he was 
nearly fatally stabbed by a mentally disturbed negress. King made 
a remarkable recovery, but was ordered to rest by his doctors. and 
he took the opportunity to visit India. During this visit King 
discussed the concept of non-violence with Gandhi's friends and 
discipleso Before the trip King had seemed unsure of himself and 
of the universal applicability of non-violence but he, "left India, 
more cop.vinced than ever before, that non-violent resistance is the 
most potent weapon available to oppressed people in their struggle 
1 for freedom11 • He gained a new confidence from seeing the results 
of a non-violent campaign where positive discrimination was being 
practised to try and atone for previous injustice. Through the 
attention lavished upon him by the Indians, King also developed a 
greater realisation of the historical significance of the Montgomery 
boycott. 
When King returned to America in March 1959, new voices for 
militancy and extremism were making headlines. The Nation of Islam 
under Elijah Muhammed, assisted by Malcolm X , was preaching racism 
against whites to instil unity and pride in blacks, and their sect 
was growing rapidly in the North. In the South, Robert F. Williams, 
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president of a North Carolina branch of the NoA.A.C.P., had 
drilled, organized and armed a group of blacks and was preaching 
armed self. defence. He was later involved in a gunfight with 
Klansmen and police and forced to flee to Cuba to avoid imprisonment, 
making him a cause cel~bre to young radicals. 
King was being criticised in many quarters for indulging in 
oratory and not action. Realising he was overstretched, he resigned 
the pastorship of his Montgomery church in January 1960. When the 
wave of sit-ins began in February 1960, King spoke to a conference 
of student delegates that became the starting.!.point of the "Student 
Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee" (S.N.CoC.). He outlined the 
tactics he had adopted from the Indian experience for a successful 
non-violent campaign; organization, selective buying, jail, rather 
than fines, universal application of ·the protest in the South and 
lastly a continued learning process about non-violence. In his 
speech King said; 
"Our ultimate end must be the creation of the beloved 
community. The tactics of non-violence without the 2 
spirit of non-violence may become a new kind of violence ... 
King had adopted by this time .a philosophy of non-violence 
which in Gandhian terms is called 11 satyagraha" (literally "satya" 
or truth and 'agraha" or suasion) meaning the application of moral 
pressure or passive resistance. This term was redefined by Gandhi 
to describe his philosophy of striving non-violently to the point 
of sacrifice, rather than fighting to obtain the truth. The concept 
of self-suffering was there originally, but through his experiences, 
Gandhi incorporated the ideas of non-·violence, love, divine 
guidance and conversion into the term., Its opposite is "duragraha" 
I 
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which is the use of non-violent action as the most effective means 
of coercion to achieve an end. This approach to social and political 
change has no moral commitment to non-violence or to the conversion 
of the adversary to the truth. 
King's form of non-violent resistance "does not seek to defeat 
or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and under-
standing." It seeks to · "awaken a sense of moral shame in the 
opponent" and its "end is redemption and reconciliation". King 
emphasizes that "it avoids not only the external physical violence, 
but also internal violence of the spirit ... 3 King believed that 
through this redemptive suffering, the Negro would fulfil his 
"highest destiny to redeem America from the curse of racism" 4 , and 
bring about the beloved community ,,.,here integrated brothers itvould live 
in justice and harmony .. 
After a summer of meetings and rallies, where King exhorted 
activists to "fill ·the ja.ils115 , he set an example in October 1960 
by refusing bail and being jailed for trespassing while trying to 
desegregate a restaurant in Atlanta, Ga. The mayor called a truce 
on demonstrations to negotiate and the students were released. 
King, however, was transferred, charged with viola~ probation 
(imposed for a driving offence) and sentenced to four months hard 
labour.. After a phonecall from the Presidential candidate Senator 
John F • Kennedy to Mrs King, and one from Robert Kennedy to the 
local judge, King was given bail. This intervention by John F. 
Kennedy was recognised as a move governed by self-interest, as well 
as concern for King. 11 There are moments, .. King said, "when the 
politically expedient is 1norally wise. "6 This sentiment did not 
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stop the Rev. King Sr., from publically changing his allegiance 
from Republican to Democrat. The Kennedy machine was not·slow in 
capitalizing on the publicity that followed the move. Two million 
copies of a prunphlet detailing Kennedy's action were distributed, 
and the incident is generally believed to have been a decisive 
element in the very close election. 
Despite the promising activity in Atlanta, King was looking 
for something more. He wanted a non-violent mass demonstration 
similar to the Montgomery boycot·t and so when he was asked by the 
new organisation he had helped found, S.N.c.c., for assistance in 
their campaign in Albany, Ga., he readily accepted. In Albany, 
King was able to test what was essentially a new strategy, one 
forced upon him by the powerful thrust from the momentum being 
gained by the civil rights movement.. Rather than focusing on a 
single issue, such as bus desegregation, he and the S.N.c.c. leaders, 
decided to make multiple demands towards racial and economic justice,. 
On his first night in .8lbany, King was arrested with 250 other 
demonstrators for parading without a permit. A truce was declared 
for negotiations which eventually yielded little. The campaign 
began anew with a boycott of department stores and a bus boycott .. 
King and Ralph Abernathy (his second in command) returned to jail 
after tl1eir trial, but the city, having learned the lesson that 
Martin Luther King in jail was bad publicity for them and a source 
of strength to the movement, released them, saying their fines had 
. been paid anonymously .. 
Through a series of mistakes by the organizers and astute moves 
by the city, the A<lbany campaig;n fizzled out. When swimming. pools 
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and libraries were targets for desegregation campaigning, they 
were simply closed down& When protest marches were organized, 
?.olice Chief Pritchett quietly arrested all the participants. No 
great national interest was aroused, and local liberal sympathy 
and interest was lost when a riot broke out between police and 
black youths .. 
The campaign failed for several reasons. The Albany Movement 
was still disorganised when they called on King to help. The 
S.N.c.c. and SoC.L.c. forces disagreed over tactics, and some 
students resented the attention King received after they had done 
the preparation work. King could not devote all his time to the 
campaign and had to leave on several occasions to keep speaking and 
fund raising engagements elsewhere. Consequently, he was unable 
to use his powers of persuasion to encourage unity between the 
different g:r:oups. This discord among thf.~ organizers meant the 
basic premise of a firm strategy was missing and the campaign was 
run on an .~d ,hoc and inspirational basis. The boycott of stores 
had failed because of another basic mistake; the s.c.L.C. strategists 
appeared not to have checked what proportion of white business trade 
\vas held by blacks. In fact, the general poverty of the blacks 
blunted their buying power, so a boycott did not seriously affect 
the shop owners. However, King and his colleagues were to learn 
from these mistakes. 
The most prominent of the lessons learned by the s.c.L.c .. 
was that the strategy of non-violent persuasion, which focused on 
changing the hearts and minds of their opponents, was unrealistic and 
ineffective. Only after the Albany campaign did King realize that 
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greater pressure would be necessary to achieve any progress. Instead 
of attempting to convince local \vhites of the error of their ways, 
they would now attempt to make the federal government impose 
progressive change. King concluded that effective change in this 
field could only be brought about by federal legislation. By 
showing the nation through the news media the brutality that blacks 
in the South could, and often did, suffer in a society dominated 
by racial segregation, national public support for federal legislation 
could be gained. 
Albany had showed that the device of bringing pressure by flooding 
jails with prisoners required careful preparation and timing. They 
now knew that every demonstration had to have a core of trained, 
disciplined participan·ts ·to serve as highly visible examples for 
those volunteers without any training or experience.. King realised 
that, in order to gain :national attention, peaceful opponents such. 
as Chief Pritchett were not effective .. In Birmingham, Ala.the 
I 
I 
I 
I public safety commissioner Eugene "Bull" Conner was a well-known 
I 
I ' 
segregationist and had a reputation for violence towards blacks. 
The assistant Attorney-General, Burke Marshall, tried in vain to 
persuade King to postpone demonstrations until after the coming 
election when Conner was expected to lose to a moderate. This 
refusal to wai·t for a more moderate opponent illustrates that King 
wanted confrontation. While still advocating non-violence, he had 
realised ·that wi·thout an overreaction from the local authorities, 
blac'J<:. protest would not receive the national media attention it 
needed to convince the government to act. 
The So.C .. L .. c .. spent several months exploring and analysing the· 
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Birmingham situation before they moved in. They gained. a sounder 
base than in Albany from a well-established local organization, 
the Rev. Shuttleworth's "Alabama Christian Movement for Civil Rights" .. 
King had acknowledged that the Albany campaign had suffered from not 
being specific in its aims, so for this campaign they aimed at 
desegregation of commercial establishments and public facilities and 
ignored areas of high resistance such as schools. Beginning in 
April 1963 with sit-ins, the jails were soon flooded, but the police 
acted with restraint. When King defied a local court injunction 
agai_nst further demonstrations, he was jailed and held in solitary 
confinement$ King's treatment in jail improved rapidly when Robert 
Kennedy, now Attorney-General, personally intervened. President 
Kennedy also telephoned Mrs. King, to reassure her that her husband 
was safe. On this occasion there was no suggestion of ulterior 
motives. It was during this period in jail that K~ng wrote his 
famous Letter From a Birmingham Jail (l) in reply to criticisms of 
his actions from eight local white clergy. 
Up to this point, there was some progress in behind the scenes 
negotiation, but no agreement had resulted.. It was a low point in the 
campaign and Wyatt Walker of s.c .. L.C .. pointed out that, "We've got 
to have a crisis to bargain with". 7 A children's crusade was 
organized and when six thousand children marched on May 2nd, nearly 
one thousand were arrested. The next day the organi,zers got their 
sought after confrontation when Conner used dogs, nightsticks and 
fire hoses to repulse the marchers, rather than arrest them. 
(1) Martin Luther King, Jr .. Why We Can't Wait ·(1964, Signet, 
New York) pages 76-95. 
Highly 
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dramatic photographs and film showing brutal scenes were shown 
around America and the world. The administration sent Burke 
Marshall to negotiate, and cabinet members put pressure on 
business associates to pressure their counterparts in Alabama. 
On May lOth, an agreement was reached with the city authorities, 
desegregating all facilities and pledging to hire blacks. 
In the established pattern, however, official capitulation 
to black demands was followed by unofficial resort to violence. 
There were a number of bombings and in the worst incident four 
black teenage girls were killed.. The movement had gained its 
dramatic victory and at the same time mobilized an immense 
number of previously uninvolved blacks. (l) There was also a 
cost.. After the Klan violence against their. leaders and churches 
many Negroes rioted, burning shops and fighting the police. 
This time the media's effect on public opinion worked, to an 
extent, against the movement and it had a profound result on 
some attitudes. It was the worst Negro violence ever seen in 
the South, despite the fact that casualty figures were lowv and 
damage restricted to a small area. As t\.vo Southern political 
scientists wrote later: 
"The passivity and non-violence of American Negroes 
could never again be taken for granted ••• The 'rules 
of the game' in race relations were permanently 
changed in Birmingham."8 
Some voting provisions had been included in the 1964 Civil 
(1) Figures from Harry S. Ashmore: Hearts and Minds .. The 
anatomy of racism from Roosevel·t to Reagan (1982, McGraw 
Hill, New York), states (on page 349) that an estimated 
1,117,600 Americans participated in 369 civil rights 
demonstrations in Birmingham in Spring 1963, 15,379 of wham 
were arrested and 389 injured, most af whom, in that area, 
would be unlikely to have been previously involved. 
35 
Rights Act, {discussed in the next Chapter) but civil rights 
leaders were st:ill unhappy with the situation and decided to 
mount another major campaign to secure the completely unimpeded 
right to vote for the Negro.. Selma, Ala., was chosen for three 
main reasons.S.N.c.c. had done a lot of ground work in the 
area in 1963 and 1964 and so there was an organizational base. 
The numbers of Negroes registered to vote were particularly 
scandalous in the county •. {l) But perhaps the most important 
reason was the local county sheriff, Jim Clark.. He was 
already known to S.N.c.c. as the Conner-type opponent they 
needed. To convince the federal government of the need for 
legislation, and to gain national support for their cause, 
they would need national exposure from the media and a reaction 
from Clark and his men that viewers would find much les.s. 
acceptable than the marches themselves. 
In January 1965, s.c.L.C. began a voter registration drive 
in Selma, Ala~ but no reaction was forthcoming. However, on 
the second march the sheriff assaulted a demonstrator without 
provocation, and media interest was assured. One thousand 
demonstrators, including King, had been arrested and jailed 
by the start of February. Most of them were released on bail,· 
but King and Abernathy stayed in jail for five days. This 
jailing was particularly significant., since it was only two 
wee]ts previously that King had received the Nobel Peace Prize. 
(1) 335 Negroes were registered as against 9,543 whites 
in a county where Negroes comprised 53% of the 
population. 
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In early March, a demonstration was launched that entailed 
a march to the State Capital, Montgomery .. In King's absence, 
the marchers were halted and dispersed, on the orders of 
George Wallace, by state troopers who used clubs and tear gas 
causing severe injuries. This proved to be the turning point 
of the campaign, and President Johnson was able to push a 
strong Voting Rights Act through Congress on a wave of public 
indignation. 
The Selma c·amp9-ign .was even more successful for the 
movement and their use of non-violence than in Birmingham. 
The Selma effort benefited from the clear articulation of a 
single easily understood goal. At Birmingham, the national 
audience was less clear about just what was being sought, and 
the several goals were seldom succintly defined by the 
leadership. Secondly,in Birmingham, some of the support for 
the marchers was lost when black frustrations overflowed into 
violence, almost counterbalancing the outrages against them on 
several occasions. However, in Selma there was no similar 
harmful black response to the violence against them and they 
were clearly seen to be the victims~ Another factor that. 
ensured gr:eater national sympathy than in Birmingham occurred 
when a white minister, who was in Selma to support the march, 
was beaten to death by white attackers. A white death always 
attracted greater media attention and national outrage than 
a black fatality, and this was seen to be the case when President 
Johnson lamented the death of the minister in his speech to 
Congress, but neglected to mention the death of a young black 
marcher., 
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The success of non-violence in the 1955-65 period 
contrasts with its ineffectiveness when introduced by C~O~RoEe 
in the 1940's. Several factors seem to be responsible. Until 
1955, the major channel of grievance for Negroes was the 
N.A.A.c.P. and, through it, the courts. However, after the 
1954 "Brown" decision, the legal approach had achieved its 
major goal. The Deep South blunted legal action by ignoring 
Supreme Court decisions, until the individual cases of defiance 
were challenged in court. Even after the segregationists 
lost, they were quick.to discover new procedures to accomplish 
old ends. 
The merit of non-violence in the new situation was that 
it encouraged participation and raised consciousnessQ even 
though Negroes were excluded .from the political process and, 
in effect, defea·ted in the legal one. In 1942, however, the 
N.A.A.C.P. was still making gains for the Negro and there 
was little suppo:rt for such a radical new group that seemed to 
be seeking confrontation, especially during the war, when it 
would have been considered unpatriotic. c.o.R.E. being 
Northern based, middle-class, and mainly white, at this time, 
had little or no chance of inspiring mass action. Other 
factors in the successful adoption of the tactic were Dr. King's 
personal qualities and his capacity to move an audience 
intellectually, morally and emotionally. 
Once adopted, non-violence gained popularity because it 
fulfilled several psychological needs of the Southern community~ 
It provided a constructive outlet for feelings of anger, 
frustration and resentment, that would otherwise be suppressed 
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or directed into violent acts. It gave a sense of worth and 
dignity to the participants, which stemmed from courageous 
and self-disciplined action in the cause of "freedom". 
Finally, it produced a sense of brotherhood between participants, 
often across race lines. For whites, it also allowed an 
expression of conscience and a relief of guilt. Most 
importantly though, it proved successful, especially when.used 
by Dr. King. He built dramatic confrontation in symbolic 
centres of oppression, which led to the type of harsh repression 
that produced publicity, and hence moral outrage, outside the 
South, leading in turn to political and legal intervention. 
When King first adopted non-violence, it is unlikely he 
envisaged the speed and scope o:f the success it would achieve .. 
The bus boycott began with very limited objectives, which did 
not even encompass .int:egration. Within a decade, .four civil 
rights acts had been passed and all Negroes were free to votee 
What then influenced I<ing • s choice of the non-violent direct 
action method over the alternatives? At tne time there '\vere 
four distinct ideologiesof black advancement. Some slaves, 
in their periodic uprisings, (such as Denmark Vesey in 1822 
and Nat Turner in 1831) (l) advocated small bands of armed 
militants rallying the black masses to attack white power with 
(1) Vesey's uprising was crushed in its infancy, although 
as many as 9,000 were estimated to be involvedo 
Turner's went further and they killed at least 60 
whites before over 115 Negroes were killed by troops. 
See, John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom 
(1967, A.A. Knopf, Toronto), pages 212-13. 
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guerilla warfare. ThE3Y hoped that the terrible violence 
and bloodletting that would result would compel whites to 
enforce social change. This idea was not considered by King 
and most blacks, since numerical facts in America dictated 
the total destruction of the Negro race if such a course were 
undertaken. The ideology of Booker T. Washington was that of 
accommodation{!), which stated that if Negroes were given 
the opportunity to-develop separately they might, by hard 
work, create viable social and economic enterprises. 
Washington believed this would lead to whites viewing Negroes 
more favourably. Garveyism rejected racial integration and 
called for the formation of a black culture \vhich might entail 
migration to Africa, or at least racial separation within 
America. Finally, ·the middle-class bl-acks who \-7ere members of 
th 1 A "' . b h E · (2) e ear y N ••. n .. C.P. or Ur an League, sue as w ... Bo DuBo~s , 
argued that they should use their education to put the·Negro 
case before society and inspire their fellow blacks to become 
educated. 
These doctrines of violence, rejection of Christian 
tradition and society, meek acceptance of injustice and the 
development of a social order valued by whites and individual 
(1) See August Meier.: Negro Thought in America 1880-1915. 
Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington, 
(1963, University of Michigan Press, Toronto) pp. 100-121. 
(2) DuBois, a founder member of the N.A.A.c.P. favoured 
leadership from the ranks of the college-educated elite, 
the "talented tenth". See Meier: op .. cit. pp., 190-208. 
For a fuller account see Elliott M. Rudwick: W.E .. DuBois 
Propagandist of the Negro Revolt (1969 0 Atheneum, New York) 
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confrontation by gifted blacks, \'Vhile leaving the large part 
of their race hehind1 were all rejected by King. It could he 
argued that he took . elements of the tactics of DuBois and 
Washington. King favoured the talented using their abilities 
to work for the whole race, hut would not consent to this 
method alone, since such elites might only serve themselves. 
He admired the hUt-nility and strength of Washington and saw 
in these some of the true Christian values. However, King's 
philosophy was unique rather than a combination of these 
other approaches. He combined the Christian ethic of love 
for your neighbour with the militance of Gandhian non-violent 
protest. He believed non-violence was a morally superior and 
practical philosophy \vhich had worked in Montgomery and would 
continue to work. 
As King grew with the movement, he saw that where he 
was once seen as a militant and extreme leader, he was 
increasingly considered to he a moderate, a respectable 
al·ternative to the bitterness and hatred of some black 
nationalists.. It suited him to cast himself as the liberal 
option; "I beg_an. thinking about. the fact that I stand in the 
middle of two-opposing forces in the Negro community. 119 
These forces were the complacent Negro, who accepted defeat 
and adjusted to segregation, the other was the "hate. and 
II 
despair of the Black Muslim.Malcolm X, near the end of life 
and wishing to be closer to the integrationist leaders, noted 
the pragmatism of this position and arrived at one of King•s 
campaigns prof:e.s:s:ing to des.i:r.~e a bloodbath.. He told Caretta 
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King that he was actually trying to make things easier for 
her husband; 11 If the white people realise what the alternative 
· h th '11 b "11" t h Ki" · .. J.o ~s, per aps ey w~ e more w~ ~ng o ear Dr. ng. 
As a result of this stance, King began to point more 
often to the radical alternative, a tactic described by less 
sympathetic observers as a threat. In his Birmingham Letter 
he wrote; 
11 If our white brothers dismiss ••• those of us who 
employ non-violent direct action ••• millions of 
Negroes will, out of frustration and despair, seek 
solace and security in black nationalist ideologies -
a development that would inevitably lead to a 
frightening racial nightmare." 11 
Speaking in New York in June 1963, he was more specific. 
f . 1 
12 1 th He oresaw "a season of terror and v:to ence" , un ess e 
Civil Rights Bill was acted upon.. In each black ghetto; 
"certain elementso ... will respond with violence 
if the people of the nation do not recognise the 
desparate plight of the Negro •••• The brutality 
they are experiencing as a result of their quest 
for equality may call for retaliation".12 
Within a year this predic·tion was fulfilled by the New York 
riots in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant.. King condenuned the 
conditions that caused the riots, rather than the participants, 
but his lack of influence in the North was illustrated when 
he was the target of eggs, thrown while he toured the riot 
areas. 
By the time he did move North to campaign, the people 
he was trying to recruit were no longer interested. Most 
ghetto blacks were thoroughly disillusioned by years of 
promises of "freedom now" wi·th no results. The popularity of 
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black nationalist ideas, and the souring effect of the 
race riots, had left the ground very hard for King to sow 
his seed of love and non-violence. King's success depended 
a great deal on his personal charisma, which itself was 
I 
boosted ·by success. This quality is extremely difficult to 
sustain and, in the North, where his earlier campaign had had 
no relevance to the position of the ghetto black, he had yet 
to prove himself. 
King's use of non-violence underwent a steady progression 
in the decade between Montgomery and Selma. His decision to 
start the Birmingham demonstrations before the city election, 
which was expected to remove 11 Bu1J~' Conner, is probably the 
most obvious evidence that the Albany experience had forced 
a change of his tactics. He knew a moderate might defuse the 
campaign· with civilit:y and he was coun't:ing on Conner's over-
reaction, and his own inevitable jailing to achieve victory. 
After Albany, civil rights had lost priority in Washington. 
King wrote, 11 The issue no longer conunanded the conscience 
of the nation1113 and he knew that a dramatic victory was needed 
to improve the declining fortunes of s.c.L.c. and the movement 
as a whole. 
During the campaign, King's Letter from a Birminqham 
Jail showed a distinct contrast of language with that he used 
after the Montgomery conflict. In Stride Towards Freedom, 
King said that his use of non-violence .. sought to win lth~ 
friendship and understandingrr 14 of his opponent.. In the 
Letter he says; 
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"Non-violent direct action seeks to create such a 
crisis and foster such a tension that a community 
which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced 
to confront the issue ••• The purpose of our direct 
action programme is to create a situation so crisis-
packed that it will eventually open the door.to 
negotiation."lS 
It can be established from the choice of Selma and the 
opponents that would be faced there, that the s.c.L.c. philosophy 
had, by this point, completely changed. It was no longer based 
on a moral commitment to non~violence or on a desire to change 
the hearts and minds of their opponents through redemptive 
suffering.. It was now based on the pragmatic knowledge that 
non-violence, coupled with violent opponents, would best serve 
the movement in gaining national support. 
Non-violence had become more the technique of duragraha 
than the moral commitment of satyagraha. This change is 
reflected to a limited extent in King's own words. Implicit 
in some statements is the declaration that action by their 
opponents, that would offend the national audience, was a 
necessity if the movement was to successfully initiate federal 
legislation. However, it was very important that the movement 
was not seen to be provoking violent reaction, since this vould 
lose most or all of the public sympathy they had gained. King 
said: 
"'.rhe goal of the demonstrations in Selma, as else-
where is to dramatize the existence of injustice and 
to bring about the presence o:f justice by methods of 
non-violence. Long years of experience indicate 
to us that Negroes can achieve this goal when four 
things occuro 11 First, "non-violent demonstrators 
go into the streets to exercise their constitutional 
rights." Second, "racists resist by releasing violence 
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against them. 11 Third, 11Americans of conscience, 
in the name of decency, demand federal intervention 
and legislation." Fourth and last, "the administration 
under mass pressure initiates measures of immediate 
intervention and remedial legislation ... 16 
This revealing statement admits that racist violence is crucial 
to the movement • s progress and vievling of it by the national 
audience is necessary, if any effective government action is 
to result from the confrontation. This interpretation was 
confirmed by Andrew Young When he said, 11 In the past, the 
movement has been sustained more or less by violence".17 
King omits to mention the role of the news media in 
bringing this violence to national attention, possibly because 
it might lay him open to the charge that he was seeking to 
manipulate the media. This would ro~ke him appear considerably 
more calculating than he would wish and would seem inconsistent 
with the religious and moral themes he aspired to. Is this a 
fair charge? Television focuses on news, partie ularly, events 
that: are thought provoking or exciting. Any outbreak of violence, 
therefore, receives far more coverage than would a small peace-
ful protest for the vote or integrated education. When King led 
a protest he received media attention, but gained more coverage 
whenhe, or his followers, were attacked. King did not invent 
this television focus on violence, nor did he ever encourage 
violence. He did, however, realise its value to his cause and 
for this reason led his forces into the areas where their 
peaceful demonstrations would provoke the most extreme reactbn. 
King could use the crudity of the Southern response and be sure 
the media would highlight it and gain him support, while 
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earning the Southern segregationist condemnation from the 
North and the World. 
Selma represented the end of the movement's successful 
employment of non-violent direct action. Due, in part, to the 
growing conflicts·within the movement itself, the ending of 
the large non-violent campaign phase was more the result of 
policy changes. While King and the S. C .. L .c. had become very 
successful at employing non-violence to win national popular 
support and political support for the legislative goals, it 
was not a strategy that could be used to pursue every policy 
goal. The national audience could be moved to support 
constitutional rights, such as the vote and equal access to 
public facilities, but when the same tactics were applied to 
the issue of open housing in the North, there was little 
widespread support from the President, Congress or the public. 
By the time King came to launch his Chicago campaign, he 
had completely alienated Presiden·t Johnson. After Selma, King 
had begun ·to speak out publicly against the Vietnam War, and 
Johnson angrily cut off all White House contact with him. The 
mass marches and Cbmonstrations that ""ere mounted in Chicago 
never achieved the numbers necessary to force the Daley political 
machine to really act. The only march that did meet violence 
was protected by the police and not attacked by them as in 
Birmingham and Selma. Violent whites outnumbered black 
demonstrators by five to one and only police intervention 
prevented any marchers from being killed~ The national audience 
was not sympa·thetic to demands that blacks be allowed to move 
into their neighbourhoods, and the Congress showed its mood 
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by killing the 1966 Civil Rights Bill. 
After Selma, the method of non-violence, even in the use 
that had been developed for it in the early 1960's, declined 
in effectiveness and disappeared altogether. There were several 
reasons for this. The "easy" victories were won and the stark 
injustices of segregation were done away with. The targets for 
further advances now applied to the whole nation; open 
housing, fair employment and poverty. The demands had moved 
from those that produced public disquiet (desegregat:ion of public 
facilities and the vote) to those requiring economic sacrifice 
(paying higher taxes to eliminate slums, provide a good 
educ.ation and jobs) .. The large unaffected spectator group 
to whom the movement could appeal without asking for personal 
sacrifice was lost and \vith it their leverage with government. 
The opposition faced by the movement in the North was 
more sophisticated than in the . South. They had learned that 
.suppression was counterproductive and protection for the 
marches worked better than brutal clubbings. Token concessions 
were used, as in Chicago by Major Daley, that made injustice 
less apparent and more difficult to dramatize. The Negroes 
themselves in the North were different to those the movement 
had previously worked for and with. The Negro in the ghetto 
was more hostile, less religious and less willing to accept 
non-violence than his Southern counterpart. Northern Negroes 
had watched the movement for years, but felt few of its 
benefits, and locked in the ghetto, were more frustrated and 
bitter and, therefore, less receptive to non-violence. 
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The war in Vietnam had drawn much energy and support 
away from Civil rights and it divided the attention of those 
that remained. S.N.c.c. had received much of its support 
from white students, who nmv turned their attention to the 
war, leaving the group without a large section of its workt1:r.s. 
When King came out in favour of withdrawal of American troops, 
it alienated not only the President, but also many citizens 
who still thought that view unpatriotic. 
Lastly, the growing split between the younger organizations 
S-.N .c .c. and c .o .R.E. and the older organizations, the Urban 
League and the N.A.c.c.P. with the s.c.L.c. in. the middle, 
sapped what power a non-violent campaign might still have 
mastered. S.N.c.c. and c.o.R.Eo had been constantly in the 
front line of the struggle in the 1960's and most of their 
members had become disillusioned with non-violence and 
incessant beatings. The pace of Negro advancement remained too 
slow for many of their young activists, who turned their groups' 
emphasis from black supplication to Black Power. 
Although Ma.t·tin Luther King adapted and developed his 
philosophy of non-violence to meet the situations he was faced 
with, the effectiveness of the strategy experienced diminishing 
returns. Before this happened, he achieved a great deal making 
huge "strides towards freedom". However, when a further chan:ge 
of tactics became necessary, he was trapped by his inability 
to further adapt his leadership to a Northern struggle. He 
could not suddenly organise a "revolution on poverty", 18 
which is what he claimed was necessary for the next stage of 
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the struggle. That would have required a new type of 
organization with new aims and new methods and there is no 
evidence that he had any such plans at the time of his 
assassination. The time and mood of the country for this 
type of campaign was gone and with it King's effectiveness. 
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Chapter Three 
The Politics of Civil Rights Legislation 
This chapter is concerned with the politics of civil 
rights legislation up until 1965. This involves an· analysis 
of the procedures behind the bills in Congress, the role and 
attitude of the Executive and the significance of the final 
acts. The Chapter will thus complement the previous analysis 
of King's career and his attempts to achieve a legislative 
solution .. 
The first successful action on civil rights, however, 
came not from Congress, but from the judiciary. In September 
1953, President Eisenhower chose Earl Warren, Governor of 
California, to be the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
The Warren Court (1953-68) was to become one of the most 
controversial in Supreme Court history. Although Chief Justice 
Hughes, Stone and Vinson had already set precedents(!) for the 
erosion of the legal bases of segregation especially in 
(1) In Missouri ex rel Gaines vs Canada 305 u.s. 337 (1948) 
the Supreme Court invalidated the State practice of 
excluding blacks from law school and offered instead to 
pay for attendance at an out-of-state law school. 
In Sipuel vs Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma 322 u.s. 631 (1948) it was ruled that a state 
xnay not deny admission to its law school on the basis 
of race. 
In McLaurin vs Oklahoma State Regents 339 u.s. 637 (1950) 
it was decided that having admitted a black to its law 
school a state cannot deny him equal use of all its 
facilities. 
Sweatt vs Painter 339 u.s. 629 ruled that a state could 
not bar admission of a black to a state law school on 
the grounds that there was a black law school available. 
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education, the approach had been to tighten the standard of 
equality within the "seperate but equal" doctrine. (l) It 
was the Brown decision ·that gave civil rights· such ·\: 
a boost by finally rejecting that doctrine, and the fact that 
Earl Warren was able to deliver a unanimous decision emphasized 
its importance. This case was the first of a series of 
decisions defending many minority rights and civil liberties. 
Indeed, the Warren Court has been described as "having rushed 
to achieve an ideal of greater social, political and procedural 
fairness ... 1 ·It was the Brown decision, however, that marked 
the beginning of a new phase of black politics. The N.A.A.c.P. 
had achieved its goal of judicial recognition of the inequality 
of the Negro position in society. This left the way open for 
renewed black activism to emerge, to force corrective legis-
lation from the Administration and Congress. 
In the wake of the Brown decision came the Southern 
reaction,which threatened to halt desegregation altogether. 
The White Citizens Council( 2) inspired a campaign of violence 
which increased after the successful Montgomery bus boycott. 
When, in February 1956, the University of Alabama enrolled a 
Negro student, Autherine Lucy, under federal court order, 
(1) First established in Plessy vs Ferguson 163 u.s. 537 
(1896) 
(2) Formed in July 1954 in Hississippi, as a grassroots 
organization to thwart implementation of school 
integration. By the second Brown decision, membership 
was 250,000. Many local groups retaliated against 
blacks active in desegregation efforts, by denying 
them credit or employment. 
52 
protests were so violent that the authorities suspended her 
2 11 for the safety of the students 11 • Later the trustees used 
the pretext that Lucy had made derogatory statements about 
the university to expel her permanently. The Administration 
declined to intervene. In September 1957, Governor Faubus 
of Arkansas used national guardsmen to prevent the entry of 
black students to Little Rock High School, in defiance of a 
federal court injunction. President Eisenhower reluctantly 
dispatched federal troops to the South, to ensure compliance 
with the federal order and provide protection for the Negro 
students .. 
It was with this background of increasing racial tension 
that the Eisenhower administration decided to sponsor new 
legislation on civil rights. Eisenhower's reticence is 
recorded in several studies, (l) but events persuaded him he 
had no alternative, other than to press for legislation that 
would, in some measure at least, meet the demands of Negroes 
and their Northern sympathizers. Attorney-General Herbert 
Brm,mwell was eager to act on the issue, but President 
Eisenhower had previously witheld his consent. When the 
President suffered a ~eart attack in September 1955, his 
Cabinet carried on the business of the Administration and 
(1) Foster Rhea Dulles, The Civil Rights Commission 1957-65 
(1968, Michigan State Univ. Press, Michigan), pp 11-15 
and 96-7; J .w. Anderson, Eisenhrn'ler, Brownwell and the . 
Congress (1964, Univ. of Alaba;::a Press, Alabama), pp 1-6, 
39 and 60-61; Anthony Lewis, ~~e Second American Revolution 
(1966, Faber and Faber, London) pp. 110-15. 
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ordered Brownwell to proceed with the preparation of a Civil 
Rights Bill under his own name, allowing Eisenhower to remain 
detached from the project. This decision was ratified, and 
the President referred briefly to a forthcoming programme in 
the field of civil rights in his 1956 State of the Union message. 
When the Justice Department presented the Bill in April. 
1956 for approval, the White House denied clearance for the 
general civil rights and voting rights sections. This meant 
dropping of all enforcement authority and only allowed for the 
creation of a Civil Rights Commission and the authorization of 
a new Assistant Attorney-General, with power over a new Civil 
Rights Division in the Justice Department. Brownwell took the 
extraordinary step of getting a Congressman to formally request 
the stronger draft: in Congress, so he could introduce the whole 
Bill against the President•s wishes. (l) 
This stronger Bill passed the House and arrived in the 
Senate in June 1957. There, the Republicans, with the support 
of liberal Democrats, managed to by-pass committee consideration 
and put the measure directly on the calendar, in order to save 
it f~rn death in the Southern-dominated Judiciary Committeeo 
Despite talk of a filibuster, this bipartisan coalition, with 
the support of the majority leader, Lyndon Johnson and the 
minority leader, William Knowland, steered the Bill to a position 
(1) For further reference on this manoeuvre, see 
Anderson, op.cit. 
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of compromise. Part three of the Bill, which sought power 
for the Justice Department to sue on behalf of any civil 
right, including desegregated schools, was dropped. Johnson 
persuaded southerners that the civil rights legislation was 
necessary and inevitable, andstanding against a moderate Bill 
demanding the vote, the least arguable right of citizenship, 
could only be self-defeating. Southern Democrats accepted the 
measure with an amendment requiring jury trials in voting 
rights cases, believing local juries would be less progressive 
than federal judges. This compormise Bill passed the Senate 
in August 1957, to become the first Civil Rights Act to get 
through Congress since 1875. 
The authorization given to the Attorney-General meant 
that the regaining of voting rights was no longer dependent 
on individual actions, usually brought at great physical and 
economic risk. The United States Commission on Civil Rights 
was given the responsibility of investigating and reporting 
on those procedures and devices used by jurisdictions to 
racially discriminate. However, the Act only allowed specific 
persons, and not states, to be prosecuted for violations and 
this, plus its application by the Justice Department 11 With all 
3 deliberate lethargy .. , rendered the Act largely ineffective. 
The Senate held up confirmation of the first head of the new 
civil Rights Division for six months. The :D.ivision acted 
slowly, and until the appointment of William P. Rodgers as 
Attorney-General, in January 1960, it brought only three cases 
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before the courts, and not a single Negro previously 
unregistered was enabled to do so, by federal action, in the 
period. 
Despite considerable activity by the new Civil Rights 
Commission, the 1957 statute proved to be of only marginal 
value. The Southern Democrats saw. the Act as a success. As 
Georgia Senator Richard Russell said, the ability "to confine 
the federal invasion of the South to the field of voting and 
keep the withering hand of the Federal Government out of our 
schools", was his 11 sweetest victory"4 in twenty-five years 
as a Senator. Nevertheless, the Act had proved a Civil Rights 
measure could pass the House and it brought the matter further 
into the public spo;tlight .. 
Pressure rose steadily from liberal Congressmen and 
civil rights groups to enact new legislation to strengthen the 
weak provisions of the 1957 Act, especially when the date for 
renewal or expiry of the Commission on Civil Rights fell due. 
The Administration came to accept the need for further action, 
and in January 1959, Eisenhower again used the State of the 
Union message to announce that civil rights proposals would be 
sent to Congress. In February, he recommended enactment of a 
seven.point programme, but did not include part III of the 
1957 Act, which Congress had then dropped. J;t would have 
allowed the Attorney-General to act on his own initiative to 
seek injunctive relief in the federal courts whenever an 
individual's rights were violatede Lyndon Johnson also 
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introduced a Bill, as leader of the Democrats in the Senate, 
but this too omit·ted Part III. Senator Douglas of Illinois 
attacked Johnson for not dealing directly with school 
desegregation, and joining with fifteen other Senators, 
sponsored a third bipartisan Bill including Part III. These 
Bills became tied up in various committees in Congress and 
in September 1959, Lyndon Johnson· and Everett Dirka$n (the 
new Minority Leader) reached an agreement that the Civil 
Rights Bill would be considered at the start of the new session 
of Congress. A rider was added, on the eve of adjournment, to 
an Appropriations Bill, to provide for the extension of the 
Civil Rights Commission for another two years. 
As agreed, the batt:le on both sides of Congress began 
again over civil rights legislation in February 1960. There 
were ·three major blocs in:volved in the political infighting; 
moderates, who supported the relatively mild Bill the 
Eisenhower Administration sponsored, a bipartisan group of 
liberal Northerners, who urged a far stronger measure, and 
Southerners, who opposed any new la~·T at all. The Administration 
Bill contained four main ·titles; the first made it a federal 
crime to obstruct or interfere with any court order related to 
school desegregation; the second provided penalties for the 
perpetrators of the burning or bombing of a building who 
crossed state lines; on voting, it called for the preservation 
of all registration records for twenty-two months and provided 
. for court-appointed referees to hel? Negroes register.. Their 
57 
appointment was dependent on civil suits and court injunctions, 
rather than investigation by the Commission and so still 
necessitated the long process of litigation. 
As in 1957, the House passed the Bill speedily, but it 
met stiff opposition in the Senate. The South fought a delaying 
action with tactics easier applied in the Senate; weakening 
amendments and temporary filibusters. New records were set, 
as Senator Keating said,"in the unrolling of the long, long, 
carpet of verbiage", adding in reference to the Southerners, 
11 If they are speaking for posterity, we need only continue a 
little longer and posterity will be in the galleries listening 
5 to us". On April 8th, after several weakening amendments had 
been added, the Bill was passed and signed in-to law on May 6th 
1960 by President Eisenhower. 
Many commentators saw this Act as another victory for the 
Southern segregationists. The provisions authorized the 
Attorney-General to investigate violations of voting rights 
and provided for optional appointment of a voting referee by 
the judge, following proof of systematic denial of rights .. 
The referee would then re-examine all rejected voter applicants 
and recommend to the judge the registration of those he found 
qualified to vote. The Act also made a state a party to any 
proceedings brought by the Attorney-General to enforce voting 
rights. Although it was expected that the use of voting 
referees would be the most effective provision, in many 
instances, the judges in Southern courts declined to appoint 
them~ Consequently, the most significant innovation was the 
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power given to the Attorney-General to seek relief for a 
group, rather than pursue each.case individually. However, 
the Negro still experienced delays where large numbers were 
concerned, since investigation and litigation still had to be 
conducted separately in each district. Despite the vigour of 
William Rodgers in the last three months of the Eisenhower 
Administration, in all only ten cases were brought in three 
years. In the next three years,with the appointment of Robert 
Kennedy as Attorney-General and Burke Marshall as assistant 
Attorney-General,voting rights cases were more aggressively 
prosecuted, and fifty-seven cases were filed. 6 
Despite the willingness· of the Justice Department in the 
new Kennedy Administration, long delays in registration were 
caused "by difficulties in obtaining access to registration 
records, in proof of economic retaliation against potential 
registrants, and by the obstructive attitude of federal district 
court judges. This raises the question of Kennedy's judicial 
appointments, which were particularly important since he had 
an unusually large number to make as a result of new legislation. 
Kennedy followed tradition in deferring to his party•s Senators 
on district court appointments. The Justice Department tried 
to gauge future judicial behaviour by personal interviews and 
consultation with civil rights groups, but in several cases 
candidates so endorsed, later showed themselves to be 
t . . t (1) segrega ~on~s s. Kennedy did appoint more integrationists 
(1) In Alabama, Clarence Allgood, although endorsed by civil 
rights groups, was a segregationist.. The same was true 
of appointees J. Robert Elliott and William Harold Cox. 
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in the South than Eisenhower, but they were concentrated 
outside the Deep South. Despite this, to an administration 
intent on enforcing civil rights to the limit and channelling 
protest into the courts, the choices made were little short of 
disastrous.. Although Kennedy was restricted in his appoint-
ments by the tradition of Senatorial courtesy, if he was to 
have any chance of co-operation in his legislative prograrrune, 
this part of.his civil rights record has remained the greatest 
point of criticism. {l) 
Early in his administration President Kennedy made the 
decision to forego the attempt to pass civil rights legislation 
for some time. Although he enjoyed Democratic majorities in 
both houses of Congress, they had been reduced from those of 
1958. Due mainly to the seniority system, the power of the 
(2) Southern politicians exceeded their numerical strength. 
The fear was that if this powerful group were angered early 
in the term by a prob:a.cted battle for further civil rights 
·legislation, they would block other domestic legislation that 
(1) For an assessment of Kennedy's liberalism seei B. Miroff, 
Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. 
Kennedy (1976, McKay~ New York); Robert J. Williams & 
David A. Kershaw, 'Kennedy and Congress~- 'The .. struggle for 
the New Frontier: in Political Studies Vol.27, No. 3, 
September l979i and John Hart, 'Assessing Presidential 
J_,eadership: A comment on Williams· & Kershaw• in Political 
Studies Vol. 28, No. 4, December 1980. 
{2) For example, in the 88th Congress {1962) the House had 
257 Democrats and 178 Republicans. The Senate had 67 
Democrats and 33 Republicans. From the 11 Confederate 
States there were 22 Senators and 105 Representatives 
(all Democrats except 6 Representatives and 1 Senator). 
In the Senate"'9 of ·the ·'f:.;t6 standing corrunittees were 
chaired by Southerners. 7 
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Kennedy was· keen to see pass, legislation that would also 
help the Negro, especially minimum wages and housing Bills. 
Any Civil Rights Bill would face long debate and probably a 
filibuster, and Kennedy was worried that this, and the 
probable defeat of the Bill, would heighten Negro resentment 
and drive the civil rights movement to more drastic action. 
He, therefore, attempted to improve the Negro position by 
Executive, rather than legislative,action. 
Kennedy attempted to change the tone of government toward 
racial discrimination through an employment policy towards 
blacks, rhetoric, and a general awareness of black aspirations, 
with a new accessibility of his office to black groups. In 
contrast to Eisenhower's silence, President Kennedy, in his 
first year of office, endorsed school desegregation, publicly 
congratulating several cities on successful desegrega·tion 
and participated in ceremonies making corporate pledges to end 
discrimination voluntarily.. He chose a large number of Negroes 
for high level appointment and established by Executive order 
the President's Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity 
(P.C.E.E.O .. ), by combining two existing, but largely ineffectual 
committees. As a result of administration pressure, the Civil 
Service Corrunission began a special recruiting .Programme at 
Negro colleges and universities. A committee to investigate 
discrimination in the military was established, and an example 
set by increasing Negro numbers in the ceremonial guard in 
Washington. In retrospect, many of these moves may appear as 
tokenism" but at the time they marked a sharp change in 
Presidential policy and \vere received by blacks as positive, 
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if limited, improvements. 
I 1947 S C t d ' ' (l) h d t d C 0 R E n , a upreme our ec;I..S:Lon a promp e • • • • 
members to test segregation on interstate travel. A further 
decision in 1960( 2), extending desegregation to terminal 
facilities, was followed in 1961 by the c.o.R .. E.-led 11 Freedom· 
Rides ... Serious violence occurred, and in one incident 
; 
Robert Kennedy's assistant, John Seigenthaler, was attacked 
and needed hospital treatment. When the Governor of Alabama, 
John Patterson, refused to call out.the.National Guard, 
Robert Kennedy dispatched nearly seven hundred marshalls to 
preserve civil peace. They were soon needed to·hold back 
an attack by a white mob on King's Montgomery Church, where a 
Freedom Riders'meeting was taking place. Finally, Governor 
Patterson called up the National Guard who were able to restore 
order, and the marshalls withdrew. Freedom Rides continued, 
but due to Kennedy's intervention, they were protected by 
local authorities until they got to Jackson, Miss., where 
they were arrested for minor offences, such as disturbing the 
peace. I<ennedy concurred with this a nee his primary concern 
was for their safety. In~tead of intervening in any arrests, 
he tried to end the discrimination. In late September, the 
Interstate commerce commission ruled as Kennedy asked and 
issued an order banning segregation in terminal facilities 
immediately. 
(1) Morgan vs commonwealth of Virginia 328 u.s. 373 (1946) · 
(2) Boynton vs Virginia 364 u.s. 454 (1960) 
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· The contrast in approach, between the Kennedy and 
Eisenhower Administrations, is striking. In the Autherine 
. 
Lucy case of 1956, the federal government had, in effect 
allowed mob rule to prevail over a court order. The Justice 
Department in 1961 was determined this should not happen in 
the case of the Freedom Riders and so intervened in the South. 
When Eisenhower did use federal force at Little Rock in 1957, 
he used rifle-carrying troops, which were reminiscent to many 
Southerners of an occupying army and Recons·truct:ion. President 
Kennedy, through his brother, had sent u.s. Marshalls, unarmed 
and wearing suits, who aroused little local antagonism in 
comparison. An opinion poll at.the time shaved most Southerners 
thought Kennedy had done the right thing in sending marshalls. 
A survey in 1957 had shown an opposite opinion of Eisenhower's 
. ( 1) 
troop deployment. I<ennedy' s action did point the way to 
the future policy of the Administration over the protection 
of civil rights workers. Force had been used as a last resort, 
using civilian marshalls, rather than military troops, and 
then only when local authorities had abdicated their responsib-
ility to uphold o:r·der. As soon as Governor Patterson assumed 
responsibility for maintaining order by mobilizing the National 
Guard, the marshalls were withdrawn. 
(1) Figures from a Gallup Poll asking whether I<ennedy' s action 
was right or wrong. In the South the figures were 50% 
right, 29% wrong, and 21% no opinion. The comparable 
percentages for Eisenhower's action had been 36% right, 
53% wrong, 11% no opinion. Nationally 70% approved of 
Kennedy's action and only 13% disapproved. 8 
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After the sit-ins and Freedom Rides, it became clear 
that with activists on the streets, violence was more likely 
to occur which might necessitate further federal intervention. 
Consequently, the Justice Department encouraged civil rights 
leaders to launch a large-scale voter registration project 
Some of the young activists suspected this was a policy 
aimed at limiting their militancy, and a heated debate began 
between the direct action and voter registration wings. Soon, 
however, S.N .. c.c. decided to join and chose to work in the 
most dangerous areas, in Mississippi and Georgia. The earlier 
argument was adjourned when it became clear that voter 
registration was direct ac·tion in such a hostile setting .. In 
January 1962, the "Voter Education Project11 (V.E.P.,) was 
announced; educa·tion, because contributions to an educational 
activity, collecting information on registration problems, \vere 
tax-exempt. Several large foundations funded the Project, and 
by January 1964, it had distributed $580,000 to national and 
local groups working on registration. 
Continuing its emphasis on the vote, the Administration 
asked Congress in early 1962, to· prohibit the use of literacy 
tests in voter registration. The bill asked that a sixth 
grade education would be acceptable as presumptive proof of 
literacy and that all other tests be abolished. Despite the 
fact that the measure was limited {it only applied to federal 
elections) and it had bipartisan support (it was sponsored 
by both leaders in the Senate), the South prevented its passage 
with a filibuster. Two attempts were made to invoke cloture 
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without success, and the bill was dropped to allow other business 
to proceed. Later in the year, there was some compensation 
when congressional approval was gained for a constitutional 
amendment banning poll tax in federal elections. In January 
1964, this was approved by the states and became the 24th 
Amendment. This constitutional route was used,. because Southern 
Senators opposed all voting rights legislation on the grounds 
that the constitution reserved authority over voting qualifica-
tions for:j:he State legislatures .. · They had, therefore, no 
objection to trematter being put to the States in an amendment. 
Having deferred legislation, Kennedy has also limited the 
. '. . ' ( ~ ' 
extent of his Executive action to avoid opposition from Southern 
Congressmen. In the 1960 campaign, he had promised to issue 
an executive order prohibiting racial discrimination in 
federally assisted housing. He had refrained from fulfilling 
this promise in 1961, because it might have jeopardized his 
chances of winning a new Department of Urban Affairs from 
Congress. In November 1962, with the formation of the new 
department rejected by Congress, he issued the order covering 
public housing and direct federally guaranteed mortages. The 
scope of the order disappointed some civil rights leaders who 
had wanted other financial institutions (banks and building 
societies) included. The order had little impact on racial 
patterns in housing and it is doubtful whether broadening 
it in this way would have increased its effectiveness. The 
main barrier to black's mobility in the housing market was 
their low inc.ome and this could not be changed by executive 
fiat. Nevertheless, the order did represent another small 
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step towards equality and more importantly, it was the first 
use of federal power to encourage the principle of residential 
desegregation. 
Under increasing pressure from the civil rights movement 
and from liberals over lack of results, President Kennedy 
finally submitted a legislative programme on February 23rd 1963. 
The proposals were as follows: where voting suits were pending, 
federal referees could register voters in counties where. fewer 
than 15% of the eligible number aE persons of any race were 
registered; voting suits would be expedited by special district 
courts; tests of voter qualification would have to be applied 
uniformly; the sixth grade literacy proposal; federal assistance 
for schools implementing desegration; and extension of the life 
of the Civil Rights Commission for at least four years. 
These measures, which bvo years previously might have 
seemed radical, disappointed many civil rights leaders in 1963. 
They did nothing to speed up school desegration, to combat 
discrimination in housing and employment or to guarantee access 
to public accommodations.. Roy Wiikins called it "an admirable 
9 document 11 , but wished it had gone further. Liberal Republicans 
also noted its omissions.. The Bill was left to the Justice 
Department, who delayed its submission, possibly to g¢tQ\ge public 
opinion. By the end of March, it had not yet·been forwarded to 
Congress. By the time it was, it had been overtaken by events 
in Birmingham. This so focused world attention on the situation 
that in June, President Kennedy was able to submit a much extended 
Bill to Congress. 11 Birmingham had not only created the moo:l, bu·t 
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demonstrated the need, and public concern now made it a legislative 
possibility 11 • 10 To present this .revised bill Kennedy went on 
nationwide television and delivered one of the most eloquent, 
moving and important speeches of his life. He asked if the Negro 
could net enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, "then 
who among us would be content to have the colour of his skin 
changed and stand in his place? Who among us would then be 
11 
content with the counsels of patience and delay?" 
Kennedy asked for a number of new proposals in addition to 
the measures he requested in February. He proposed a broad 
law banning the segregation of all public facilities, and he 
sought authority for the At·l:orney-General to initiate proceedings 
against the segregation of schools. To help achieve voluntary 
acceptance of the public provisions of the Bill, he proposed the 
creation of the Community Relations Service and the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission. It was 11 the most comprehen-
sive Bill ever to receive serious consideration from the Congress 
• I 12 
of the Un~ted States'. 
The Administration knew enactment wou~only come after a 
long battle and consequently threw all its efforts behind the 
Bill= President Kennedy attempted to restrain the activities 
of the civil rights movement and also held a series of meetings 
at the White House, with many different interest groups and 
sections of people who would be most affected by the Act. He 
hoped by this latter move to establish a broad concensus in 
favour of his legisla·l:ion and to encourage voluntary steps to 
comba·l: discrimination. A succession of Administration officials 
67 
went before the committees to demonstrate support; the Secretary 
of State, Dean Rusk, the Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, and 
his assistants Burke Marshall and Nicholas Katzenbach, all 
testified. The Justice Department also privately lobbied those 
congressmen whose votes they hoped to gain~ 
Kennedy also took a personal interest in the planning of 
the "March on Washington ... He met with civil rights leaders 
in June and was told of the march proposals. When Kennedy 
became convinced that the march was essential to the civil 
rights leaders, so that they could keep control and harness 
·the energies of Negroes already 'bn the streets", he began 
organizing behind the scenes, to ensure it was an orderly and 
peaceful demonstration. On August 28th 1963, a quarter of a 
million protesters gathered in Washington D.c., one quarter 
of them white. The militant tone of some speeches, especially 
that of John Lewis of s.N.c.c .. , was moderated and Martin Luther 
King delivered the most famous speech of his life. 
"I have a dream, that one day this nation will 
rise up and live out the true meaning of its 
creed: •we hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal'. 
I have a dream that one day even the state of 
Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of 
oppression ••• will be transformed into an oasis 
of .freedom. When we allow freedom to ring • •.• we 
will be able to speed up that day when all God's 
children, black men: and white men, Jews and Gentiles, 
Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands 
together and sing in the words of that old Negro 
spiritual: 11 Free at Last~ Free at Last~ Thank God 
Almighty, we are free at last~" 13 
The march probably had ·no significant effect on the 
legislation in Congress, but it did create a favourable 
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impression of the civil rights movement, among the public. It 
had dramatically illustrated the commitment of black and white 
to the goal of equality. No bitterness had been exhibited by 
the blacks, and religion had played a major part in the 
proceedings. This suggested to the American public that when 
blacks were not being beaten for protesting, they could act 
responsibly and peacefully. However, this was the last time 
that blacks and white were to collaborate in the mass movement 
for racial justice. From this. time on, the struggle became 
increasingly under black leadership, and only rare and specific 
incidents, such as the violence at Selma, would encourage white 
support,, and then, in ever decreasing numbers .. 
In late October, a breakthrough was secured in the House 
when the Judiciary Committee approved a bipartisan compromise 
Bill. Meanwhile, . the Republican leader in the Senate 6 Everett 
Dirksen,, privately assured the administration that the Bill 
would come to a vote in the Senate. Then, on November 22nd 
1963, the nation was stunned by the assassination of President 
Kennedy. The shock felt around the world is well documented, 
but the effect on Negroes was generally even greater. Many 
blacks had idolized Kennedy and felt they had lost a close 
friend. The prospect of a white Southerner as President, only 
increased their feelings of trepidation about the future. 
Within ten days of assuming office, Johnson moved to 
dispel this fear by publicly committing himself to fulfilling 
Kennedy's civil rights programme. He called for an early 
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passage of the Bill as a memorial to the slain Presidente After 
a prolonged struggle, which included the successful invoking of 
cloture, the legislation was enacted.in July 1964. The Act 
was sweeping in its scope. It outlawed all discrimination in 
employment and enforced equal access to all public facilities. 
Federally assisted activities practising discrimination, were 
threatened with the loss of federal funds. The Community 
Relations Service and Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
were created, and the Civil Righ'ts Commission extended for four 
more years. 
In the area of voting, many of the same problems occurred 
as had been experienced with the 1957, and 1960 Acts. Much of 
the blame for this has been attributed to the way this 
legislation relied upon the judicial process for enforcement. 
The major provision of the 1960 Act, the referee clause, had 
gone virtually unused by the Courts. Only two referees were 
ever appointed and they recommended the registra·tion of no more 
than a few hundred new voters. After the 1964 Act., much larger 
gains were made than with previous legislation; in forty--six 
counti<i~:::, against which a total of seventy voting suits were 
brought, between 1957 and 1965, 37,146 new black voters were 
registered. However, as a percentage of the total possible 
this only represented 6.7%. In Mississippi as a whole, the 
percentage had only increased from 4 .4% to 6 .4% in 1954-64. 
These statistics tend to substantiate Chief Justice Warren 1 s 
opinion that the 1957, 1960 and 1964 Acts 11 have done little 
• • • I 14 h to cur.e the problem of voter d~scr~m~nation 1 .. T e 
\ 
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conclusion that the judicial approach to enforcement proved 
ineffective was unavoidable, as one commentator put it, 
11 eight years of litigation provided the most persuasive 
argument that adjudication and court-ordered enforcement 
t 1 ld • • • II 15 oo s cou not ensure extens~ve reg~strat1on • 
In Dallas County, Alabama, of which Selma is the seat, 
Negroes comprised 53% of the population, yet (in 1965) there 
were only 335 Negroes registered as opposed to 9,543 whites. 
On February 1st, Martin Luther King led a giant demonstration 
to the Selma courthouse and was one of 770 demonstrators 
arrested. The next day a further 550 were imprisoned. 
Released four days later, King immediately requested the 
Admi.nis·tration introduce a new and stronger vo·ting rights 
act into Congress.. On February 9th, he conferred with 
Vice-Px·esident Humphrey and Attorney General Katzenbach, and 
'\\7as given a firm assurance that a strong Act w:>uld be sent to 
16 Congress .. in the near :euture 11 • 
More marches occurred in Selma, and state troopers, 
sent by Governor George Wallace, and volunteer sheriffs 
recruited locally, stopped a further demonstration on March 
7th 1965, with particular brutality. The events were given 
nationwide coverage, shocking the country and prompting many 
mass demonstrations in sympathy. A few days later three white 
clergymen, in Selma for a further march, were attacked by 
whites and one died from multiple skull fractures. Fo~ days 
later, on March 15th 1965, President Johnson addressed Congress 
and delivered, what was later described as, the 11 most radical 
statement ever made by a President on civil rights 11 • 17 
71 
Johnson said: "Every device of which human ingenuity is 
capable has been used to deny" the right to vote. "It is 
wrong, deadly wrong, to deny any of your fellow Americans 
the right to vote in this.co.untry". Calling for, "no delay, 
no hestitation and no compromise", Johnson reminded the. 
legislators that "outside this chamber is the enraged 
. f . ,; 18 
consc1ence o a nat1on • After receiving two standing 
ovations, he concluded, "This c·ause must be our cause, 
too. Because it~ not just Negroes, but really all of us, 
who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and 
injustice. 19 And we shall overcome". 
The rush of attention which the bill received and 
the strenuous efforts of the Congress to pass it quickly, 
dif:Eered remarkably from previous civil rights legislation. 
The Bill passed the Senate wi·thin ten weeks of being sent 
up, after a vote of cloture ending further debate was easily 
passed with bipartisan agreement. A slightly different Bill 
was voted ·through the House seven weeks later. A conference 
committee was set up to resolve the differences, and by 
August 4th the Bill was approved and signed by the President 
in a television ceremony two days later. If the Act was not 
the direct result of the Selma demonstrations and the three 
deaths that accommpanied them 6 then the events there heavily 
influenced the production of the Act, ensuring only minimal 
delay and no weakening amendments. 
The Act marked a significant departure from earlier 
legislation, not only in the way it was passed, but also 
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because for the first time an administrative process aimed at 
eliminating voter discrimination was used, instead of the 
judicial process. The most important provision was section 
five, which required any state with a history of voting 
discrimination to "preclear" any changes in voting laws or 
procedures with the Justice Department •. The "political 
subdivision" has the responsibility of showing that the 
proposed change "does not have the purpose,and will not have 
the effect,of denying or abridging the right to vot~ on account 
20 
of race or colour. 11 To decide whether a jurisdiction should 
be subject to this, or't:overed", it must have employed a "test 
or device" in the 1964 elections and have had, either a voter 
registration of less than 50% of eligible citizens, or a 
voter turnout rate of less than 50%. Jurisdictions were 
eligible for release after a five-year period, during which 
they were required to preclear voting law changes and abolish 
the use of "tests and devices". This five year period was 
extend~d by the 1970 and 1975 amendments to the Act and·it was 
further extended in 1982. 
This formula originally included all of Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia, and 
counties in North Carolina, Idaho, Arizona, Alaska and Hawaii. 
Other sections authorized the Attorney General to send federal 
examiners to list voters for registration in any county from 
which he received twenty complaints of denial, or whenever he 
believed such action was necessary. The Act established 
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criminal offences for failure to register votes, intimidating 
voters, altering voting records, conspiring to interfere with 
voting rights or providing false registration information. The 
only provision that is temporal is the applicability of pre-
clearance and requirements to covered jurisdictions, and it 
was these which caused long debate in Congress in 1982. 
Although it passed with comparative ease, the Act still 
had many opponents.. When "tests and devices" were banned by 
the Act, South Carolina began a suit against the Attorney-General, 
challenging its constitutionality; South Carolina vs (1) Katzenhach d 
Chief Justice Warrendeclared .the act "an appropriate.means for 
carrying out Congress's constitutional responsibilities and 
21 
consistent with all other provisions of the const.itution" .. 
Although the states have "broad powers" to determine the condi·tione 
for exercising the vote, the 15th Amendment, addressed to Negro 
voting rights, "superceeds contrary exertions of state power" 
22 
·when discrimination is practised. Finally, there was 
successful voting rights legislation. This was demonstrated 
when, in less than a year, registration by blacks in Mississippi 
quadrupled. Today there are nearly fifteen times as many blacks 
registered as in 1964 and one out of four vote~is black. 
Although President Eisenhower's administration is credited 
\'lith t:he passage of the first civil rights legislation of the 
century he displayed little enthusiasm over its passage. He 
(1) 383 u.s. 301 (1966) 
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played a passive role in the two Acts passed in his second 
term and actively tried to limit the scope of the 1957 Act, 
although his Attorney General acted on his own initiative to 
prevent this. There is little doubt that part of the 
responsibility for the weakness of the 1960 Act is Eisenhower's. 
A liberal Bill, especially in the· field of civil rights, could 
not have passed without firm leadership from the President. 
·Eisenhower chose instead 11 equivocation and inaction, rather 
than resolute leadership11 • 23 It is true that even with his 
support, the outcome might have been little different, with 
Congress in the hands of conservative leadership, but without 
it, a strong Bill was doomed. 
Despite his half-hearted leadership in civil rights, many 
Negroes were grateful for his intervention at Little Rock, the 
appointment of Chief Jusi::ice Earl Warren, who was seen by many 
as the champion of black rights (although Eisenhower privately 
regretted the appointment) and the promise of civil rights 
legislation in 1957, sponsored by the administration. This was 
. :·:,.· , 
reflected in 1956, when 40% of the.Negro vote supported him 
for a second term. This was a dramatic increase over 
Eisenhower's showing in 1952, also ag~1st Adlai Stevenson, 
when he had only achieved 21% of the Negro vote. 
The Negro vote in 1960 played a large part in President 
Kennedy's victory. For example, Illinois was carried by 9,000 
votes, and 250,000 Negroes are estimated to have voted for him 
there. Similarly,in South Carolina, he won by 10,000 when an 
. 24 
estimated 40,000 Negroes voted for him. This was quite 
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probably due, at least in part, to Kennedy's phone call to 
Mrs King when her husband was in jail. Certainly his campaign 
capitalized on the incident, two million pamphlets were printed 
and distributed around the country describing the episode. So, 
elected with a mandate from the Negro population on·a strong 
civil rights platform (l), Kennedy had inspired great 
expectations for rapid progress among many American blacks. 
In 1962, however, Joseph Rauh( 2) said of Kennedy, 11 he got a 
'plus' when compared with Eisenhower, but a minus' when compared 
25 
with his own campaign promises ... 
Up to that point in his administration, Kennedy attempted 
to mollify the Southern Congressmen, partly because he was 
pessimistic about the chances of passing effec·tive legislation 
after the attempts in 1957 and 1960, and partly because he did 
not want to anger them over civil rights legislation or 
executive action, in case they might block his other legislative 
measures. An example of his concilatory attitude was over his 
appointment of dis·trict court judges in the South. In deference 
to Southern Senators he picked several segregationists .. 
Eisenhower, by contrast, as a Republican, had no.Southern 
Senators to propitiate, but still appointed several judges 
(1) 
(2) 
Kennedy promised desegregation of federally assisted 
housing "at the stroke of the Presidential pen".26 He 
also indicated he would use Executive leadership to 
eliminate discrimination in Government, Presidential 
leadership in Congress to fulfill the Democratic platform 
proposals and the moral and educational authority of his 
position to create understanding and tolerance. 
A Washington civil liberties lawyer and leading member 
of the "Americans for Democratic Action" group. 
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who were anti-civil rights. An analysis of judges named 
by the two Presidents in the Fifth Circuit, showed each was 
responsible for five segregationists, Eisenhower for eight 
moderates and Kennedy for three, Eisenhower for two integrat-
ionists and Kennedy for eight. (l} Despite this, his judicial 
appointees were a grave disappointment to black leaders and 
an obstruction to his own aims. 
Legislation was, therefore, dismissed as a possibility 
until February 1963, and there are several reasons why Kennedy 
chose this time to make his legislative drive. Schlesinger 
argues that, "the President, recognizing the discontent and 
perceiving a need for action if he were to preserve his control, 
had decided 'to seek legislation". 27 Since January 1961, the 
Kennedy administration had strongly influenced the direc·tion 
.of the civil rights movement.. The shift from Freedom Rides to 
voter registration had been suggested by Robert Kennedy. 
However, with the events at the University of Mississippi (2) 
and later in King's Birmingham campaign, the civil rights 
movement, and the reaction it aroused, had passed the admin·-
istration by. The situation was rapidly reaching. a crisis 
(1} Mary J. Curzan: "A Case Study in the Selection of Federal 
Judges in the Fifth Circuit 1953-63 11 , a Yale Ph.D. thesis 
discussed in Carl M. Brauer: John F. Kennedy and the 
Second Reconstruction (1977, Columbia Univ. Press, New 
York) pp. 123 and 340i and A~M. Schlesinger: Robert Kennedy 
and His Times (Andre Deutsch, London) pp. 333-34~ 
(2) Riots had occurred over the registration of James Meredith, 
under Supreme Court orders, the first Negro to attend 
the University of Mississippi. Twenty thousand troops 
were needed to restore order. 
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point, and President Kennedy felt that it was imperative that 
the Federal Government should intervene. 
A second reason for Kennedy's action might well have been 
his own perception of himself as a leader, and his deep 
conviction that equality must be fully upheld. He realized 
that the Civil Rights Bill could fail and might cost him the 
next election, but he felt it was the right decision(l) and 
he was "deeply and firmly committed to the cause of human 
. 1 . u 28 r~ghts as a mora necess~ty • It is probable, given 
K d I t , f th , d ( 2) enne y s percep ~on o e Pres~ ency, that he would have 
seen the mass action in Birmingham, on a scale previously 
unknown with thousands being arrested, and the brutality with 
which it \V'as met, as calling for decisive leadership and a. 
regaining of control over events by the Presidency. It was 
also, probably., a factor, that with the election of 1962 (3) 
Kennedy would have felt his personal mandate renewed and 
possibly felt more confident to pursue this legislative goal. 
(1) According to a quote of the President, in private conversa-
tion with Luther Hodges mentioned in Brauer: op .. cit. p .. 247 
and Schlesinger: op.cit., p.372. 
(2) See John F. Kennedy's book, Profiles in Courage, (1956, 
Harper & Row, New York) ... 
{3) The Democrats, surpassing any adminis·tration. in a mid-term 
election since 1934, gained 4 seats in the Senate and had 
a net loss of only 2 in the House.. The internal composition 
of Congress was little changed, but this was a great boost 
for the administration who could bave expected to suffer 
significant losses. See A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 
John F. Kennedy in the White House (1965, Houghton, London} 
pp 588-9 and 644. 
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President Kennedy let it be known that he considered 
the vote, particularly in the South, the key to Negro advance-
29 
ment. By his strategy of foregoing legislation, he was 
probably seeking to prolong the traditional 11 honeymoon period" 
between a new President and Congress~ which would have 
certainly evaporated quickly, had he begun his term with civil 
rights legislation. Kennedy also took this time to try and 
convince the South by his actions over the Freedom Rides, 
that he was not vindictive to the South and did not intend 
to attenpt to force change on the people there. It is probable 
Kennedy's preference for voter registration wad due to two 
main reasons. Firstly, to decrease .activism on the streets 
which could lead to violence, and secondly, because if Negroes 
could gain political pov1er in the South, the "Dixicrats". would 
have to moderate thei:r: political stance, and so facilitate 
civil rights legislation. 
Despite this careful courting of civil rights opponents 
Kennedy, although moderating his Executive action (for instance 
over the housing order), still used it to good effect. He 
promoted an end to racial discrimination in voting, schools, 
the federal government, jobs and housing. From June 1961 to 
June 1963, the numbers of Negroes holding jobs in the middle 
grades of the civil service increased by 36.6% and in the top 
30 grades by 88.2%,~ from an admittedly low base. In the 
latter part of the administration he committed the moral 
authority of his position to racial justice by speaking to 
the nation in support of civil rights. Overall in his 
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administration, Kennedy surpassed any previous civil rights 
advocacy by a President and made civil rights a focal point 
of public policy and political debate. It would have been 
difficult for Lyndon Johnson, even if he had wanted to, to 
reverse the building of equality after Kennedy laid the 
foundations. · 
Despite the unease.of some blacks over the Presidency 
of a Southerner, Lyndon Johnson soon revealed his support 
for the Negro cause. Johnson had played a significant 
role in the passing of the 1957 and 1960 Acts. Although 
he often acted to weaken the bills, as they passed through 
Congress, it is quite likely that without these amendments, 
l1e would have been unable to convince his fellow Southerners 
to allmv them to pass at all. His leadership in legislation 
was reinforced in 1965, with his strenuous efforts to see the 
Voting Rights Bill enacted. 
Many writers claim the Voting Rights Act was.the "result" 
of the events at Selma.(l) However, as David Garrow points 
31 
out, Johnson made the decision to put forward voting rights 
legislation in 1965, before King opened his Selma campaign. 
This claim is reinforced by a memorandum drafted in December 
1964, forwarded from Attorney General Katzenbach to the 
President outlining legislative proposals, which Johnson 
says he had asked for soon after the November election. 
(1) Among them are Doris Kearns: Lyndon Johnson and the 
American Dream, (1976, Harper & Row, New York), page 228; 
Eric F. Goldman: The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (1969 
A.A. Knopf, New York), page 318; John Herbers: The Black 
Dilemma (1973, John Day, New York), page 27 and Thomas 
Dye: The Politics of Equality (1971, Bobbs - Merrill, 
Indianapolis), pp 55 and 122. 
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What is not in dispute, however, is that extensive news 
coverage of the Selma demonstrations, and President Johnson's 
national speech, ensured the Bill would be enacted into law, 
with the minimum of delay. The events of Selma heavily 
influenced the speed and the scope of the Bill, if not its 
inception. 
President Johnson, at this point in his Presidency, 
firmly supported the civil rights fight for equality in 
Congress and in his speeches. He too, had a mandate from 
the black community. Civil rights had been a large factor in 
his landslide victory over the Republican Presidential candidate, 
Senator Barry Goldwa·ter, and Johnson maintained the Civil Rights 
emphasis in Democratic leadership that Kennedy had initiated. 
The fact that this did not last throughout his Presidency will 
be investigated at a later stage. 
From 1957 to 1965, there were four Civil Rights Acts and 
several Supreme Court decisions, all contributing to the 
advance of the Negro towards equality in the United States. 
There had been a constantly rising tide of expectation among 
American blacks in this period. When in Birminghal.ri,this tide 
threatened to engulf the President who had been, in part, 
responsible for it, he tried to respond with the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. However, hy the time Congress had finally enacted 
the 1964 and 1965 Acts, the cries of "freedom now" were being 
drowned by cries of "Black Power". The process had been too 
slow for many blacks who were turning to the ''long hot stimmers" 
and more extr.emist politics. 
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Chapter Four 
Malcolm X: The Radical Alternative 
In 1946, Malcolm Little, alias "Det~oit Red", was 
sentenced, at the age of·twenty-one, to eight to ten years 
in prison for burglary and theft. This ended his criminal 
career and began a process of change in him that would influence 
the way all black men in America were regarded by many whites. 
Malcolm served six years in three Massachusetts prisons and 
it was during this time that his brother Reginald introduced 
him to the ideas of the Honourable Elijah Muhammed, leader of 
a small religious sect, the "Lost-Found Nation of Islam". 
Muhammed preached that the black man's hell in America was 
caused by white oppression and that to gain salvation he had 
to give up the white man's religion and adopt the true one, 
Islam. Malcolm studied Muhammed's ideas and by the time he 
left prison in 1952, he had been converted. He changed his 
surname to "X" to signify his renunciation of his former life 
and his abandonment of the_ slave name, "Little". 
He rose quickly in the hierarchy of the Nation of Islam, 
organizing ministries in Boston and Philadelphia, before 
becoming minister of rremple No .. 7 in Harlem, New York .. By 
hard work and fiery rhetoric he buil·t it into the leading 
temple in the country ar:rl Malcolm became a trusted minister 
and disciple of Elijah Muhammed. One incident plucked 
Malcolm from relative obscurity and pushed him to the forefront 
of Harlem lifeo One evening in April 195~angry at the 
beating by police of one of their members, Johnson Hinton, 
l 
I 
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Malcolm, with a squad of the 11 Fruit of Islam, (l) surrounded 
a Harlem police station and demanded Hinton be released and 
receive medical treatment. This dramatic and successful act 
of defiance and the $70,000 damages for personal injury by the 
police, later awarded in aourt, established the Nation in Harlem 
and launched it on a period of growing membershipand rising 
prosperity. The few hundred signed-up believers became two 
thousand with a presence and impact far larger than their actual 
numbers. Malcolm•s influence steadily mounted and, mainly due 
to his efforts, the Nation grew to over forty thousand strong, 
11 with twice that many synpathizers in more than twenty cities 11 • 1 
Membership fees, weekly tithes, and receipts from small businesses 
contributed over $100,000 annually to the movement. 
Heightened visibility in the ghetto brought increased 
exposure through the media. c. Eric. Lincoln, who coined the 
name, "Black Muslims .. , by which they came to be known, wrote 
the first book about them in 1961. This/was followed by others, 
notably one by E.u. Essien-Udom, which was actively encouraged 
by the Muslims. Newspapers, magazines, then radio and television 
began to put the Nation on public view. The publicity was a 
boost for the Muslims, but a mixed blessing to Malcolm. Much 
of it cast him in the most simplistic terms as a hatemonger and 
a demagogue. This image ultimately hurt the Nation and haunted 
Malcolm after he left it. 
Malcolm's rise to national prominence brought with it 
special problems8 His popularity with the media was a cause 
for jealousy and gave rise to suspicions in the movement that 
(1) A highly secret self-defence corps of ths Nation of Islam 
trained in unarmed combat .. 
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he was a vain publicity-seeker acting above his station. 
Dissatisfaction was also becoming apparent on Malcolm's part. 
He wanted more active participation in the Civil rights struggle 
and recognition for Muhammed (and later himself) as legitimate 
claimants to a place in the Negro leadership. He believed the 
Muslim's non-involvement policy was the reason for the stagnation 
in· growth after years of steady expansion. This came to a head in 
April 1962, when Los Angeles police shot seven Black Muslims, 
killing one and crippling another for life. Sixteen Muslims 
were arrested on criminal assault charges and held on a total of 
$160,000 bail. Given charge by .Huhammed, Malcolm began a 
campaign in defence of the victims and organized mass protest 
meetings with media coverage. Then, without advance notice, or 
any explanation" all protest plans were dropped by Muhammed 
alld emphasis pu·t on a purely legal de:Eence in the courts. 
Malcolm said later: 
"The Messenger LMuhammegJ has seen God.. He was with 
Allah and was given divine patience with the devil ••• 
the rest of us Black Muslims have not seen God, we 
don't have this divine gift of patience with the 
devil. 2he younger Black Muslims want to see some 
action". 
Personal factors also played a part in the growing rift ... 
Malcolm's conclusion that Muhammed had been violating the 
Nation's strict sexual codes undoubtedly weakened his respect 
for him. Muhammed's confidence in Malcolm was probably eroded 
by slanderous rumours circulated by members who feared Malcolm's 
growing powere The occasion for the split between them was a 
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remark(l) Malcolm made after President Kennedy's assassination. 
It was in line with the pronouncements the Nation·had.been making 
for years, but violated a ruling on the matter by Muhammed. 
Malcolm was suspended for ninety days and submitted humbly in 
public to the decision. However, when at the end of this perioo, 
in March 1964, he had not be reinstated, Malcolm announced he 
was leaving the Nation and forming his own organization. 
Malcolm's thought was restricted, at least publicly, to 
Black Muslim doctrine from 1952-64. Muhammed's teaching was 
based on a myth called i•Yucub' s History''~ which told a 
different story of creation, the core of which was that the 
white man is the devil. Nuhammed taught that Allah had decreed 
th~ white man will be destroyed by fire, pestilence, disease, 
sin and cosmic upheaval. Blacks, to be saved must separate 
themselves fron1 the devils before the day of Armageddon. They 
must give up evil ways learned from white people; unhealthy 
foods including pork, drinking, smoking, fornication, drugs, 
gambling, lying, stealing and race mixing, and prepare for 
freedom through hard work and prayer to Allah. Malcolm took 
this doctrine and applied it to the present day. He talked on 
integration, non-violence, the civil rights movement and defended 
( 1) On December 1st, 1963, nine days after Kennedy's assassination,. 
Malcolm attributed the President's death to the climate of 
hate and violence that whites had created or tolerated: 
"Chickens came home to roost! --being an old farm boy 
myself, chickens coming home to roost never did 
make me sad; they've always made me glad".3 
Malcolm had come to represent the activist, radical tendency 
in the leadership and Muhammed the abstentionist, conserva-
tive tendency. This was the main breaking-point and the 
Kennedy remark only the excuse for the split. 
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the Black Muslim position against some of the best speakers 
of the day. Although many of his positions changed after he 
left the Nation, since his later thought derived from this 
period, the Muslim ideology must be examined. 
The main aim 'for the Muslims was separation; they wanted 
a mass return to Africa or, failing that, a separate state, 
supplied for an initial period of twenty-five years by the 
government. This was. a demand, not a request, in recompense 
for their long years of enslavement. The attempt to integrate 
blacks into society was to advocate their destruction as a race. 
Malcolm thought that integration would not happen on a 
significant scale anyway, without great bloodshed; 
"If all the token integration v;hich you see in the 
South, and it's only tokenism, has caused the 
bloodshed that it has, what do you think white 
people both North and South, will do on the basis 
of real integration?"4 
Integration was a chimera·to be pursued by middle-class 
blacks fleeing their blackness. The method they used to seek 
it, non-violent protest, was a degradation. To limit the 
protes·t, whites had taken over the civil rights movement by 
joining it and financing and so diluting it and by "flattering 
its leaders with media attention, rigged popularity polls and 
d . 5 periodic invitations to tea an sympathy at the Wh~te House." 
This is what happened, Malcolm claimed, to the March on 
Washington. "They didn't integrate it, they infilitrated 
it 6 And as they took it over, it lost its militancy." 
Of the Negro leaders he said; "They control you, but they 
7 
never have incited you or excited you ••• They contain you$" 
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Malcolm preached these ideas and all Muhammed's other 
teachings in morals and the way aE life with unswerving devotion 
during his years with the Nation. However, he also stretched 
the bounds of Muhammed'· s doctrine. He introduced new elements 
of style and ideology into the faith. Although Muhammed kept 
him out of active participation, Malcolm kept the Nation in the 
headlines by commenting on national events. After he left the 
Muslims, the new head of the New York mosque, James X, and his 
assistant, Henry X complained: 
"It wasMalcolm who injected the political concept 
of 'black nationalism' into the Black Muslim movement, 
which was essentially religious in nature when 
Malcolm became a.member." 8 
On March 12th 1964, Malcolm announced he was forming a 
new organization. Straight away he revealed the gap between 
him and the Muslims and his desire to be involved in direct 
action. He said that the Muslims had "gone as far as they 
can" because they were too narrowly sectarian and too inhibited. 
He continued: 
"I am prepared to cooperate in local civil rights . 
actions in the South and elsewhere and shall do so 
because every campaign for specific objectives can 
only heighten the political consciousness of the 
Negroes and intensify their identi'fication against 
white. society .0 .. There is no use deceiving ourselves. 
Good education, housing and jobs are imperatives 
for the Negroes and I shall support them in their 
fight to win these objectives, but I shall tell the 
Negroes that while these are necessary they cannot 
solve the main Negro problem."9 
Here, Malcolm was announcing a move to direct action. This 
was not, however, a move tmvards the integrationist view as 
he points out.. He went further to dash any such claim: 
11 I shall also tell them that what has been called 
the'Neg-ro Revolution' in the United States is a 
deception practised upon them, because they have 
only to examine the failure of this so-called 
revolution to produce any positive results in 
this past year ••• There can be no revolution 
without bloodshed and it is nonsense to describe 
the civil rights in America as a revolution." 10 
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Malcolm still could not bring himself to criticise Elijah 
Muhammed. He later said he had hoped to avoid friction with 
the Black Muslims, but he was soon to : realise that he was a 
direct threat to them, both in what he knew about the Nation, 
and because his new organization represented direct competition 
to them. In the meantime, he said; 
"I still believe Mr. Muhammed's analysis of the 
problem is the most realistic and that his 
solution is the best one. Thiq means that I 
too believe the be st. solution is complete 
separation, ~dthout ~eople going back to our 
African homeland." 1 
However, he now saw this as a long-range solution and the 
temporal needs of blacks for better jobs, homes and schools 
came first. He declined.to discuss the "internal differences" 
that had 11 forced 11 him out of the Nation of Islam. Later he 
regretted this; 
"I made an error, I know now, in not speaking 
out the full truth when I was first suspended .. " 12 
His new 11Muslim Mosque, Inc." (M.M.I) would give him the 
religious base from which to "rid our people of the vices that 
destroy the moral fibre of our community." 13 For those who 
were not religiously inclined, the secular programmes would 
be open to all accept whites, who could only contribute ideas 
or money: 
"There can be no black-white unity until there 
is first some black unity." 14 
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The political, economic and social philosophy .would be 
"black nationalism" which meant politically; 
"We must control the politics and politicians of 
our community ••• sweeping out of office all 
Negro po).iticians who are puppets for the outside 
forces. u· 15 
Finally he reiterated his belief in self-defence: 
"In areas where our people are the constant victims 
of brutality and the government seems unable, or 
unwilling, to protect them, we should form rifle 
clubs that can be used ·to defend our lives and our 
property in times of emergency."l6 
Malcolm•s vision of black nationalism depended heavily 
on the idea of black community strength. Having spent many 
years of his adult life in the all-black·area of Harlem, he 
pointed to it as an example of separation from white society 
in practice. Most of the blacks living in Harlem and similar 
ghetto areas in America would spend their lives there, never 
amassing the wealth or education to allow them to escape its 
poverty trap. Malcolm, therefore, believed that they should 
run the ghetto. As a Muslim, he equated black nationalism 
with separation into a separate nation, or a return to Africa .. 
By March 1964, he differentiated the two concepts and by May 
1964, he had given up all advocacy of a separate nation, saying 
he thought Negroes should stay infue United States and fight 
for what was rightfully theirs. To be able to fight 
effectively blacks would have to build a sense of cormnunity, 
recognise their heritage and develop a racial pride. He 
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constantly tried to expose the white American as an exploiter 
and manipulator of the blacks, to help bind blacks together 
in a rejection of racist institutions and values in Arrsrican 
society. When black solidarity had developed, Negroes could 
bargain for a better life from a position of strength. 
This March 12th speech, which has been called his 
"declaration of independence", 17 was vague about what his 
new organization should actually do. Malcolm only spoke of 
recovering control of community politics, hardly a new idea, 
and of repudiating non-violence as a strategy. ·This is not 
surprising since he had announced his decision to leave only 
four days previously.· His statement had been improvised and 
he continued formulating his plans in this manner over the 
·next weeks. His transformation from Black Muslim to independent 
leader in black politics was a process of trial and error, 
discovery and disappointment, over a period of months. From 
the outset, the M.M.I. was weak and ill-structured, however, 
several writers especially Breitman, regard it as a period 
·of transition, a time when Malcolm was still feeling his way 
and developing his own ideas. 
One of the most notable speeches he made in this period 
was on April 8th 1964, at the socialist Militant Labour Forum 
in New York. He continued his attempts at conciliation begun 
the previous month; 
"All our people hav~ the same goals, the 
same objectives. That objective is freedom, 
justice, equality. All of us want recognition 
and respect as human beings." Separation and 
integration are only methods. "Our people have 
made the mistake of confusing the methods 
with the objectives. As long as we agree 
on objectives, we should never fall out 
with each other just because we believe 
in different methods or tactics or strategy 
to reach a common objective." 18 
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Malcolm probably did not believe that separation and integration 
were 11 just methods 11 • Means and ends were as inextricably 
intertwined for him as for the civil rights people; they could 
not abandon non-violence, he could not adopt it.., He was 
trying to make himself more amenable to the mainstream movement 
by stating that they had common aims, and also by shaking off 
more of his Muslim past by ·saying that separation was not an 
end in.itself, but a means "to obtain freedom, justice, 
l •t d t .· II l9 equa ~ y an respec as human be~ngs. 
Although he was t.rying to bridge some of the gap beb;.·1een 
himself and the civil rights leaders, he was not about: to 
join them.. It is more p:t·obable that he hoped to find some 
middle-ground by softening his own line, while radicalizing 
their views. To this end, he spoke to an S.N.c.c. audience 
in Selma, Ala., who were organizing for the·vote, supporting 
their action, but. advocating self-defence when attacked. 
Malcolm believed that non-violence, as it stood then~ 
perpetuated the conditions that the Negro was struggling 
against. The harsh realities of black life were not going 
to be changed, he said, by demonstrations or even by the 
passage of minimally-enforced civil rights legislation and 
the token victories of the movement were only "devices to 
lessen the danger of an explosion, but not designed to remove 
the material that's going to explode~" 20 
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In mid-April, Malcolm left for an extensive tour of the 
Middle East and Africa, where he was received enthusiastically 
by heads of state, ambassadors, political leaders and 
expatriate black Americans. He made a pilgrimage to Mecca, 
the shrine of orthodox Islam, entitling him to the use of 
"El-Hajj" in his name and:he became known to Muslims as El-Hajj 
Malik El Shabazz. He underwent a 11 spiritual rebirthu 21 
after seeing the fraternal relations among the multi-racial 
pilgrims. As a result, on his return, he no longer believed 
racism was an incurable cancer destroying America, that it 
could be overcome and sweeping indictments of the white race 
. (1) 
were wrong. It has been suggested that Malcolm had already 
reached these conclusions before his trip and only used his 
pilgrimage as a way of introducing ·the idea to the masses 
as less of a 11 U"-tu:rn", but, while this is plausible it 
can only be speculated upon. 
In Ghana, he met with President Nkrumah and became 
convinced it was time for all Afro-Americans to become an 
integral part of the world of Pan-Africanists. He established 
a network of contacts in Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, 
Higeria 6 Ghana, Marrocco and Algeria.. When he returned to 
America on May 21st 1964, it was with a sense of his African 
heritage and a broadened perspective on the world forces 
affecting Afro-American affairs. 
In a press conference on his return, he again confirmed 
(1) See Louis E. Lomax: To Kill a Black Man .. (1968, 
Holloway House, Los Angeles) , pages 170·-176. 
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that he wanted to enter a united front with various civil 
rights leaders. He was anxious to come into what he described 
22 
as "a new regard by the public, especially Negroes,." as a 
radical alternative for blacks who were too angry to surrender 
and too proud to beg. He also called for the expansion of 
civil rights activities to an international level, hoping 
that if the Negro situation were classed as a violation of 
human rights, it might be raised at the United Nations and 
America condemned by the world as racist. 
lVhile in Africa, Malcolm had become convinced that the 
M.M.I. was not the proper vehicle for the non-religious 
activities in which he wanted to engageD In March, he had 
been very concerned to promote the widest possible black 
unity, being careful to convince leaders he was not interested 
in "raiding" their organizations; 
11 I won't tell Negroes to come and follow me, 
I'll tell them to join any organization where 
black nationalism is practised." 23 
He was also very clear in his wish for non-Muslims to 
join him, however, he now realised that was impractical with 
the M.M.I. as his sole organization.. So on June 28th 1964, 
he announced the formation of a secular group, the "Organization 
of Afro-American Unity11 ( o .A .A .u.) modelled after the 
11 0rganization of African Unity" founded by the heads of 
independent black African states. A statement of basic aims 
and objectives was released putting brief proposals forward 
under ·the titles of education, political/economic, self-defence, 
social and cultural. It read like a Black Power manifesto 
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two years ahead of its time; a declaration of the importance. 
of black control of every aspect of the black community. Its 
agenda was to include voter registration, school boycotts, 
rent strikes, housing rehabilitation, programmes for drug 
addicts, a war on organized crime and a black cultural 
24 
revolution to "unbrainwash an entire people". Whites 
were again forbidden to join and this time even to give 
money. He announced an initiation fee of $2 and dues of 
$1 a week to keep the O.A.A.u. out of white control. Malcolm 
acknowledged the "roughness" of the·statement and a committee 
was set to work in January 1965 to produce a programme. 
Malcolm's main interest was in bringing the United States 
before the Uni·t::ed Nations Human Rights Committe·e, on the 
grounds that the deteriorating plight of Afro-Americans was 
a violation of basic human rights. In July 1964, he returned 
to Africa to lobby heads of state ga·thered in Cairo for the 
second summit conference of the Organization of African Unity. 
He was given observer status, a berth on a yacht with the 
leaders of the major African national liberation movements 
and was allowed to submit a memorandum to the delegates. As 
Essien-Udom says: 
"This was quite a feat~ It must be remembered 
that this was a head of state summit meeting. 
It was an extraordinary concession to Malcolm 
and the Afro-American community he represented, 
since he was neither a head of an existing state, 
nor a leader of a state in exile." 25 
A moderately worded resolution was passed a·cknowledging 
concern with racial problems in the United States. It noted 
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the recent Civil Rights Act, but was deeply concerned."by the 
continuing manifestations of racial bigotry and racial 
oppression against American Negro citizens," 26 and concluded 
with the wish that the.government would intensify its efforts 
against discrimination. Malcolm's efforts were further rewarded 
during the United Nations debate on u.s. involvement in the 
Belgian Congo crisis of the autumn of 1964. Several African 
delegates, whom Malcolm had previously contacted, connected 
the oppression of blacks in the United States with America's 
action in the Congo. Ghana's foreign minister argued that the 
United States had no more.business there than Ghana would have 
intervening in the American South "to protect the lives of 
Afro-Americans .... tortured al!d murdered for asserting their 
legitimate rights .... 27 
Nalcolm had placed the problem on the international agenda, 
but he had not obtained the widespread support he had hoped for 
Consequently, he visi·l:ed African capitals for some time after 
the conference-for talks with important heads of state (Nasser, 
Nyerere, Mkrumah, Kenyatta, Obote and others). While meeting 
these leaders Malcolm gained an appreciation of the complicated 
nature of African affairs and of the limits the complications 
placed on his own aims. On this trip the reaction of the Islamic 
\lniversity in Cairo certified Malcolm's ministry in..America 
and the World Muslim League in Hecca made him their American 
representative. 
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On his return to New York on November 24th 1964, he 
finally gave up any links or relations with Elijah Muhammed. 
He suggested Muhammed was a religious faker and said; 
"My religion is Islam as it is believed and practised 
by the Muslims in the Holy .City of Mecca. This 
religion recognises all men as brothers. It accepts 
all human beings as equal before God and as equal 
members in the Human Family of Mankind. I totally 
reject Elijah Muhammed's racist philosophy, which 
he has labelled 2 Islam' only to fool and misuse 
gullible people, as he fooled and misused me".28 
Malcolm then undertook an exhaustive speaking tour of major 
cities with black populations~ His purpose was to heighten 
the black consciousness and create a new sense of identity; 
to foster a greater racial pride. 
After this ·trip to Africa, Malcolm began to express his 
vie't'.7S on socialism. He had been very interested to discover 
socialism in Africa and the alterhative it provided for the 
development and progress of a country. However, he did not 
throw himself into socialistic rhetoric as completely as 
some writers claim. Instead, his position, at this point, 
was composite rather than systematic; he had "a loosely- strung 
series of positions held together more by his militant hearing 
than by any single coherent philosophy". 29 As he said; 
11 I'm for a society in which our people are recognised 
and respected as human beings and I believe that we have 
the right to resort to any means necessary to bring that 
about. I'm headed in any direction that will bring us 
some immediate results. u30 
Early in February, he stated that the programme of the 
O.A.A.Uo would be presented on February 15the However on 
February 14th his house was bombed and the presentation was 
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postponed until February 21st. On February 21st 1965, 
Malcolm X was assassinated in the Audulon Ballroom in Harlem 
as he began his speech. The programme ""as printed after his 
d~ath and it suggested that the organization was to have a 
secretriat, or executive committee, under Malcolm's direction, 
the members of which would be in charge of eight policy and 
four administrative committees. An active secretariat would 
help Malcolm avoid the concentration of authority in one man 
that hampered the day-to-day operations of the Muslims. The 
parent body would help generate local chapters which would have 
two functions. They would help defend each community against 
the unlawful attacks of white racists and would work for the 
total :r:evi'l-:alization and pu:r:ification of the black communities. 
By creating semi-autonomous enclaves within white society and 
transforming each ghetto into a unified and militant alternative 
to integration or separation, the O.AoA.U. would make it 
possible for people to, within limits, control their economic, 
political and social destiny. 
Malcolm ~anted to create a mass nationalist struggle for 
the liberation of the black people in America. He had long 
since abandoned his Muslim or transitional belief in a return 
to Africa and, at the end, believed in a return only culturally 
and philosophically, to develop a working unity with the 
framework of Pan-Africanism. He had made the change from 
segregationist to revolutionary Pan-Africanist. He was revolu-
tionary because he wanted radical change, although he was less 
interested in overthrowing institutions than undermining the 
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assumptions on which they were run. He decided that Afro-
Americans must fight, not only to gain control of their 
community, but also to change society as a whole, to reconstruct 
it on a truely non-exploitative basis. To achieve this he 
thought socialism should be considered as an alternative, since 
he had concluded that capitalism is a cause of racism. The 
concept of changing society was a "profoundly revolutionary 
• 1' t, 11 31 ~mp ~ca ~on • 
As a black Muslim, Malcolm X faithfully spread the teachings 
32 
of Elijah Muhammed, that 11 our enemy is the white man" and 
that whites were a devil race created from the genes of blacks 
b '1 . t• t 33 y an ev~ sc~en ~s • These statements and his later advocacy 
of black self-defence earned him vilification in the media(!) as 
a man of violence and a hatemonger. WJ:id.le still a follower of 
Muhanuned, Malcolm defended these statements as trying to uplift 
the hlack man's mentality and his social and economic condition 
in the country, by breaking his reliance on whites and having 
him join a separate black nation. If he was a racist, he claimed 
it was because he was reflecting white society's treatmentof 
him. When he broke with Muhammed, he no longer believed or 
taught that the white man was inherently evil, but that America's 
racist society encouraged him to act in an evil way. 
Malcolm also had to constantly defend his position on 
self-defence, which was usually interpreted as his favouring and 
(1) The day after he died the New York Times editorial said, 
''He was ••• an extraordinary and twisted man, turning 
many true gifts to evil purpose ••• his ruthless and 
fanatical belief in violence ••• marked him for fame' and 
for a violent end.u34 
promoting violence. He never advocated the initiation of 
violence by blacks. In his autobiography he said: 
11 I'm not for wanton violence, I'm for justiceo•• 
when the law fails to protect Negroes from 
whites attacks, then those Negroes should use 
arms, if necessary,to defend themselves. 1135 
Malcolm was not under any illusion that a powerless black 
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minority could mount a physical challenge to a powerful white 
majority and survive. But·,· as c. Eric Lincoln points out, 
"they could mount a psychological challenge and,· if theywere 
persistent, they might at least produce some erosion in the 
attitudes and the strategies by which the white man has always 
protected himself and his interests." 36 
A challenge to racis·t institutions that was often proposed 
and was finally mounted in 1965 was a campaign for the vote8 
The importance of the vote was regularly over~exaggerated, not 
only by Malcolm X., but also by King and S .N .c .. c. Malcolm said: 
"America is the only country in history in a position 
to bring about a revolution without violence and 
bloodshed .... because the Negro ••• holds the balance of 
power and if the Negro ••• were given what the Constitution 
say he is supposed to have, the added power of the 
Negro in this country would sweep all of the racists and 
the segregationalists out of office. It would change 
the entire political structure of the country. It would 
wipe out the Southern segregationism that now controls 
America's foreign policy, as well as America's domestic 
policy." 3 7 
In making this statement Malcolm, and those who also 
believed the franchise would have an immediate and dramatic 
effect on the Negro's position, were ignoring the fact that 
Negroes were not a homogeneous group and were highly unlikely 
to vote as a bloc. Secondly, even if all Negroes were 
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registered overnight, it is likely that many older blacks 
would not break the habits and fears of a lifetime and vote 
straight away. However, although the right to vote was not 
in question, the ability to exercise that right would be a 
great.psychological victory for the Negro and, if wrested 
from the grip of the segregationist, a great blow to him. 
It was of significant value therefore, despite the fact that 
it \'las not a panacea for all the problems of the Negro. 
I-'lany interpretations have been placed on Malcolm • s 
contribution to the struggle of the Negro for an equal place 
in society.. On one side there is the Reverend Albert Cleage, 
who argues that his single contribution was to teach black 
people the "first basic principle" that "the white man is your. 
enemy"., On that principle, Cleage contends, black people can 
. 38 
"build a total philosophy, a ·total course of action for struggle" .. 
He does not believe Malcolm was seriously interested in relating 
the black struggle to "the struggl(':lS of oppressed people 
39 
everywhere". On the other side George Breitman argues, 
"Malcolm was a radical both before and after leaving the Black 
Muslints. After, he was a revolutionary - increasingly anti-
. 1" d . 1" t 11 t. . . 1" . t rt 40 cap~ta ~st an pro-soc~a ~s , as we as an ~-~mper~a ~s • 
The Essien~Udoms share this position: 
"He had become a foe of the international capitalist 
system and a staunch Pan-Africanist ••• He was not 
thinking solely in racial terms toward the end of 
his life. He very clearly indicated that the oppressed 
Lblack citizen§? might find allies both in America and 
in Europe that were opposed to the capitalist system" .. 41 
EcU. Wolfenstein contends that, 
"For for racial 
liberation was necessarily revolutionary. Malcolm 
was the leading spokesman for the revolutionary 
interest of the masses; through the O.,A.A.u., he 
hoped to bring the Negro middle-class into this 
projected mass struggle. The end result of this 
activity was to bring the black masses into the 
middle-class reform movement. He helped to create 
the revolutionary means needed to realise radical 
reformist ends. By so doing, he helped to weaken 
the line of class division within the black 
community ... 42 . 
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Thomas Blair said he will be remembered for 11 his definition of 
a way to deal with the system of radical politics and his 
efforts to redefine the relationships of blacks to the white 
43 power structure... Peter Goldman simply states, "Malcolm's 
44 
real contribution to the struggle was catalY't:ic, not corporate." 
Finally, c. Eric Lincoln claims, "Malcolm was the first of the 
contemporary black revolutionaries".45 
Nost writers agree that Malcolm X infused a p:r·eviously 
lacking racial p:r:ide into the freedom movement o There is also 
a broad consensus that he developed a new consciousness in the 
American Negro; at a minimum, he showed the politically aware 
an alternative to the non-violent integrationist approach to 
the problem and many adopted it later in various forms. Malcolm 
is often criticised for not forming a lasting organization .. 
Although fuis is true, it can be countered by the fact that he 
left behind instead, an abundance of ideas and inspiration in 
the short time he had. (In less than one year between.the 
split and his death, Malcolm was in the country only five 
months.) His lack of direct action can be accounted for in the 
same way, plus the fact that he was caught in a political vacuum. 
Black moderate leaders thought him too militant. White liberals 
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and the traditional Socialist and communist Party leaders 
denounced his ideas as 11 racism in reverse 11 and a danger to 
their hopes of forging a national alliance of whites, blacks, 
trade unions and the Democratic Party.46 New black, radical 
groups thought he was losing contact with the people in the 
ghetto and abandoning black nationalism and separatism for 
Trotskyist socialism. As Malcolm said; 11 They won't let me 
turn the corner. I'm caught in a trap".47 
Malcolm's attempt to develop good relat±ons with the civil 
rights leaders while still pursuing black nationalism might, 
in the eyes of some observers, leave him open to charges of 
confusion and trying to keep a foot in both camps. While it is 
true that he was sometimes unsure as to the best policies to 
follow. in his last year, Malcolm had always the central aim of 
radicalizing blacks. "His objective was to heighten the 
consciousness of the ghetto and to cost white people sleep in 
48 the process". His aim in courting civil rights leaders was 
not to join them, but to avoid the isolation that was rapidly 
overcoming him. Malcolm had challenged the leaders and the 
orthodoxies of the civil rights movement in the midst of its 
glory days and he had paid the cost of a kind of quarantine 
that only lifted with his death. As with other "martyrs 11 , many 
of those who had shunned him as dangerous when he was alive, 
later professed a close association with him. While he sought 
to keep good relations with those leaders, in the hope they 
might move closer to his position in the future, he did not 
compromise his beliefs to do so. In the summer of 1964 the 
New York Times wrote; 
"Malcolm X is going to play a formidable role 
because the racial struggle has now shifted to the 
urban North. If Dr. King is concerned that he has 
sacrificed ten years of brilliant leadership, he 
will be forced to revise his concepts. There is 
only one direction in which he 4§-n move and that is 
in the direction of Malcolm X." 
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Another criticism levelled at. Malcolm X is that he had 
no pursuable strategy, no concrete programme and that his 
personal philosophy was simply a ragbag of other ideas looseJ.y 
drawn together. For instance, several writers emphasize 
Malcolm's tentative adoption of some aspects of socialism. 
Breitman, :in particular, makes much of the occasional socialist 
phraseology that Malcolm used, (l) but his wife, Betty Shabazz, 
insisted that Malcolm was not a socialist.50 Some apologists 
for Malcolm explain his lack of strategy·· or clear direction by 
pointing out how far he developed from his Muslim days in the 
short time he had~ Others, such as Goldman, use empty rhetorical 
phrases to excuse this feeling such as; 
"Malcolm's life was an accusation and the real meaning 
of his ministry in and out of the Nation of Islam, was 
to deliver that accusation to us ••• He was not so much 
a politician as a moral commentator on politics." 53 
What is clear is that Malcolm's talents, like those of 
Martin Luther King to some extent, lay not so much in organizing 
or developing programmes, as in the ability to articulate with 
rhetorical power the worst aspects of society, while at the 
(1) "Racism is the handmaiden of colonialism and capitalism" 51 
"It is impossible for capitalism to survive, primarily 
because the system needs some blood to suck ••• It's only 
a matter of time, in my opinion, befor.e it will 
collapse completel~.52 
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same time inspiring their followers to attempt change. King 
surrounded himself with an organization and advisers, while 
Malcolm, worked, for the most part, alone. In his plans for 
the O.A.A.u. Malcolm had proposed executive committees to 
help formulate and execute policy, which might have alleviated 
this weakness, but it was too late. 
It was, however, Malcolm's beliefs that became the 
political currency for the end of the 1960's rather than those· 
of King. His nationalist programme was almost wholly adopted 
by the advocates of Black Power, (l) the Black Panthers, and 
later by extremist groups( 2) which resorted to robbery and 
violence. to further the black 'revolution ... These latter groups 
were only using the name of Malcolm X, rather than his ideas. 
The black nationalism Malcolm promoted was less concerned about 
the details of blacks achieving domina·tion over their community 
than persuading black people that they could do it. His 
nationalism began with self-respect; 11 That's what black 
nationalism is - personal pride." 54 He maintained that the 
philoscphy; 
11 had the ability to instil: within black men the 
racial dignity, the incentive, and the confidence 
that the black race needs today to get up off its 
knees and to get on its feet and get rid of its 
scars and to take a stand for itself ... ss 
(1) see next chapter. 
(2) For example, the 11 Black Liberation Army" and the 
11May 19th Coalition ... 
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By 1966, the younger civil rights workers of S.N.c.c. and 
c.o.R.E. had tired of the beatings and the jailings they · 
had received since 1960 for the non-violent ethic and.began 
turning to the nationalist ideas of Black Power. They had 
entered the l960 1 s as the children of Martin Luther King, 
but left the decade as the "angry children of Malcolm X." 56 
Malcolm articulated the needs of the Northern ghetto 
black when no-one else could or would.. He cannot be 
ideologically pinned down because, as he was constantly saying; 
11 I 1 m flexible." 57 He formulated a new approach in the struggle 
for a proper place in society for the black man and he kept 
international attention on the racial situation in America. 
Although not the first to relate the American struggle to the 
emerging African nations, Malcolm was the most persistent and 
the most successful in heightening black cultural heritage 
and in linking the national. struggle to the international one o 
He saw the storm of racial fury brewing on the horizon and 
even predicted some of the places it would hit, but no-one 
listened. 
The last progranune he developed, but was unable to put 
into action, was, although largely ignored at the time, later 
widely adopted by many groq:>s as· the basis of the Black Power 
programme. He recognised, as several moderate leaders later 
would, that the answer to Negro problems was not solely 
legislative or judicial but also economic. Perhaps then, more 
than any other black leader, Malcolm X could be accurately 
described as a man ahead of his time. 
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Chapter Five 
Black Power 
In 1966, there occurred a crisis of confidence within 
the civil rights leadership, as the movement agitated for 
new, more complex, goals which worried many white liberals 
and the more conservative organizations; the Urban League 
and the N.A.A.C.P. Martin Luther King began his first Northern 
campaign in Chicago in January 1966, with the aim of organizing 
slum tenants to demand better conditions. S.N.c.c. and c.o.R.E., 
and later King, had begun to speak out against the Vietnam War, (l) 
and this had produced another crack in the already weakened 
wall of civil rights unityo It was a·t this time of uncertainty 
that members of S .. N .c .c. began using the term "Black PoW3 r 11 
that was to prove so divisive to them and the whole movement .. 
This chapter will investigate what the term meant to the people 
using it, how its meaning changed, and why it fell into disuse. 
An assessment will then be made as to the overall achievements 
and drawbacks resulting from the introduction of the concept. 
King wrote in his book, Where Do.J.ve Go From Here: Chaol§l. 
or Community?, that the poverty of the Northern black showed 
that political rights were insufficient, if economic factors 
were against them. Legally, Northern blacks could vote, work, 
use public facilities and could largely live where they wished. 
(1) In July 1965 I<ing had spoken against involvement in Vietman 
at an s.C~L.c. rally in Virginia. In January 1966, he 
wrote"an article in a Chicago newspaper presenting his first 
long and reasoned antiwar argument 1 thus beg,inning his 
alienation from Lyndon Johnson .. 
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Yet, in practice, they lived in black ghettos, like Harlem 
in New York, Watts in Los Angeles and the south side of Chicago. 
King realized that, 11Jobs are harder and costlier to create 
than voting rolls. The eradication of slums. housing millions 
1 is complex far beyond integrating buses and lunch counters." 
The frustrations of these Northern blacks untouched by the 
victories of the Southern based civil rights movement had 
erupted in ghetto rioting in 1964 and 1965. Although not a 
new phenomenon! l) these riots repr.esented a worrying development 
in the 1960's, since Northern protest had previously been non-
violent, or restricted to separatist organizations, like the 
Black Muslims. In the spring and. summer of. 1966 there were 
thirteen ''disorders.,, and this discontent in the streets was 
reflected in increasing militancy in S.N.c.c. and c.o.R.E. 
At their April 1966 annual conference, SeN.c.c. voted for 
the radical Stokely Carmichael as their new chairman. He 
replaced the more moderate John Lewis, who had refused to boycott 
the White House Conf.erence of. Civil Rights. S .. N .c .c. regarded 
the White House· Conference as a useless endeavour by the 
administration,. .,designed to use blackAmericans to.recoup 
prestige lost internationallyi•, and that the .,executive 
department and the President f.Werw not serious about ensuring 
constitutional rights to black Americans". 2 c.o.R.E. had 
been engaged in a campaign in Bogalusa, La., to desegregate 
(1) There were serious riots in Springfield, Ill., in 
1908,'Chicago in 1919 and Detroit in 1943. 
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the local industries. To protect themselves against attack 
they had allied "t,rith an armed force called the "Deacons for · 
Defence". The policy of having armed guards was a marked 
departure from the tactics of praying for their attacker, but 
James Farmer, c.o.R.E.'s long-standing chairman, was forced to 
sanction it: 
"If violence is on the horizon, I would certainly 
prefer to get it chanelled into disciplined defence, 
rather than random homicide and the suicide of 
rioting. u3 
In an article in March l966(l), Carmichael had noted the 
apathetic and frustrated spirit among his workers and indicated 
the time had come for a bold new approach. The opportunity 
for its introduction came in June 1966, and i·t was to be a 
turning-point for the civil rights movement. James Meredith 
began a solo march from Tennessee to Mississippi to help dispel 
the fear among Southern Negroes. He was barely inside Mississippi 
when he \'las wounded by a sniper. The leaders of the major 
civil rights organizations met to continue the march as a means 
of revitalizing their. lagging movement. However, rather than 
uniting them, the group became more fragmentedo They argued 
over the goalsof. the march and the tactics that were to be 
employed. King got his \'lay on tactics, with S.N.c.c. and 
c.O~R.E. agreeing to a non-violent interracial march, but ftere 
was further debate over the march objectives. Williams and 
Young wanted a single goali achieving a strengthened version 
(1) Quoted in T.L. Blair: Retreat to the Ghetto (1977, Hill 
& Wang, Nex.\r 'York).c: page 69 .• 
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of the Civil Rights Bill passing Congress. The militants 
produced a strident statement attacking President Johnson and 
ignoring the Civil Rights Bill altogether. A compromise was 
reached whereby the attack on the President was toned down 
and the Bill included. However, when released, the .. march 
manifesto.. made several demands, including a multimillion 
dollar 11 freedom budget .. to involve the poor in 11 the making of 
their own destinies ... 4 
This idea of black community control of federal funds 
represented a new direction for civil rights, which was to be 
rapidly developed by carmichael. King signed the document with 
Carmichael and Floyd McKissick(!), but to the others it seemed 
impossibly broad. They refused to sign and withdrew the 
N .. A .. A .. c .. P. and the Urban League from the march. Carmichael 
had deliberately forced WilJ~ins and Young to withdraw, leaving 
only King to be won over to his cause. He thought that it would 
be inadvisable to attempt to sway the three traditional 
organizations together, but that King would be easier to persuade,. 
given his desire for unity between the civil rights groups. 
When the marchers reached' Greenwood,, Miss., Carmichael 
posed a new threat to the remaining unity. Speaking to a large 
audience of mainly poor blacks he said; 
"The only way we're gonna stop the white man 
from whippin' us is to take over. We've been 
saying 'freedom now• for six years and we ain't 
got nothin'. W'nat ·we gonna start saying now is 
'black power• ... S 
(1) Farmer's successor as head~ of C.OoR.,E. from January 1966 .. 
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King immediately declared himself against the slogan, 
because he thought it would be divisive, and he managed to 
stop its use for the remainder.of the march. Carmichael had 
deliberately used·the term at that time to try and force King 
to make a stand for Black Power, and to get him to join S.N.c.c. 
and c.o.R.E., in a more radical approach to the movement's aims. 
The result was, however, an ideological split in the movement 
and many different people tried to define the term to suit 
their own ends. 
The controversy over the phrase and the confusion over its 
meaning dominated the c.o.R.E. annual conference that year~ 
King refused to attend the conference, ostensibly because of the 
demands of his Chicago campaign, although D.L. Lewis(l) suggests 
it was really because he an·ticipated a c .o.R.E .. pro-Black Power 
vote. Carmichael took his place and steered the slogan t.o 
acceptance by the convention. c.o.R.E. was still emphasizing 
working within the political system, but increasingly they saw 
themselves as not only independent of, but separate from, and 
in many ways hostile toward, existing political leaders and 
parties. c.o.R.E .. at first advocated working within the Democratic 
Party, and planned a strategy of electoral politics for the run--up 
to the 1968 elections. Violence and urban riots were deplored, 
but accepted as a natural expression of oppressed people.. c.o.R .. E., 
aimed to reorganize the community through new leadership and 
political power with the two-party system. This meant replacing 
the present elected officials with blacks more responsive to 
( 1) D~.L.. Lewis: Martin Luther King~- A. Critical Biog:r::aphy 
(1970, Penguin, London) ; p. 331 
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black wishes. c·.o.R.E. wanted to try and cultivate a more 
positive black self-image, and build up enough economic power 
to command a greater share of federal resources. Under 
McKissick, c.o.R.E. rejected violence and still advocated 
working within white society. 
When Roy. Innis took over the leadership in mid-1968, his 
first press release showed a further move toward black nationalism~ 
He declared that c.o.R.E. was irrevocably a black nationalist 
organization with separation as its goal and went on to endorse 
separatism as a system under which blacks could control their 
own destiny. 
"When \ve have control of our own destiny, then we 
can talk about integration, for those Negroes who 
want it."6 
He demanded recognition for blacks as a "nation within a nation", 7 
and he envisaged a collection of black enclaves being woven 
together as a separate entity. Thus, Roy Innis' rise to leader-
sh:tp marked the emergence of separatist tendencies within c.o.R.E. 
S.N.c.c. was moving faster and going further in the same 
direction. It disengaged from the civil rights movement, 
abandoned their Southern bases. and began to espouse black urban 
revolt. They emphasized unity with African and oppressed · 
peoples of the world and undertook Third World speaking tours. 
Carmichael toured American schools and colleges spreading black 
. militancy and the Black Power slogan. He led S.N.c.c. into a 
brief alliance with the Black Panther Party~ based on a shared 
belief in an anti-colonial struggle for self-determina·Qon, 
which would, at some point, involve widespread violence., 
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Carmichael, Brown, and Forman(!) all .received positions in the 
Black Panther Party, but the alliance was short-lived because 
of ideological differences between the groups on the role of 
whites in their struggle. 
The Panthers had a socialist element in their doctrine 
not readily apparent in the idea of Black Power. S.N.c.c., 
therefore, was against any white involvement, whereas the 
Black Panthers were< intere·sted in allying with white socialists:. 
Carmichael became more involved in "cultural nationalism", 
rather than the Panther's "revolutionary nationalism". Cultural 
nationalism holds that black people throughout the world possess 
a distinct culture, and that before black liberation can be 
acheived in the United States, blacks must reassert their 
cultural heritage .. A cultural revolution is, therefore, ·essential 
before Afro-Americans can conunand the unity necessary to revolt. 
effectively against their "oppressors". It rejects separa·t:ion 
or repatriation and claims that it is through culture and art 
that blacks are "prepared for liberation ... 8 Carmichael was 
allegedly 11 equa·ting black power with black violence'·', 9 and \vas 
therefore, expelled from S.Nec.c. After his expulsion 
Carmichael left America:, disillu~s±one·d, in 1969.. He lived for 
some time in the Republic of Guinea and has, more recently, 
adopted Pan-Africanist views and believesin black emigration 
to Africa. 
Carmichael had been replaced as Chairman of S.Nec.c. in 
May 1967 by H. Rap Brown, who had begun ·to associate the 
( 1) All former chairmen of s:.N.c .. c. a:n:d long-standing members 
of the group.. Forman, for instance, was executive secreta:r}, 
from 1961-·66. 
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the organization more and more with revolutionary rhetoric, 
reflecting the unrest raging in~ the urban ghettos. At a 
conference held in Newark, immediately after the rioting 
there, Brown urged blacks to 11 wage guerrilla war on the 
10 honkie white man 11 • Similar speeches in Cambridge, Md., 
led to his arrest for incitement to riot. This was the 
first of a series of arrests, occurring each time he was 
(1) 
released, sometimes on dubious charges. S.N.c.c. and 
c.o.R.E. declined rapidly from 1968. Their increasingly 
black nationalist views, and S.N..c.c.•s advocacy of armed 
guerrilla warfare, had totally cut them off from any source 
of organizational or financial support. Deprived of its 
leaders, Carmichael and the imprisoned Brown, S .NI.C .. c.. went 
out of business. c .. o .. R .. E .. turned to political activism and 
helped elect significant nurnba:t·s of blacks to office, in the 
national elections of 1968 and 1972.. More recently, it has 
turned to voluntary seririce work,. financed by government and 
foundations,but has been unable to harness the energies of 
the most aggrieved blacks. 
The. first group to t:r·y and define· their interpretation 
of Black Power was S.N.c.c., who issued a position paper in 
Augus·t 1966. r·ts main theme was that whites should be 
(1) Over a period of eight months, Brown was arrested, released 
and rearrested five times. He was only given extra-
ordinarily high bail, and '!tlhen he left New York to see his 
attorney in February 1968 6 he was jailed and held in 
solitaxy confinement for bond violation .. Brown thought 11 
·these arrests were a government attempt"to silence him". 
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excluded from black organizations, but was at pains to point 
out that this policy was not anti-white~ Their claim was 
that white presence in a group that was trying to organize 
the "black masses", intimidated some blacks because they 
could not "vent the rage that they felt about whites, in the 
presence of whites" •12 White people should work in their own 
community and combat racism there, allowing "indigenous leader-
ship" to be built in S.N.c.c. If blacks form their 11 own 
institutions, credit unions co-ops, political parties and write 
their own histories", 13 they will only be reflecting their 
experience of America~ as a racist society. Although this 
would leave only a very small number of S.N.c.c. members, 
they envisaged alliances with other all-black groups. They 
claimed blacks could not identify with the organization unless 
it was all black and, therefore, a source of pride. Their 
main aim was to break down the inferiority that blacks felt 
and to instil a sense of pride and ability to succeed. This 
determination to bec:ome independent included an end to reliance 
on white financial support, bec~use it would entail an element 
of whi·te control. For them, Black Power meant a "black-staffed, 
1 k f • d ' t • II 13 black-controlled, and b ac - ~nance , organ~za ~on • 
Stokely Carmichael held a number of inconsistant views 
on Black Power and frequently contradicted himself on the issue 
119 
f k . 1 (1) o blac v~o ence • However, his most permanent and, one 
supposes, his most reasoned explanation of the term, appeared 
in the book "Black Power, The Politics of Liberation in 
America, written with Charles v. Hamilton( 2) and published 
in 1967. To obtain true "liberation" in America Carmichael 
claims blacks must first develop a "sense of community".17 
Next, a process of "political mobilization~' must begin. This 
entails questioning the old values of society which support 
racism. He rejects the aim of "assimilation into middle-class 
Ame:ci ca" because it "perpetuates racism" as a class. The 
creation of new values necessitates new institutions in society, · 
which will be more responsive to the needs and interests of 
black people. To modernize these "structures of society" a 
11 broadened base of political participation .. will be necessary. 
Blacks must become more pol~cally active and choose their 
own leaders. They must no longer 11 deliver" the black vote 
and cannot be tied to the "white political machine". He sums 
up the Black Power concept as: 
( 1) 
(2) 
"a call for black people in this country to unite, 
to recognize their heritage,· to build a sense of 
community. It is a call for black people to begin 
to define their own goals, to lead their own 
organizations and to support these organizations. 
It is a call to reject the racist institutions and 
values of this soceity" .. 
Carmichael said: Black Power "just means black people 
coming tog(:::ther and getting people to represent their needs 
and to stop oppression because of race". He didn't 11 see why 
the rallying-cry of Black Power would mean anti-white" 14 
And u·we cannot and shall not offer any guaran·tees that 
Black Power, if achieved,. would be non-racist"$15 
Also ~'If a white man tries to walk over youq kill him .... 
o;;;-match and you ca:n re:ta•liat:e·. Burn, Baby,. Burn ..... 16 
A black American political scien·tis·t who might be assumed to 
have contributed much o:f ·the political analysis of the book .. 
This concept rests, he claims, on the fundamental premise 
that solidarity is necessary before a group can operate 
effectively from a bargaining position of strength. 
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carmichael defends this position from the label of 
"racism in reverse" and says i.ts ultina.te aims "are not 
domination or exploitation of ather groups, but rather an 
effective share in the total power of society11 • He says he 
only wants full participation in the decision-making process 
affecting black lives. For support of this view he points 
to the National Committee of Black Churchmen, affiliated with 
the National Council of Churches, who wrote that., 11without 
the capacity to participate with power, i..e. to have some 
organized political and economic strength, to really influence 
people, with whom one interacts, integration is not meaningful". 
The time of the non-violent cpproach has ended, Carmichael 
cJaims. Schools, unemployment and housing conditions are 
getting worse and the civil rights laws that are passed are 
deliberately weakly enforced. From this time, blacks will 
defend themselves if a·ttacked a:pd tokenism will be unacceptable. 
Black Power demands equal rights and conditions from society 
for blacks without individually integrating into white society 
and losing their identity. These benefits should be conferred 
on the black conununity as a whole, and blacks will unite to 
get them. In areas where they have a majority, will "use 
power to exercise control". Where they lack a majority, they 
will seek proper representation and a sharing of control. By 
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uniting with a common pride, they will be able to develop the 
political power base to achieve this. 
Carmichael is specifically appealing to the Northern 
ghetto black in this book. This group, having already achieved 
the aims that were being fought for in the South, had been 
virtually ignored by the civil rights workers. Trapped in the 
ghetto by economic, rather than legal barriers, they wanted 
decent housing, equal education and a job. The calls to unite, 
develop a sense of community, attack new goals and have new 
leaders, were all aimed at the vast untapped area of the ghetto. 
The idea of self-defence was particularly necessary, since 
the example of being beaten and turning the other cheek was 
totally rejected by Nox·thern blacks from Harlem, raised to 
believe more in Black nationalism than the Church. However, 
very little of this package was new to the North. Malcolm X 
had for years preached a similar message; 
"The political philosophy of black nationalism 
means: we mu·st con't:t:ol the politics and the politicians 
of our community. They must no longer take orders from 
outside forces ••• There can be no black-white unity 
until the:):"e is firs·t some black unity .... Concerning 
non-violence: it is criminal to teach a man not to 
def€md himself:, when he: is the· constant victim. of 
brutal attacks ••• the time has come for the American 
Negro to fight back in self-defence, whenever and 18 
wherever he is being unjustly and unlawfully attacked." 
Malcolm X is advocating all the major points of 
Carmichael's explanation of Black Power, and he was saying 
it three years earlier. Malcolm had also predicted riots, 
and in the 1966-68 period when the Black Power term was most 
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popular, the country was undergoi.nga series of progressively 
worsening domestic upheavals. 
Martin Luther King analysed Black Power in his book, 
' Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? He saw it 
as "a cry of disappointment • • • born from the wounds of despair" • 
He believed this despair came from the "gap between promise 
and fulfillment of the civil rights· movement". 19 Young blacks 
had seen new freedoms encased in great laws, but the government 
had failed to enforce them, and so contempt for the legislative 
process and disillusionment in the capacity of law to change 
white attitudes had grown up. He also blamed the administra:tion, 
who were "more concerned about winning an ill-considered war 
20 in Vietman than about winning the war against poverty at home" .. 
So, Black Power called for blacks ·to "amass the political and 
economic strength to achieve their legitimate goals," to 
"transform their condition of pmverlessness to creative and 
21 positive power". The problem of .. transforming the ghetto" 
is one of ll·power; a confrontation between the forces of power 
demanding change, and the forces of power dedicated to 
preserving the s·l:atu.s-. quo"$ Howe\7-er, three years- earlier King 
himself has urged for Negroes to unite politically to make 
themselves heard. He called for the election of blacks to key 
positions, the use of the bloc vote, and the development of a 
new political awareness and strength in the Negro community.(l) 
(1)~ In his pook: Why We can•t Wait, (1964, New American Library, 
New York); page 149 ff. 
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The Black Power call for a pooling of black financial 
resources to achieve economic security was not.new either. This 
was already practised by the s.c.L.C .. in the plan "Operation 
Breadbasket" which had tle .primary aim of securing more and 
better jobs for blacks, by calling on the black community to 
support businesses giving a fair share of jobs to blacks, and 
withdrawing support from businesses practising discrimination. 
The s.c.L.c. had put this into effect in twelve cities, and 
achieved eight hundred new and upgraded jobs, worth over $7 
million in new income for blacks. (l) This idea had been used 
by the Nation of Islam and the Garvey movement, although 
the s.c.L.c. were the only group to advocate its use in 
conjunction with government aid to employment. Carmichael 
and Hamilton talked of forcing white business out of the ghettos .. 
This might uplift Negro moral, and Negro co-operatives might 
help reduce the flowof capital out of the ghetto,. and contri-
buting slightly to the accummulation of capital and providing 
employment. Whether Carmichael and Hamilton saw this as the 
whole answer is unclear since the problem was more deep rooted 
than this solution suggested. 
King agreed with the Black Power faction up to this 
point, but overall he thought it unlikely to succeed as the 
basic strategy for civil rights. He claimed it was "a nihilistic 
philosophyborn out of. the conviction that the Negro can't win" .. 
It holds, as its central tenet, the view that American society 
( 1). Figu:re'S. quoted from King: vlliere• Do We Go From Here .. Chaos·. 
or community? (1967, Beacon Press, Boston); page 145 .. 
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is 11 SO hopelessly corrupt and enmeshed in evil. that there 
is no possibility of salvation from withiri". 22 He blames 
some of this disillusionment on himself since; 
11 For twelve years Lh§l and others like iiiiml held 
out radiant promises of progress. iH~ urged them 
to have faith in America and in white society. 
Their hopes had soared ••• They were now hostile 
because they were watching the dream that they 
had so readily accepted, turn into a frustrating 
nightmare 11 .23 
King also disagreed with Black Power's "most destructive 
f t II 24 . 1 f 1 . . 1 ea ure , ~ts cal or reta ~atory v~o ence. He feared 
that the demarcation line between defensive a:pd aggressive 
violence was very thin; and that once the former was 
embarked upon, it was only a matter of time before the. 
latter was used. 
However, Black Power was constantly being redefined and 
re-evaluated. A year after the publication of his book on 
Black Power, Charles v .. Hamilton wrote an article for the New 
York Times Magazine, in which several significant changes 
could be seen from his original stance on the subject. He 
began by saying that in the contemporary situation, 11 it is 
virtually impossible· to come up with a single definition 
. 25 
satisfactory to all". He stated that Black Power was 
_concerned with "organizing the rage of black people", and 
that it must deal with the obviously growing alienation of 
black people and their distrust of the institutions of this 
society". He claimed that the riots may have made it clear 
that whi·tes 'will have to "bargain" with blacks or "continue to 
fight them in the streets of the· Detroits and the Newa:cksn" 
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The ghetto rebellions, in addition to "producing the possibility 
of apartheid-type repression, have been functional in moving some 
26 
whites to see that viable solutions must be sought". 
In his paper, Hamilton acknowledges the advances made by 
"Operation Breadbasket", crediting it with creating 2,000 jobs 
in Chicago alone. (l) This, he says, is Black Power in operation. 
He praises c.o.R.E. and S.N.c.c. cooperatives, and several 
independent ventures on the East Coast. He recognized these 
enterprises were small, and says "their purpose is to establish 
a modicum of economic self-sufficiency".27 The role of the middle 
class is emphasized, stating their "awareness" is growing and 
that without them, 11 Black Power will probably die on the speaker's 
28 platform." Hamilton also recognizes that Blacks will need 
\V'hite help in "many places", because there simply are not 
ff . . . . bl ] . . If 29 su ~c~ent econom~c resources ••• ~n the ace commun~ty • 
Also, politically, white support will be necessary, but internal 
unity is essential first. He admits that this lack of independ-
ence of the "white power structure" is where "rhetoric and the 
reality often clash". In many areas, Hamilton believes, it will 
not even be necessary to create black parallel agencies. If they 
have an independent base,. blacks could work within the existing 
agencies, unless the organization in question was blatantly 
racist, as in tihe case of the Alabama Democratic Party under 
Wallace.. Each situation should be assessed for cost and benefit . 
and acted upon accordingly, insisting wherever possible, that 
(1) The figures are later than those already attributed to King. 
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institutions in the black community be led and staffed by 
blacks. 
This paper represents a very significant toning-down 
of Black Power demands. While Hamilton did not speak for 
any major group, he was a respected academic and had co-
authored the only major work on Black Power. It is very 
important, tlerefore, that such a prominent figure should 
have, by April 1968, mar:kE dly changed his position. The 
whole paper exhibits a new pragmatism that was seriously 
lacking previously. Hamilton allows for the necessity of 
blacks and whites working together, if blacks are united 
first. He recognizes the need for "billions of dollars each 
30 year" and says the blacks have not the resources on their 
own. Specific examples of concrete action are proudly 
pointed to, in contrast to the first book, which talked 
vaguely of new institutions being necessary. 
Hamilton is very definite in pointing out that violent 
revolution in America will fail and lead to harsh repression. 
If open calls to violence are .used, the only result will be 
"immediate infiltration"o However, the riots focused 
attention on black needs. The only points still emphasized 
to the same extent, are the building of a new racial pride, 
a sense of black community and the need for political unity. 
On every point, Hamilton has dropped the heady rhetoric of 
the earlier work and introduced practical considerations. 
Gone is the sneering rejection of the black middle-class 
31 
as "·the backbone of institutional racism .. , and in its place,. 
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a recognition that their expertise is indispensible to 
black unity and advancement. There is no mention.of the 
need to fight back when attacked and it is emphasized 
that Black Power is not separatist or isolationist. Neither· 
does he any longer insist that black organizations must be 
all black, only "wherever possible". This is the kind of 
Black Power that King advocated and would have supported had 
he lived, since all the aspects he regarded as nega·tive 
have been dropped. 
Perhaps as an attempt to preserve an independent and 
distinct ideological identity from the definition of Black 
Power being put forward by integrationists, S.N.c .. c. was 
going in a different direction to that of Hamilton, and even 
c .. a .,R .,E. carmichael resorted to more and more extreme rhe'l::t!:lon<-. 
in common with his successor to the chairmanship of S.N.C.C. 6 
H. Rap Brown. They became enmeshed in the violence of the 
riots and began to make statements such as: 
"When you talk of Black Power, you talk of building 
a movement that will smash everything that Western 
Civilization has created" .• 32 and 
"Until there is peace. for Negroes, S.N.c .. c. is 
against peace for anyone. • • • We're gonna tear 
the cities up ••• We built this country and 
we'll burn it down." 33 · 
This extreme rhetoric may simply have been an attempt to 
appeal to the Northern ghetto Negro who had rejected the 
civil rights integrationist approach. 
Only black nationalism had had any success in 
the North and. in. "The. Trouble with ~~ck Pow~,. Lasch sug,gests. 
. . ~. 
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why nationalist sects, like the Nation of Islam, have never 
made much headway in the South and yet find the Northern 
ghetto "a fertile soil".34 He says that a group cannot 
achieve equality, without first developing institutions which 
express and .create a sense of its own distinctiveness. He 
claims that Southern Negr,oes developed their own subculture, 
based on the family unit and the church as the control 
institutions of their community. The Northern Negro, by 
contrast, fell between \<7hite American society and this 
Southern subculture, and failed to develop a comparable culture 
in the ghetto. In the South, the Negro church implanted an 
ethic of patience md su:Efering, ·which proved surprisingly 
conducive to effective political action.. The civil rights 
movement addressed itself to legal, inequalities, and not 
to the need to acquire a culture. This "cultural vacuum11 
was filled for the Northern ghetto Negro, by the nationalist 
34 
sects which spoJce to the 11 Wretchedness of the ghetto". The 
Nation of Islam, wi.th a harsh, uncompromising and authoritarian 
discipline,manged to organize ghe·tto blacks untouched by t.he 
ethic of non-violence, which presupposes an existing self-
respect and sense of community. 
The Nation of Islam, which was the main exponent of 
Black nationalism in the 1940's and 1950's, underwent a 
period of stagnation in the early 1960's after years of 
steady expansion. This was, in the opinion of Malcolm X, 
due to Muhammed's policy of noninvolvement in protest~ Black 
Power produced a revival of black nationalism, but in a 
129 
different form. Black Power secularized the separatist idea, 
which was usually manifested in religious form. Advocates 
such as Stokely Carmichael abandoned the myth of Negroes as 
a chosen people<;> and identified with the contemporary 
struggle against colonialism in the Third Word. Where 
earlier nationalist movements wanted physical separation 
from America and reunion with Islam or with Africa, many 
followers of Black Power wanted to fight their 11 revolution" 
in America .. 
Much of the basis of Black Power comes directly_from 
Garveyism. Like Black Power advocates, Garvey conceived 
of only two versions of the future; either the black man 
would receive his freedom, or race war would be inevitable. 
He avoided stating that his organization would instigate a 
revolutionary uprising, although he did often use inflammatory 
revolutionary rhetoric .. He wanted to prepare blacks "for 
action" 35 , by foste:~:ing a belief in the moral integrity and 
reasonableness of black nationalist demands. Garvey's idea 
of emigration, often represented as a call for a mass exodus, 
36 
only planned for relatively few (at most a hundred thousand) 
blacks to 11 return" to help develop the Africa continent, and 
to strengthen ties between blacks in America and Africa. This 
was expanded by Black Power exponents, the "Republic of New 
Africa" group, which proposed a geographically separate nation .. 
(1) In the Black Muslims they were thought to be the Asian 
Black·nation of the tribe of Shabazz. 
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Garvey promoted black economic independence and demanded 
"Rights for Negro Peoples of the World" 37 including the 
right to vote, representation on juries and the judge's 
bench, and full freedom of press, speech and assembly for 
all. U.N.I.A.'s call for "all ••• churches, lodges, fraternal 
• t • • • 1 d 1" f d • I 38 • • organ~za ~ons c~v~ an up~ t bo ~es' to jo~n ~n annual 
conventions, was echoed by the Black Power. conference· in 1967 .. 
This development of the Black Power idea, to include 
armed revolution against "colonialism", was an expansion 
from its original Garveyite roots to include influences such 
as Fanon and Guevara~l) Carmichael made statements such 
"Our enemy is white Western imperialist society·; 
our struggle is to overthrow the system which 
freed itself and expanded itself through the 
economic, and cultur~~ exploitation of non-white 
non-Western peoples" · and 
"·the only means to face oppression" is to 11 take 
up arms•<40 
as; 
H .. Rap Brown claimed that "the stark reality remains that 
the power necessary to end racism, colonialism, capitalism 
and imperialism will only come through long, protracted, 
41 bloody, brutal and violent wars with our oppressors". 
These statements revealed the· increasing identification of 
black militants as the revolutionary vanguard of Fanon's 
proposed violent social change. Fanon had written, in 
The wretched of the Ea,rth, that violent ac·tion was the 
(1) See, John Gerassi (ed}: Vencer.emos .. The Speeches a,nd 
;,vritings of Krnesto Che Guevara (1968, Weidenfield & 
Nicholson, London) and Frantz Fanon: The Wretched of the 
,;g:arth, (1965, McGibbon & Kee, London) • 
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"essential purifying element"42 in the quest for independence, 
and many followers of Black Power had adopted his work as 
their revolutionary Bible. 
This diversity of sources helped to produce contradictions 
in its usage. On the one hand, where Black Power derived from 
separatism, it advocated self-help in black cooperatives and 
self-discipline. On the. other hand, spokesmen were promoting 
guerrilla warfare against American colonialism. These 
posit:ions coexist, as in Carmichael and Hamilton's book, 
causing further confusion: 
"Whatever the consequences, there is a growing ••• 
body of black people determined to ••• take care of 
business.. They will not be stopped in their drive 
to achieve dignity to achieve their share of power ••• 
by whatever means necessary ... 43 
The book also leaves arguments underdeveloped or unclear. The 
authors mention, for instance, the parallel between the black 
situation and that of other ethnic groups. They observe that 
"studies in voting behaviour specifically, and political 
hehaviourgenerally, have made it clear that politically, the 
American pot has not melted". They also recognize that 
11 trad~tionally, each new, ethnic group in this society has 
found the route to social and political viability through 
• • • t"t • II 44 the . organizat~on of ~ ts OWl J.ns ~ ut~ons • This identifica-
tion of the Negro as an ethnic group seems to differ from 
their earlier analysis of "colonialism .. in America. "Black 
people in this country form a colony and i·t is not in the 
interest of the colonial people to liberate him ... 45 Later 
in the text 1 the issue is further clouded by the statement. 
that "a coalition of poor blacks and poor whites .... is 
46 the only coalition which seems acceptable to us". This 
raises further questions of whether the authors see the 
problem as a class issue, an ethnic issue, or a national 
or colonial issue. 
After the failure of this book and the Black Power 
idea to produce politicization of the ghetto, Carmichael 
tended to further "substitute rhetoric for analysis, and 
• f • • • II 47 def~ant gestures or pol~t~cal act~on • Black Power had 
begun as an effort to prevent race war. It claimed to 
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"represent the last reasonable opportunity for this society 
to work out its racial problems, short of prolonged oestructive · 
48 guerrilla warfare ... · It, for. its advocates at least, was 
an effort to discipline the anger of the ghettos and to 
direct it toward racial action, working against the despair 
and resentment present in the ghetto. However, Black Power 
was not only an attack on this despair, but also a product 
of it. It taught blacks to stop hating their colour. In 
doing so, without making concrE:)te proposals for action, it 
perhaps, just contributed to t'he nihilism in the ghetto by 
instead, teaching hate of whites. When Black Power leaders 
like Carmichael and Brown began to associate the term with 
racial violence, they were abdicating responsibility for 
their own movement by concealing an uncertainty of purpose: 
with revolutionary rhetoric. 
With the decline of Black Power as a rallying point, 
and the demise of the main groups advocating it, the standard 
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of black nationalism passed to small armed revolutionary 
groups such as the Black Panthers, R.A.M. (the Revolutionary 
Action Movement) and, more recently, the Black Liberation 
Army and the Republic of New Africa. The Black Panther Party, 
by calling for armed resistance to police brutality in the 
ghetto, attracted F.B.I. infiltration and police repression, 
in a concerted effort to discredit and.d9stroy the organizationill 
This was very successful, and by 1970, at least thirty-eight 
Panthers were dead and all their leaders were in jail or 
facing indictment. After many of these charges were dropped 
the Panther leaders adopted a change of tactic. They gave 
up their revolutionary stance and moved toward community work 
and voter registration. Having seen both R.A.M. and the 
Panthers infil'l:rated and broken up by police, the Black 
Liberation Army and the Republic of New Africa went under-
ground. They became small, paramilitary, revolutionary, 
extreme socialist groups, divorced from black activism, only 
surfacing occasionally in an attempt to. steal funds, in 
armed robberies. 
Blac;'!k Power as a slogan,. and a movement,. gre't'\7 up for 
a number of reasons. It was a response to the frustrations 
that S.N.c.c. had endured over the Mississippi Democratic 
Freedom Party, the Lowndes Black Panther Party failure, 
( 1) F .B .I. files released under. the Freedom of Information. Act. 
have shown. a policy,. initiated by J. Edgar Hoover, designed 
to "cripple the Black Panthers". See Cathy Perkus (ed): 
Cointelpro. The F.B.Is's Secret War on Political Freedom, 
(1975, Monda Press, New York). 
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and the lack of real progress being made by the traditional 
civil rights groupse The new concept of Black Power represented 
a search, by the younger and less patient elements of the 
movement, for new approaches to the struggle. S.N.c.c. wished 
to 11 nationalize 11 the issues they were fighting for, rather 
than keep them in the Southern area. The Northern ghetto 
was a vast untapped source of power, which could force radical 
political change, and which they needed to involve in their 
fight. This proposed change of tactics, however, was not 
simply the idea of S.N.c.c. It was a reflection of the growing 
disenchantment with the civil rights movement among large 
segments of the black population, as evidenced by the wide-
spread urban violence, that by 1966 was changing the whole 
country's conception of black rights. 
The concept of Black Power has remained confused. It 
encompassed different s·trands of Black nationalism and inte-
grationist ideas~ Traditions of cultural nationalism, whereby 
the cultural heri·t:age of the Afro-American is asserted to 
promote unity, were incorporat~d. However, revolutionary 
black nationalism, whi.ch calls for armed revolution to rid 
society of captialism and imperialism, based on a combination 
of black nationalism and Marxism/Leninism also began to be 
used in definitions of Black Power. These dualities of 
internal contradictions were to cause the splintering of 
the little unity the term brought about. 
Black Power had a number of strengths and positive 
effects.. It :is vvidely accepted that as a psychological symbol 
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for harnessing the pride and imagination of Negro Americans, 
the slogan imparted a sense of urgency and occasion for 
younger blacks, that the more moderate programmes and 
leadership did not. It was very important in stimulating 
a group identity and racial pride, especially in the North, 
which had been left untouched by the unifying effects of 
civil rights victories. Apathy, typical among the poor and 
uneducated, lad resulted in little mobilization for the 
goals of the movement, whEn it. did attempt to move North. 
The impact of Black Power did stimulate some parts of the 
black community to agitate for more "community control" and 
economic unity, in the form of credit unions and buying clubso 
Recognition of the ne:Jed for new institutions to promote self 
reliance resuli:ed in the creation of the Congressional Black 
Caucus in 1969. In sending a list of policy proposals to 
the President in March 1971, it characterized itself as a 
new type of leadership, articulating the desires of the black 
people they represented. The Caucus has not been able to fill 
the vacuum of leadership for blacks since their prime function 
is to concentrate on legislation~ but it has become an effective 
and disciplined voting bloc for black interests. It also 
attempted to initiate another separate institution for blacks 
when it called a National Black Political Convention in 1972 
which, despite internal difficulties,. has under various names, 
continued to lobby for black interests. 
The weaknesses in the concept, however, may be seen to 
outweigh the benefits and strengths.. It involved 
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no specific programme of ac·tion and its goals were stated in 
such broad terms that they allowed room for considerable 
variation in interpretation and emphasis. The often conflicting 
body of thought that it drew upon proved to be highly 
divisive later on. Passionate committment to distinct 
nationalist viewpoints became a formidable obstacle to united 
action, and instead, stimulatedmistrust and hostility. This 
is illustrated in the breakup of the alliance between S.N .. c.c .. 
and the Black Panther Party, which one writer tells us nearly 
ended in a gun-battle between the factions. (l) When some 
leaders drew Black Power towards revolutionary nationalism 
in its later stages, it brought with it a disparate assortment 
of largely ill-fitting socialist and Marxist ideological 
fragments, which confused the issues still further. In 
Feaver's article, on the concept, it is suggested that Black 
Power, as a manifestation of the "New Left 11 , shares with 
the white left, "a sense of powerlessness and despair for 
49 
which the revolutionary rhetoric serves to compensate" .. 
This agrees with Milton Morris' analysis when he says 
that there was a 11 tendency to encourage a peculiar over'-· 
indulgence in polemicism and programmatic fantasizing, when 
there were profound and perplexing problems which required 
pragmatic approaches to solution"o 50 This is precisely the 
course that Carmichael and Brown took when they increasingly 
(1) Julius Lester: Revolutionary Notes (1969, Grove Press, 
Ne'~"' Yor,k, pi:.1.ge 144) ~· 
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attacked the government a~d the American power structure, 
without suggesting a viable alternative. This was avoided 
by Hamilton, when he advocated practical economic proposals, 
instead of Third World solutions involving Pan-Africanism. 
The premise that the blacK population must 11 close ranks" 
before it can succeed in bargaining with white America may 
have had a certain psychological advantage to the black 
community, but it could not be maintained as the basis of 
a useful political stra·tegy. As Martin Luther King put it: 
11 The Negro cannot entrust his destiny to a philosphy11 
based on 11 a slogan that cannot be implemented into 
a programme 11 .51 
Its lack of definition gave Black Power an availability 
for wide ranging use, tha·t produced a Jarge impact and 
allowed it to be employed as a tool to produce mass black 
political action. This proved overall, however, to be a 
weakness, since its vagueness precluded its use as an 
ideology, which must necessarily confer an identity on its 
adherents. Without a clear definition and programme the 
term was so widely used by different groups that it lost 
its potency as a mobilizing and unifying concept. 
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Chapter Six 
Civil Rights Legislation and the 
White Backlash 
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The "March on Washington~" in 1963 had been a huge public 
relations victory for.the civil rights movement. The largest 
gathering in American history1 had created a very favourable 
impression with the public, demonstrating the commitment of 
large numbers of both black and whi.te people to racial equality. 
This level of public sympathy for the Negro cause was maintained 
throughout 1964, by the enactment of the Civil Rights Act and 
by the shock of the murder of three civil rights workers in 
Mississippi. Support generally tended to increase with racial 
confrontation in the South, and decline when demonstrations 
and disturbances moved North. Pro-Negro sentiment probably 
reached its apogee with the Selma-Montgomery march, led by 
Martin Luther King, and the subsequent passing of· the 1965 
Voting Rights Act. 
One week later, in Au-:,Jus·t 1965, large-scale rioting 
erupted in Watts, a suburb of Los Angeles. Tensions had been 
building up for some time in the area: its ghetto population 
density was among the worst in the Nation, and employment was 
only slightly higher than the level during the Depression~ These 
conditions of despair were ignored by the media, who instead 
drew the nation•s attention to the immediate results; Thirty-
four people dead, hundreds injured and widespread,destruction 
The ri.ot. shocked all thos.e . who, had he.e,n confident. that race, 
relations were improving infue No.rth, and "evoked a new mood 
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2 in the ghettos around the country". It marked the beginning 
of a steady decline of white tolerance and goodwill. 
Between Selma and Watts, President Johnson called for a 
White House Conference "to fulfil those rights" 3 of equal 
citizenship for all. The project grew rapidly and when the 
full conference met in June 196.6, it had 2,400 delegates 
discussing a report by a 28 man council, including the "Big 
Five", (l) plus many influential business, labour, and political 
leaders. When the conference had been first proposed the 
Voting Rights Act was moving easily toward enactment, but by 
June 1966, when it met, the latest Civil Rights Bill was running 
into difficulties., A different mood had taken the country, and 
a change in national in·l:erests \vas evident. Much of white 
America was beginning to lose patience with the continuing 
demands of the civil rights movement and was turning its attention. 
to ather concernso Between August 1965 and July 1966, the 
American commitment of troops in Vietnam had increased from 
4 46,000 to 260,000 and its importance to the nation had grown 
cons.iderab:ly •.. TliJ.e' extent: to which public sympathies had' bee:tl. 
reversed became evident with the treatment Hartin Luther King 
received, when he began marches in all-white areas of Chicago. 
in July 1966, calling for open housing. The level of violence 
these protests drew was unprecedented in the North, and it 
(1) A Collective term for the largest civil rights organizations; 
the N.A.A.C.,P..,, C.O .. R .. E., S.N .. C .. C .. , S .. C .. L~C .. and the 
Na tiona I Urban Leagu.e .. 
143 
signalled a rejection by many whites of any further advanCes 
for the Negro. 
In April 1966, the Johnson Administration introduced a 
comprehensive BiJ.l,"to assure non-discrimination in federal 
and state jury selection and service, to facilitate the deseg-
regation··; of public schools and other public facilities, to 
provide judicial relief against discriminatory housing 
practices,. and to prescribe penalties for certain acts of 
violence and intimidation". 5 Its major purposes were to 
protect civil rights workers in the South, to end all white 
juries in communities of substantial Negro population and 
to fight residential seg1~egation. De facto segregation was 
more prevalent in the North and West than in the South, where 
most of the other civil ri.ght.s legislation had its impact. 
As Senator Sam Ervin (D..,N oC.) said; 
"For the first time '"e have a Bill that proposes 
that other than Southern oxen are to be gored". 6 
The Bill did not contain all that the civil rights 
leaders wanted; it omitted any ~rovision for compensation for 
civil rights workers killed or injured, and for removal of 
certain cases from state to federal courts. But it prohibited 
threat or injury to "persons engaged in the exercise of their 
constitutional rights ••• or in urging or aiding others, by 
speech or peaceful assembly, to exercise such rights". 7 
Violat:ors were to be punished. by up to a $10,000 fine and ten 
years in jail, or, in the case of murder by life imprisonment. 
It also contained strong provisions to assure selection of 
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juries without regard to race and also l:>roadened the Attorney 
General's power to initiate litigation, to end remaining 
segregation in schools and public facilities. 
When debate began in the House on July 25th 1966, Black 
Power was in the air and eight cities had been hit by rioting 
that year. Disorders continued during the Senate hearings 
in September, and many Congressmen, fearing white backlash, 
were conscious of the November elections looming closer. 
Senators were deluged with anti·-legislation mail, often in 
. 8 
the proportion of one hundred to one over favourable letters. 
The House adopted a compromise amendment exempting ~1ner 
occupied properties of four units or less, which cut the 
affected housing by an estimated 60%. This killed the effective-
ness of the Bill, showing the lack of support there was, even 
in the House, normally the more sympathetic of the two chambers 
to liberal legislation, bu·t also the more responsive to 
changes in public opinion. A provision relating to rioting 
was added to the Bill, making it a federal offence to cross 
state lines with intent to riot~ or con~it any act of violence 
during the riot. This amended Bill passed the House on August 
9th and was introduced to the Senate two days later. 
Debate in the Senate was postponed until after the Labour 
Day recess. Substantial opposition developed during this 
period, especially to the housing provisions. Opponents 
filibustered: the Bill and in mid-September, passage was precluded 
when votes of. cloture. were def.eat.ecl 52-42 and 52-41. Th:a:t 
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session of the Senate also killed another Civil Rights Bill 
that had Administration and House approval. "An Equal 
Employment Opportunities Act of 1966" passed the House by 
over two hundred votes in April, giving the Commission on 
Equal Employment Opportunities much needed enforcement powers 
and strengthening the employment sections of the 1964 Act. 
However, the Senate declined to consider the measure. 
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966 failed for several 
reasons.. The political climate was not conducive to further 
civil rights legislation, especially with national elections 
imminent. White a·ttitudes reflected the view that Negroes. 
(1) 
were advancing "too fast", and they no longer saw the 
legisla·tion as human rights denied. Many Northern whites were 
great supporters of civil rights when that meant letting 
Negroes eat in white restaurants in the South, but when it 
meant a black family moving in next door, they beat a hasty 
retreat. There was no "outraged conscience.of a nation" 9 
pushing Congress to action, as in 1965. Previous legislation 
had been pushed through, or at .least helped,by a wave of 
sympathy or shame, caused by a major incident or racial 
confrontation. There was no Birmingham or Selma to help this 
Bill. 
Other factors were also at work. S9N.c.c. was becoming 
an all-black organization and was calling for Black Power and 
(1} In 1966; a Louis Harris poll showed that 75% of whites 
thought that blacks were moving too fast. The corresponding 
figure: in l 9:6'4: wa:s 50%.. ID 
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c.o .. R.E. was turning down the same path while fighting 
desegregation in a lone battle in Maryland. Martin Luther 
King was based in Chicago, where marchers were out-numbered 
by the police escorts protecting them. None of these actions 
stimulated the reaction needed, nor did the legislation lend 
itself to public sympathy.. Most whites were happy to let it 
die. Muse suggests that the jury system and school segregation 
powers would probably have been enacted in a separate Bill, 
11 but as a package, there was little hope. The one remaining 
factor that might have helped it pass, was effective leadership 
from President Johnson. It was mainly due to his efforts 
that cloture had been successful, thus ensuring the passage 
of the 1964 and 1965 Acts. However, Johnson was too busy 
with the quickly escalating Vietman War to provide the 
necessary leadership in 1966. 
The mood of the country that had helped anti-civil rights 
forces in the Senate kill. the Civil Rights Bill, showed itself 
at the November elections. Looking at the results of 
Democrati.c primaries in. which mo.cierate candidates for Governor 
in Georgia, Maryland and Arkansas were defeated by overt 
racists, the Washington Post said; 11 An ominous and dangerous 
12 
reaction has gripped this country11 ,. '.rhe November election 
results reflected a hardening of white attitudes toward the 
Negro and a loss of interest or a growing opposition to the 
civil right$ movement. The victories of Lurleen Wallace in 
1 b ,. .ri.,..-, of "T .. A.·.·t• .. G.~.c.o. ·rge· D·.o., .I'"'·" ~ .. 13 a·"'··-;'!··.· of: t·'",· e• A a ama ,, on a. p:te"...;:,·'""' · .. ~ ·- -"" . ~. . •·•"A . .L·! 
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violently segregationist, Lester Maddox (l) in Georgia, "\vere 
a jarring reminder that racial prejudice was still deeply 
entrenched. 
The setbacks for the Democratic Party and for liberal 
racial policy were not restricted to the South. In California, 
liberal governor Pat Brown was deserted by the voters and 
Ronald Reagan, a rising new figure in the Republican Party, 
was elected by nearly a million votes. Over all, the Republicans 
gained forty-seven seats in the House and three in the Senate. 
Surveys showed that, in the House, thirty to thirty-five 
identi:Eiable liberals had been replaced by conservatives 1 making 
the prospects for civil rights legislation even bleaker. These 
resul·ts suggest more than the traditional off-year swing to 
the opposition party, but rather a broader swing. signifying 
th t tl t h d t . d f . t. d f (2) a 1e coun ry a grown ~re o ~nnova ~on an re orm. 
Despite these losses, some gains were made. The effect 
of the Voting Right·s Act and the real impact on the South of 
the Negro vote for the first time, lead to a marked advance 
toward in.t.eg.ratio:n:... Neg:ro. voter registration had. risen: by 
half a ntillion since the last election, leaving about half 
. d ~/ . (3) of the eligible Negroes reg~stere compared to 70'1o of wh~tes. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Maddox had fought desegregation of his restaurant by 
handing out axe handles to white customers to use on any 
Negroes who dared to enter. 
For further analysis see, Benjamin Muse: The American Negro 
Revolution. From Non-violence to Black Power 1963-67 (1968~ 
Indiana University Press, Bloomingtori,Ind); pages 263-67. 
~rhe figures in 1981 were about 57% of blacks in the South 
registered as compared with 67% of whites .. l4 
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A notable triumph over racial bias was the election of Republican 
Edward Brooke as Senator from Massachusetts, with 61% of the 
vote in a state where Negroes were less than 3% of the total 
population. It was all the more unusual since the Republicans 
were the minority party. In the nation, 154 Negroes were 
elected to 27 states legislatures representing a gain of 50% 
over the low base of 1964. 
The diminution of white sympathy for the Negro cause was 
illustrated in a report on "Violent Aspects of Protest, and 
Confrontation to the Na·tional Commission on the causes and 
Prevention of Violence 11 , (known as the "SolnickReport") in 
which the authors point out the growth of white mili·tancy in 
this period. One indication of this was the evidence showing 
a sizable segm(:mt of the urban population was willing to 
use violence against black disorder.. A Harris poll in 
September 1967 indica·t.ed that 55% of white gun owners said 
they would use their gun to shoot people in the case of a 
riot. A second poll in March 1968 found 51% answering the 
same question affirmatively.. Linking these responses to 
actual behaviour, the report states that in Los Angeles, 5% 
of whites, sampled as to their willingness to use guns, 
actually bought firearms during the riots in their city, and 
it gives figures in other cities where gun registration doubled 
after riots 0 It is acknowledged, however, that the violent. 
white militant, with the notable exception of the South, was 
in a minority, operating beyond the law., no longer enjoying 
encouragement or assistance of official bodies. 
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In a study prepared for the Kerner Commission(!) whites 
were asked whether, in the case of a Negro riot in their city, 
they should "do some rioting against them", 15 or leave the 
matter to the authorities, 8% of white males advocated counter-
rioting. Again, to link this with actual behaviour, it points 
to the number of 11 riot-related" arrests of whites. in 1967 
after riots in Detroit, New Haven, Plainfield, Dayton and 
Cincinnati. 
The area the Solnick Report identifies as being of the 
most immediate importance is growing militancy among policemen. 
In a study done under a grant from the Justice Department and 
sul)mitted to the President • s Committee on Law Enforcement in 
1966" 11 0Verwhelming evidence of widespread virulent prejudice 
by police against Negroes 11 was found. Based on field observa-
tions of officers in the sununer of 1966 in Boston, Chicago and 
Washington D.c., it was found that 72% of the policemen were 
11 considerably or extremely prejudiced against black Americans". 16 
The incidence of police militancy carried into action is seen 
in 11the growing number of police·attacks on blacks entirely 
17 
unrelated to any legitimate police work". The report details 
many of these in New York, Detroit and San Francisco and says 
they are not isolated incidents. 
(1) The "Report of tre national Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders .. was referred to extensively in Lord Scarman's 
report on the Brixton riots of 1981. 
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Perhaps more worrying were .its findings related to the 
Cleveland shoot-out between black militants and police in 
July 1967, in which eleven people died. The Commission found 
that after the shoot-out police opposition to the Negro mayor, 
Carl Stockes, and his administration, moved toward "open 
revolt". When police were withdrawn from ghetto duty for one 
night to allow black community leaders to quell the rioting, 
police reportedly refused to answer calls and sent racist 
abuse and obsoeni ties against ·the mayor over their radios. 
Officers in one district refused to travel in racially mixed 
squads into black areaso For several weeks after the riot, 
posters v'lith the mayor's picture and the words, "Wanted For 
Murder", hung in district police stations. "Similar revolts 
d . . . ..18 d d against higher police an c~v~l authorl.ty ha occurre· 
elsewhere. 
The report concludes that the police are 11 0verviorked 
undertrained, underpaid and undereducated" and "that police 
view ••• blacks as a danger to our political system and 
racial prejudice pervades police attitudes and action".19 
This attitude is hardly surprising when one considers the 
statement of J. Edgar Hoover in testimony before the commission 
in September 1968; 
11 Conununists are in the forefront of civil rights 
demonstrations, many of which ultimately become 
disorderly and erupt into violence". 20 
.. . . 
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The conclusion was reached that the minority of whites 
who radically oppose the aspirations of the black community, 
is a matter of considerable concern, and their organization 
into militant groups, poses at least as much threat to public 
order and safety, as the activities of militant blacks. One 
such grrup is the Mississippi White Knights of the K.u Klux 
Klan, which is identified with much of the violence against 
civil rights workers in Mississippi. Apart from the much 
publicized triple murder in 1964 of civil rights workers, the 
W11ite Knights also killed the head of the Hattiesburg N.A.A.C.P. 
in 1966 and the head of the Natchez chapter in 1967. They are 
also suspected o£ burning seventy-five churches21 • 'rhe W11ite 
Knights stress tha·t the major source of their effectiveness 
is favourable pl.lblic opinion .. "As long as they are on our side, 
d • t b t th" t • "th • "t II 22 we can o JUS a ou any ~ng o our enem~es w~ ~mpun~ y • 
From October 1965 to October 1966 6 it is estimated that Klan 
strength rose by 25% to 51,000. Other groups also experienced 
a boost during this period. The "Fuhrer•t of the American Nazi 
Party was mobbed by admirers when he visited Chicago during 
King's open-housing campaign. His philosophy was sununed up 
in his book "White Power", when he said; 
"Negroes ••• are a semi-wild form of half-human 
animal, unable to build or maintain a civilization, 
but capable, in vast numbers of utterly and 
completely destroying all civiliza·tion" .23 
Despite ·the failure of the 1966 Bill and the mood, of the 
country, another civil rights package was introduced to 
Congres·s in I967.. Acting on various measures separate'ly, the 
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House shelved the open housing provisions, but passed one 
measure designed to protect civil rights workers. When this 
was introduced to the Senate in February 1968, an open housing 
amendment, sponsored by Edward Brooke (RJMass.) (the only 
Negro Senator) and Walter Mondale (D., Minn.) was attached 
to the House passed measure. Following a narrowly defeated 
attempt to invoke cloture, a compromise was reached with 
Senate Minority Leader Dirksen. This weakened the Bill by 
exempting from coverage single family homes, sold without 
the aid of a real estate broker, and by weakening the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development's (H .. U.D.) 
enforcement powers. Finally, af·ter major anti-riot amendments, 
sponsored by Strom 'I'hurmond (R., s.c), were added, the Bill 
passed (71-20) on 11th Ma:rch 1968. 
Commentators were convinced ·that: the House would reject 
24 
the bill, for much the same reasons as the 1966 Act·had 
failed. The House was much more conservative since the 
Democrats lost forty-seven seats in 1966, and Johnson, pre·-
occupied with Vietnam and the'Presidential election(l), was 
not providing the executive leadership characteristic of the 
1963-65 period. However, just before the House vote on 
whether or not ·to send the Bill to conference, Martin Luther 
King was assassinated. The riots which followed, continued as 
(1) Withi~ two weeks of the Bill going to the House, he announced 
he would not run for a second full term. 
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a background to debate, until the House enacted the legislation 
(by a vote of 229 to 195) on lOth April 1968. 
The Act extended to all property, except those multiple 
rentals which were owner occupied and where the number of 
units to rent did not exceed four, and owner occupied housing 
sold privately, without a real estate agent. The former 
exception was to protect the person who wanted to rent out a 
few rooms in their house, and the latter allowed an owner 
occupier to sell privately to a friend or neighbour of the 
same race. This left the Act covering about 80% of u.s. housing 
stock. Responsibility for administration was given to H.U.D., 
but while it was to set up a complaint procedure, it was not 
given powers to initiate complaints or issue injunctions. The 
agency could subpoena witnesses and could attempt to resolve 
complaints by "conciliation, conference and persuasion". 25 In 
addition, private persons could file cases in district cou:rts 
an:1 when a "pattern or practice of discrimination" 25 existed, 
the Attorney General could file suits. In both instances the 
courts could issue temporary injunctions and restraining orders 
to freeze the sale or rental of property during litigation. 
In the case of private action, unspecLtied amounts of actual 
damages plus up to $1000 punitive damages plus costs, could be 
awarded to p~tiffs. Court orders, which could transfer the 
disputed property to the plaintiff, were also sanctioned .. 
In the three areas of enforcement; H .. U .D. • s. complaint 
procedure, private litigation and enforcement by the Attorney 
General, the focus was on providing remedies in individual 
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instances of discrimination. Most of the Act avoided the 
dilemma of defining what federal policy should be toward the 
integration of federal housing programmes. The Act was also 
very weak in enforcement provisions and this drew some criticism. 
Parallel with legislative action came judicial activity. Two 
months after the Act was passed the Supreme Court, in Jones vs 
(1) Meyer resurrected the 1866 Civil Rights Act which, by 
declaring that "all citizens of the United States shall ha"re 
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed 
by white citizens thereof to inherit, lease, sell, hold and 
26 
convey, real and personal propercy 11 , extended coverage to 
all housing. 'I'his case was important in reinforcing the main 
message of the Act, that the federal government had responsibil-
ity for extending equal housing opportunities to all citizenso 
However, it remained purely supportive, rather than playing 
a direct role, since it contained no specific enforcement 
provisions. 
The Civil Rights Laws of the 1960's were heralded by 
some white liberals and blacks as a breakthrough in race . 
relations. They represented what seemed at the time to be 
the culmination of the long struggle for racial equality in 
the United S·tat es. In particular the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
and the 1965 Voting Rights Act promised not only the guarantee 
of legal equality for racial minorities, but also "affirmative 
(1) 392 u ... s. 409 (1968),. 
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action" by governments to eliminate broad practices or patterns 
of discrimination. The crisis in Birmingham was the catalyst 
that ultimately moved an otherwise immobile political system 
to meaningful action. This lesson was not lost on the civil 
rights leaders. The crisis in Selma profoundly influenced the 
passing of the Voting Rights Act five months later. For 
decades blacks had gone to court fighting the evasive tactics 
of the Southern States, in an effort to enforce the 15th 
Amendment, granting protection against denials of the vote 
based on race. It laid the foundation of momentous changes 
in voter registration, voting and the election of blacks to 
office, especially in the South. However, protracted struggles 
sometimes heighten expectations to unrealistic proportions, 
increasing the potential for cynicism and alienation, when 
expectations are not met.. The struggle merely to gain the 
vote led some to overemphasize its potential usefulness. The 
problem was exacerbated by the tendency of some civil rights 
workers to focus on the possession, rather than the exercise 
of the vote. 
From 1966, as more Northern cities exploded in violence, 
it became obvious that the racial minorities had not progressed 
to the state of equality vvith whi·tes that the la\<7 seemed to 
have promisede Disillusionment in both the minority community 
and among white commentators .. spread rapidly so that by 1968,. 
when the las·t of the· C.i vil Rights Laws outlawing racial 
discrimination in housing was passed, the Kerner Commission 
had report.ed; 
"Our nation is moving toward two societies, one 
black, one white- separate and unequal 11 .. 21 (1) 
The 1968 Act~ along with previous legislation, soon feel 
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into disrepute. By the early 1970's, it was not.uncommon for 
basic texts. on American government to talke about the 
"symbolic" role played by civil rights laws, or to claim 
that they were designed to placate an increasingly vocal 
28 black community with token gestures of legal equality O· · 
This argument grew increasingly hard to counter as the position 
of the Negro in American society was seen, by many, to be 
almost unaltered under the weight of this legislation. The 
strength of the "white backlash" and its national charactercan 
be seen in the Presidental campaigns of George Wallace. 
Wallace was first elected in 1962 as Governor of Alabama 
and, in his no-;V' infamous inaugural speech, proclaimed; "Segrega-
tion now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever". 29 Prohib-
ited in 1966 from succeeding himself, he persuaded his wife 
to run on a pledge of continue his leadership. Wallace's 
attempts to win the Presidency seemingly had a profound. effect 
(2) 
on American politics." Carlson details a convincing case 
for Wallace:• s. own claim: that he pushed, not only Nixon, but:. 
every other candidate to the right. In an early attempt to 
attract Southern vo·ters Lyndon Johnson sent Vice-President 
Humphrey, in May 1967, to visit the governor of Georgia, 
Lester Maddox. Humphrey posed arm-in-arm with Maddox and 
{1) Paraphrasing the words of the 1896 ,Plessy vs Ferguson 
decisio~ (163 US 537) • 
(2) In. her bo0k 11 .§Borge.~ C •. Wall.ace qnd. the·, P0:1.5L,t,;hcsc cdf Po~Jir 
.Iessness, . The Wallace Campaigns :for. the Presidency 1964-76.; 
(1981, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books). 
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assured all that there was plenty of room in the Democratic 
party for a great variety of views, including Maddox's 
segregationist views. 
When Johnson withdrew, and Nixon and Humphrey became 
the major party candidates, Wallace set up his American 
Independence Party and stood as a third party candidate. 
This caught Nixon and Humphrey in. a dilemmat each candidate 
needed the Wallace vote to win, but neither wanted to appeal 
directly to the basis of that vote; racial hatred. Each 
accused the other of trying to get the Wallace vote, while 
. . . 1 30 . . pursu~ng ~t h~mse f. N.1.xon's attempt was more obv.1.ous 
in his courting of the South, while Humphrey, needing to 
protect his black vote, was more circumspect. Nixon named 
31 11 conservative, unreconstructed, nee-confederate", Strom 
Thurmond, as an advisor and appeared to consult with him 
on many positions. The 1968 election was, in the end, very 
close • Nixon wo!'J.. by a ve1.·y narrow margin and Wallace came 
close to denying· victory to either candidate. He received 
13.3% of the vote (over 9,290,000 votes) and carried five 
st:at·es;.. Wallace claimed he had achieved his aim o·f forcing, 
Nixon to the right. 
Between 1968 and 1972 Wallace's consuming concern was 
the federally ordered desegregation of public schools. In 
September 1969, he urged parents to ignore court orders on 
school assignment:s;.. and to. ent.er their children in the schools 
of their choiceo Desegregation, however, went ahead. Wallace 
ran for gove·rnox. in 1970 in a· ve-ry dirty campaign, during 
which doctored photos of his oppone11t appearing with 
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prominent blacks were publishedo Wallace, by contrast, was 
endorsed by Robert Shelton the Imperial Wizard of the Ku · 
·KlUx Klan and by the White Citizens Council. Out of state 
forces were also at work. Watergate disclosures revealed 
. t $4 . . 32 N~xon pu 00,000 ~n the campa~gn of Wallace's opponent. 
Nixon, in an attempt to head off Wallace's campaign, reaffirmed 
his commitment to neighbourhood schools and came out against 
forced busing. With Wallace's victory in the gubernatorial 
election, however, Nixon evidently decided he could not outdo 
Wallace on his own ground and had his aides promise more 
integration for the South that autumn than in any previous 
year. 
Between the primary and the general elections, Wallace 
had once again tried to urge parents to defy federal court 
orders assigning their children to desegregated schools. As 
before, there were no incidents. Wallace knew he had been 
unable to get whites stirred up enough to defy the federal 
government on anything except busing. He also recognized 
the growth in importance in the black vote with blacks now 
accounting for 20% of Alabama voters. Accordingly, in his 
1972 campaign, he dropped his overt racial stance~ Maintaining 
a racial slant he announced he would not permit any additional 
busing and ordered school boards to disregard busing orders. 
He later got the Alabama legisla·ture ·to pass a law allowing 
parents to disregard busing plans if they wished, and 
persuaded the Senate to withold state funds allocated for it. 
Wallace threw himself behind this cause with his usual fervour 
callirtg busing, 11 the mo~Tf: atrocious, callous, cruel, assinine 
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thing you can do for little children".33 Three days after 
Wallace won the Florida primary, Nixon called for a halt to 
forced busing. Humphrey praised Nixon's decision, but when 
his advisors strongly objected, changed his position the next 
day. 
On May 15th 1972, Wallace was shot while campaigning 
in Maryland.. At the time he was the leading Democratic contender 
in ·'the popular vote tally. He got 1.5 million more votes than 
any other Democrat in the first fourteen primaries, five of 
which he won, and five he was second in. He was, however, 
out of the race. He ran again briefly in 1976, but paralysed 
and deprived of his racist issue and forced to court the 
black vot.e, he began to insist he had never been a racist .. 
Despite being elected to a t:hird gubernatorial term, his 
Presidential campaign faltered badly md the Southern vote 
was mostly usurped by the more moderate Jimmy Carter. Although 
(1) 
written off by some commentators, a "new" Wallace 
made an impressive pol.itical comeback to become governor for 
the "fourth" time on November 2nd 1982, in the face of the 
opposition of black leaders. One in three blacks still 
preferred him to a Republican and he was elected on a pledge 
35 
to be a "Govenor of all the people ... 
Wallace was unique in American politics in several ways. 
A Southern politician and a national figure, he gave dramatic 
(1) "Gossip had it that he would run for Governor in 1982, 
but. no one· s:e:emed' partt'icularly int-eres:t:ed ...... • a se:tting 
sun gives off no heat'." (34) 
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expression to the grievances and discontent of not only 
Alabama whites, but all whites who felt the, same way. As 
such, he reflected many people's feelings about blacks; in 
1968 when the riots were at their heigh·t: and race relations 
at their nadir, he was at the zenith of his power. When public 
feeling no longer demanded that reaction be epitomized, he 
moderated his stance. By 1976, this moderation had reached 
the point where he no longer had a platform and was forced 
to withdraw from the race. Despite this, he had a great: 
influence on national civil rights policy, and he could be 
regarded, in this period as a touchstone of racial politics. 
His withdrawal in 1976 probably helped the Carter campaign 
and Wallace • s contention that he "reshaped American poli·t:ics 
and made possible the election of a fellow Southerner as 
President",.36 is not completely without foundation. 
Partly, as a result of the influence of Wallace, President 
Nixon did much to se·t: back the cause of civil rights. He 
compelled. the outspoken Chairman of the Commission on Civil 
Rights to resign, and his adm~nistration enforced civil rights 
statutes with so little resolution that the commission rebuked 
it three times in the same year. In 1969, Nixon even opposed 
the extension of the Voting Rights Act in its original formo 
The legal director of the N.AoA,C.P. charged that he had 
1 . . 1. f 37 11 consigned Negroes to a po ~t~ca doghouse whose roo leaks ... 
In the summer of 1969, the Department of Justice stunned civil 
rights groups by asking a federal court to postpone the 
desegregation of Mississippi•s schools .. The N.A .. A.C.P.•s 
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legal branch showed how much the White House had been trans-
formed, when it asked that the United States be switched from 
plaintiff to defendant in the action, because the national 
government, was no longer championing the rights of black 
children. The Supreme Court ruled that dese.gregation must 
38 
take place at once". The Administration's policy was 
clarified ·for all when a White House memorandum addressed 
to Nixon by his domestic advisor, Patrick Moynihan, was 
leaked. It proposed that "the time may have come .when the 
39 issue of race could benefit from a period of 'benign neglect'." 
Paradoxically, some of the greate~gains for blacks, 
especially in school desegregation, came under Nixon. In 
1968, despite ·the good will of the Kennedy and Johnson 
administration, 68% of black students went to all black 
schools. In 1970, the figure had dropped to 18% due mainly 
to policies instituted under Johnson, and also because of 
independent action by the federal courts. However, it also 
owed a lot to the initiative of the federal government under · 
Nixon. Much of this activity was due, not to Nixon's enterprise 
or leadership, but rather, as Leuchtenburg says, 11 from momentum 
developed by the federal bureaucracy, a momentum which no 
President could easily halt".40 While this may be an over-
simplification, it is true that Nixon was very right-wing 
especially in the field of civil rights.. John Ehrlichman 
claims in his recent autobiography(!) that Nixon's policies 
(1) ~John Ehrlichnra:rr: Witn0ss to Power (198l, Simon and Schuster,. 
New York) • 
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were often designed to appeal to racists; "That subliminal 
appeal to the antiblack voter was always in Nixon's statements 
and speeches on busing and housing". More specifically he 
alleges; 
"Nixon said be believed America's blacks ••• were 
genetically inferipr to whites." .Although, "We 
should still do what we could for them, within 41 
reasonable limits, because it was right to do so." 
If the policies and platforms of Wallace and Nixon were 
a reflection of a much-vaunted white backlash, what were the 
factors which first produced, and then limited it? Even 
though the gains being made seemed, to many Negroes· .. only 
token, to the working-class white, it seemed his job, his 
neighbourhood, his gove1:nment and his children's education 
were all being encroached upon 1 and even taken over by blacks. 
In the five year pe:r·iod, 1966-71, the non-white rate of entry 
into the white collar occupations was 127%, while the increase 
for whites was 14%. In that short span, the ratio of non-
whites to whites in these more visible, higher status, higher 
paying occupations, jumped from 29% to 58%.42 The median 
income of non-white families moved from J/2 to 2/3 that of white 
fatnilies. Also, the number of blacks in state or federal 
legislatures jumped from less than 50 to over 200, and there 
was a corresponding increase' in blacks elected to city and 
county offices, including the mayoralties of several major 
• +- • CJ:.-..J:.es. 
These figures looked very different to both sides of 
the racial divide. To the black. activist they were proof 
that not enough was being dona to promote the long overdue, 
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and much promised, equality between black and white, and 
showed, despite all his sacrifices and hard work, he was 
still only earning, on average, 2/3 of a white man's pay. 
To the white man, brought up ina white dominated society 
both occupationally (and, therefore, economically) and 
politically, he could see this dominance slipping away very 
rapidly. 
Other status patterns of his previous lifestyle were 
also disappearing. There was no longer any comfortable way 
to keep blacks residentially 11 in their place". Federal and 
s·l:ate laws by the end of the 1960's prohibited discrimination 
in all places of public accommodation and in most housing. 
Southern schools had given up the fight against de jure 
desegregation and Northern schools were being flooded by 
court orders to take extraordinary measures to correct de 
facto segregation. lrt the beginning of the 1960's, about 
2/3 of all black students were attending exclusively or 
predominantly black colleges. By the end of the decade 2/3 
of them were attending mixed colleges. The number of black 
students in colleges also doubled in the period.43 With such 
a dent to any sense of dominance and the possible creation 
instead, of a sense of impending displacement, the question 
is not why was there a backlash, but why was there such a 
limited backlash? 
As previously suggested, the extent of the support that 
George Wallace received is a rough, but useful indication 
of the strength of this backlash.. While about one quarter 
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of white Americans identified with him and his views, many 
of these people would not actually vote for him. Asked why 
in a 1976 poll, many respondents said they were afraid of 
his 11 extremism".44 The major parties were successful in 
absorbing the extremist impulses of the backlash, illustrating 
their strength as coalition parties~ for example, the victory 
~ 
of Jimmy Carter with the support of both militant blacks and 
Wallace's supporters. Part of Nixon's overwhelming victory 
in 1972 against McGovern can be explained. by his perceived 
resistance to civil rights advances. The reaction against 
these had been further stimulated by racial quotes, an out-
growth of affirmative action, which were unpopular and created 
feelings of displacement among whites. Thus, Nixon was able 
to oppose these, absorbing the backlash sentiment, without 
generally being branded as an extremist. 
Finally, although blacks were perceived to be gaining 
on the white position in society, producing this backlash 
sentiment, the intensity of the response was limited by 
objective factors. The increase in real income for whi·tes 
between 1947-70 was only 2/3 of that of blacks, but it still 
was a healthy 86%, and during the height of black advancement, 
white unemployment dropped with that of blacks. The inflation 
and recession of the early 1970's also did not significantly 
harm the large majority of Americans. While· the real income 
of white Americans did not increase from 1970-75, neither did 
that of black families, and in neither case did it significantly 
decrease. 
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The white backlash therefore, could probably, be 
better described as a reaction to advances, and as representing 
a turning of the nation's attention to new, more pressing 
problems. It signified a halt to special consideration of 
Negro problems, rather than a reversal of previous achievements. 
White reaction was exacerbated by each successive outbreak 
of rioting, which itself was an expression of frustration 
caused by the lack of further progress towards equality. As 
increasing repression of civil disorder occurred, rioting 
came to be seen as counterproductive. The frustrations 
which had caused it, however, remained to a large extent, 
untouched. 
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Conclusion 
A variety of themes have emerged in this thesis which 
can be usefully extracted and set apart from the historical 
narrative. Amongst the most important are the reasons why 
black protest began in Montgomery, Ala., in 1955, why and 
how it progressed and later how it faded from public view. 
The response of American institutions to the largest civil 
movement of the century, is central to an understanding of 
the blacks struggle for equality, and its examination will 
show how different events triggered different reactions from 
all branches of government. However, the popular understanding 
of the civil rights movement is flawed by the prevalence of 
myths and legends about the movement and its leaders, and the 
exposure of these will help illus·trate the problems still 
faced by the American Negro. 
The 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown vs Board of 
Education of Topekq,, Kansas, undermined the whole legal 
superstructure for the idea of racial separation. This had 
a catalytic'effect on many blacks throughout, the country, 
by demonstrating the possibilities of success against 
the segregation system. This first decisive victory in the 
courts encouraged the N.A.A.C.P. to redouble its efforts 
and begin further litigation. 
Montgomery Ala., became the bridgehead of the civil 
rights campaign for a number of reasons. As a typical southern 
city, it had the necessary background of humilia·tion and 
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oppression of blacks, to allow such a pro·test to start and 
grow. The large black population were bound together both 
by their low position in society, and by the church. Ministers, 
even young and inexperienced ones, as Martin Luther King, Jr. 
was in 1955, were highly respected and held great influence 
over these poor and largely uneducated blacks. It is doubtful 
that· the Montgomery protest woul3. have emerged as it did 
without the dynamic, young orator, King, as its focal point. 
Deprived of the inspiration of his speeches and actions, the 
Montg·omery boycott might well have foundered in ·;the face of 
white opposition. 
The use of a boycott was an inspired tactical choice. 
This method gave ·the ordinary Negroes a sense of involvement, 
importance, contribution and unity that had been lacking 
in the purely legalistic approach. The choice of the buses 
as the target of the campaign, rather than other forms of 
discrimination, also contributed to their success. The 
bus company was the main means of transport for Negroes, 
and they comprised seventy per cent of its passengers. The 
segregation of the buses was probably the mos·t visible~ and· 
frequent source of discrimination against the Negro, and 
so the boycott commanded wide support from the black 
community. 
Once started, the boycott was fueled by the interest of 
the media, and King quickly became aware of the importance 
of publicity. From the beginning of the campaign when,in 
condemning it, a white newspaper inadvertently gave 
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publicity to the boycott, to the climax of the protest, when 
"Time" magazine put King on its cover, the media played a 
large part in the Negro success. King realized how far news 
of the Montgomery protest had spread when he received great 
acclaim on his trip to India. 
The media became increasingly important to King and his 
use of non-violence until by the time of his Birmingham, Ala., 
campaign in 1963, it was an essential part of his strategy. 
King's objective had, by that time, changed from encouraging 
reconciliation in the community to building creat~ve tension. 
By causing this tension between the marchers and the local 
authorities and filling the jails, King challenged the social 
mores of the Southern whites to the point where many of them 
reacted violently. King could then, by ensuring media 
coverage of black submission to this violence, provoke national, 
and even world, opinion to demand the basic sociachanges which 
he sought. This tactic was rendered ineffective in later 
years by the increasing unwillingness of young blacks to subject 
themselves to this violent white reaction, in order to gain 
what were seen by many as only token victories. 
The power of the media was only one reason why the Negro 
protest flourished in the 1960's .. 1960 was the dawn of a new 
decade; a new beginningo This was symbolized by the election 
of a young Democratic President, whose inaugural speech in 
January 1961 had looked to the future with ne;,v hope and ne'\v 
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idealism.(!) The black vote had played a major part in his 
election and many Negroes looked to the new administration 
for leadership in the field of civil rights. 
The social and economic climate of the country almost 
certainly influenced the Negro protest. The economy was 
expanding, and the standard of living rising~ America was 
the land of opportunity. The Negro, in contrast, was 
"smothering in airtight case of poverty in the midst of an 
affluent society ... 1 King told us the Negro was tired of 
being "on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast 
ocean of material prosperity".2 In the North, the Negro 
was trapped in the ghetto by his povertyi and in the South 
the segregation system kept him still tied to the plantation( 2), 
or to the most menial jobs in society. 
The North-South divide was also evident in other spheres. 
The geographical separation of Negroes was reinforced by 
ideological, sociological and temperamental differences. Many 
Southern Negroes still worked on the land and were deeply · 
religious. In the North, by contrast, nearly all blacks 
were city dwellers, held in ghettos· not. by segregationist 
laws, but by economic deprivation. Lacking any strong ties 
to the church, the Christian call to non-violence was largely 
(1) "The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans 
••• unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those 
human rights to which ·this nation has always been committed 
and to which we are committed today at home and around the 
world".3 
(2) On one' plantation blacks had never seen U.s. currency; 
they us.ed octagonal tin coins handed out .. by the>white: 
owners and shopped at the plantation store as slaves 
had done. 
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scorned by Northern blacks, many of whom were instead attracted 
by more militant ideologies and the transitory appeal of 
rioting. 
Protest by Negroes for equal treatment under the law 
was an idea whose time had come. A spontaneous mix of world 
even·ts, such as the gaining of independence in African 
countries, national events like the election of President 
Kennedy, and local events during King's first successful 
campaign, all combined to act as catalysts to Negro aspira-
tions. This volatile mixture exploded into a burst of 
frenzied activity and began a decade of change and innovation. 
An enormous amount was accomplished in a very short time. 
From the early, simple demands in 1955, of courteous manners, 
and a fairer system of seating on the buses,. ""'ithin ten 
years they had won an end to public segregation,and the vote. 
A new mentality emerged in many Negro communities replacing 
the· old, submissive !'Uncle Tom" attitude with a ne\v racial 
pride, epitomized by the expression "Black is Beautiful ... 
Without careful examinati.on, it might be easy to see 
the civil rights movement as a uniform, united association .. 
In the introduction I explained why the different groups can 
be accurately described as a movement and infue main text 
many of its characteristics are detailed. However, it must 
be noted that the movement was neither nationalnor monalithic. 
Before the "Brown" decision, most of the pressure for better 
conditions for the Negro had come from the North. When black 
non-violent protest began, its focus was in the South and 
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although this later shifted, there continued to be a strong 
Southern base. There was never one central organiz-ation, 
and so there was no overall discipline or direction. This 
inhibited an ideological and tactical consistency and even 
the leaders of the various factions were often confused as 
to the next best step. The movement was always a dynamic 
evolving entity, with £ts activity chracterizeq by an ebb 
and flow; rather than a constant surge. 
The idea that King was the unquestioned lm der throughout 
the period is illusory. There were often profound divisions 
over tactics, goals, timing, racial co-operation and 
leadership. This led to a multiplicity of goals which for 
a long time were limited in the South and irrelevant in the 
North. However, despite this disharmony and confusion, and 
the heterogeneous na·ture of the movement, it made great 
advances until the· end of the 1960's. Why then did the 
movement falter and fail to progress in the 1970's? Perhaps 
the most important factor was the disenchantment of American 
society. Many blacks became disillusioned with the gains 
that had been made~ Carried along by the religious fervour 
of the protest, expectations had risen unrealistically high. 
Leaders began to fall foul of their own verbosity and believe 
the vote would be a panacea to all ills. King said: 
"If Negroes could vote .... there would be no 
oppressive poverty directed against Negroes, 
our children would not be crippled by segregated 
schools, and the whole community might live 
together in harmony." 4 
He was not alone in his over optimism. Malcolm X said; 
"If the Negro ••• were given ••• ,LEhe votg7 •• 
the added power of the Negro in this country 
would sweep all of the racists and segregationists 
out of office. It would change the entire political 
structure of the country. It would wipe out the 
segregationism that now controls America's foreign 
••• and domestic policy." 5 
When people realized that after winning the vote schools 
were still segregated, black unemployment was higher, and 
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black wages were lower than those of the white man, and that 
the black was in many ways a second-class citizen, many gave 
up and left the struggle. 
Many whites were also losing patience. After the Watts 
riot, a large number recoiled in revulsion, a reaction which 
became increasingly common with each subsequent "long, hot 
summer". Many whites denounced the urban violence, citing 
it as the response of an un~Jrate:Eul Negro community for all 
that had been done for them... When the demands of black 
protesters began to involve the previously largely unaffected 
North, whites retreated further from the new, more complicated 
issues of busing and positive discrimination, claiming that 
Negroes were moving too fast .. 
The civil rights organizations, had used the overreaction 
of local Southern authorities in the creation of national 
opinion, favourable to their cause. The shock value, in the 
North, of seeing a Southern policeman viciously beat a non-
violent black demonstrator was greater than if the assailant 
was in the uniform of the Ku Klux Klan. However, when King 
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moved his campaign North, many whites were so outraged that the 
marchers needed, and received, police protection. The issues 
were, by then, less clear cut and no longer commanded large 
white support in the North, leaving King with no disinterested 
spectator group to whom ·he could appeal. 
Attention was fin±her diverted from Negro problems by the 
Vietnam War. When the Voting Rights Act was passed there were 
no combat troops in Vietnam. By 1968, the military solution, 
. 6 
which had committed 485,000American soldiers and $20 Bn.a year 
to:·the war, was faltering under the weight of the Tet Offensive. 
This no·t only drew students to anti-war protest, thus weakening 
bodies like S.N.c .. c. and c.o.R.E. who depended on their support, 
but also distracted Congress and the President. The civil rights 
movement became another war casulty, as money was diverted to 
arms from the anti-poverty programme, and President Johnson was 
alienated by King's anti-war stance. 
By the end o:E 1968, the leaders who had been so important 
to the movement were all but gone.. President Kennedy, Robert 
Kennedy, Medgar Evers, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King had 
all been assassinated, and the less popular, radical leaders 
were rapidly being imprisoned, killed, or had gone into exilee 
The remaining figures of Abernathy, Jackson, Wilkins and Jordan (l) 
had neither the stature nor the insight to keep the different 
factions united, or to formulate a new strategy to succeed the 
(1) Abernathy of s.c.L.C~, Wilkins of the N.A.A.C.P., Jordan of 
the Urban League (took over 1971) and Jesse Jackson, who 
be.came. ind.epe.n.dent .le.,a.d.er: o.f O,pe,r.ati.on:. Breadbasket:. and lat·eJr'. · 
his own organization .. 
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now defunct non-violent marches leading to legislative action!. 
Internal disputes between the groups allowed the more militant, 
small groups to gain a prominence far beyond that justified 
by their numbers. The result was that the 1960's ended with 
the black movement fragmented, leaderless and lost. The end 
of the idealism of the decade and the start.of.a new one, in 
which a series of Republican administrations was broken only 
by that of a Southern. Democrat, symbolized the inability of 
Negro groups to find anyone who cared about the remaining 
problems facing them. 
The responsiveness of the American political system 
was severely tested by the demands of the massive unrest the 
movement produced. '!'he Supreme Court, noting Presidential 
indifference,and Congressional inability to respond because 
of its procedure and composi·tion, had acted ahead of public 
opinion with the Brown decision. This heralded a period of 
crisis management, rather than innovation, or constructive 
leadership. Preisdent Eisenhower was forced to intervene 
with federal troops, not to secure the rights and freedoms 
of American Negroes, but to uphold his constitutional position 
and maintain Presidential authority. Congress attempted to 
grasp the nettle of race relations with first, the 1957, and 
then the 1960 Civil Rights Acts, but failed to produce 
legislation that had any last·ing effect. Negro rights were 
once again compromised for political expediency. Consequently, 
judicial enforcem~nt r.emained the sole hope for advancement 
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for some time. 
The election of President Kennedy resulted in action, for 
the first time, by the Justice Department. However, due to 
Kennedy's precarious political position, it was only with the 
breakdown of law and order in the South that he was able to 
produce effective leadership. Ironically it was his assassination, 
and the subsequent wave of sympathy, that helped the black 
cause by pushing legislation through Congress. There began 
a short era of primacy in national affairs for the Negro, during 
which the 1964 and 1965 Acts were passed and the antipoverty 
programme begun. The momentum, however, could not be maintained. 
and when other national problems overtook it, the Negro problem 
was once more treated with benign neglecte King's assassination 
was followed by the enactment of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 
which was interpreted by some as an attempt to pacify the 
black community .. 
The response of government to the widespread cry for 
equality and justice was, therefore, not swift and decisive 
but rather sporadic. Both the executive and legislative 
bra·nches of government had stumbled f:rom crisi.s, to crisis, 
reldom achieving more ·than plugging leaks in the ship of state .. 
vlhen,in the middle 1960's, the anti-poverty programme began, 
it was soon starved of the funds necessary for it to have any 
lasting effect. As President Johnson's dream of a "Great 
Society" faded, a pe-riod: of hope· in the country ended. The 
Republican victory of 1968 was a sign that the nation was 
concerned wfth other issues;· the war was the most pressing 
matt:er, and th.e return to conser·va.tism after the libera:t 
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experiment of the early 1960's, relegated the Negro problem 
to a much lower priority. This retreat from liberalism was 
checked, briefly, by the Watergate scandal, and the subsequent 
Democratic victory in 1976, but with the perceived failure of 
the Carter administration, the country oncemore turned 
convincingly to a new conservatism. The inability of government 
in the 1960's, arid subsequently, .to solve the social and 
economic problems experienced by the poor, despite the massive 
funds at its disposal, has seriously shaken the credibility of 
government and led to popular support for increased decentraliz-
ation. 
After the demise of effective black protest, many whites 
claimed that it had ended because blacks were happy with the 
gains that they had made. It was only with hindsight that 
most people realized how token their success had been. It is 
true that the legislation passed brought great advances in the 
social status of, and social attitudes to, the American Negro. 
However, in actual material progress, measured in terms of 
reduced unemployment or improved housing, the great mass of 
Neg·roe·S· were sti11. under.privile~:red. and. often be~low the• poverty 
line. What was needed was a massive programme to fight.all 
povertye The mood of the country would no longer support 
programmes specifically aimed just at blacks and there was 
little Congressional interest in allocating the vast sums 
necessary, t.o relieve the suffering of the poor .. 
In 1964, Martin Luther King had called for $50 Bn. to be 
7 
spent on anti-·po:ve:rty measure:s.. In 1868 the• Kerner: Commi.ss:Eon:1. 
appointed by President Johnson, to investigate the sources 
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of race riots, reported that massive funds were needed to 
counter the "brutalizing discrimination" that had "spawned the 
riots". 8 Johnson announced that it v-.ould cost $30 Bn. (l) to 
implement the proposals, and that the country could not afford 
it. At the time of his death, King was trying to organize 
a campaign of civil disobedience that would force Congress 
to allocate the very necessary funds to the problem. It is 
doubtful that he would have even partly succeeded, but without 
him there was no chance, and black needs receded from the 
public eye. 
Due to the very high esteem in which King was held by 
blacks, a feeling intensified by his "martyrdom". King has been 
almost deified in several rather effusive biographies. Some 
writers have even drawn parallels between King and the Mahatma 
Ghandi, seeing King as a deliverer of his people from the 
oppression of the white man. More recently revisionist works 
have tried to humanize King and remove him from this pedestal. 
This is not to denigrate his achievements or character, but 
merely to counter an unrealistic image that had grown up. A 
recent book by Stephen Oates was the first academic work that, 
while condemning the campaign of personal vilification against 
King by J. Edgar Hoover, recognized some of King's personal 
and political weaknesses. This work and the realization that 
by the end of his life King's star was fading and that he was 
(1) The Office of Economic Opportunity estimated it would. 9 
cost $1 Trillion to wipe out slums and poverty in 1967. 
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outbid for black support by more radical leaders, has helped 
put his career in perspective. 
In contrast, further popular misunderstanding of the 
period, and of King himself, is still being fostered by some 
sources. In 1979 NBC television in America produced a 
"docudrama .. , screened in several countries, including Britain, 
on the life and career of Martin Lutle r King. This production, 
and the book that accompanied it(l), will have been taken by 
most people, without specialist knowledge, as a true represen-
tation. On the contrary, it is a type of "faction" or 
11 fictionalized fact 11 , that obscures and distorts the subject. 
Characters are not individuals but composite, speeches are 
misquoted and misattributed, sensationalist details are 
added and the chronology of events totally ignored. For 
instance, three pages of the book are devoted to a conversation 
between Malcolm X (at one st:age referred to as Michael X) and 
King that supposedly occurred during King's Chicago campaign. 
However, King's campaign began in January 1966, while Malcolm X 
died in February 1965. The speech that King extemporaneously 
delivers, in the. book, on learning of Malcolm's death was 
not actually delivered until February 1968. This type of mis-
representation and rewriting of history can only result, given 
the power of television, in large numbers of people being 
totally misinfonned on the subject, and its success raises 
worrying questions about the effect of such programmes. 
(1) K:ilnq,. by Will±anr Johnston bas:ed on a screenplay w,r;ttt:en: by 
Abbey Mann (1978., W .. H .. Allen, London) o 
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Television is not solely to blame in this area. News-
papers have also played a large part in the building of false 
images and reputations. In the case of Malcolm X, newspapers 
were quick to latch on to the racism of the Black Muslims, 
while ignoring any positive aspects of the sect. When Malcolm 
X left Elijah Muhammed and publicly rejected his racist 
philosophy, the press still persisted in portraying him as a 
bitter and evil man. On the day after he died the New York 
Times wrote;_ 
11 He was a case history, as well as an extraordinary 
and twisted man, turning many true gifts to evil 
purpose ••• his ruthless and fanatical belief in 
violence • • • marked him for fame and for a violent 
end, ••• he did not seek to fit into .society or 
into the life of his own people ••• The world he 
saw ••• was distorted and dark. But he made it 
darker still with his exaltation of fanaticism. 
Yesterday, someone came out of the darkness that 
he spawned and killed him .. " 10 
There is much evidence to suggest that King and Malcolm X 
were not that far apart in their final approach to black 
problems. They both laid great emphasis on the vote and.the 
importance of using it to remove white segregationists from 
office. Both men demanded good education, housing and jobs, 
· specifically, and justice and equality in general, and they 
warned of the potential for violence in the ghettos, if the 
situation was ignored. I have shown that King did not shrink 
from using violence perpetrated against blacks as a lever to 
pressure Congress. Similarly, Malcolm was attempting to use 
the threat of violence, in the form of self-defence, to 
frighten some whites into making concessions and decrease 
attacks on blacks. 
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Malcolm had long argued that what the Negro needed was 
not equal rights in society, but equal means to enjoy those 
rights. Martin Luther King also reached this conclusion in 
later years. IIe came to believe that the constitutional and 
legislative victories blacks had won had been hollow, and that 
the problem was essentially an economic one. This represented 
a shift toward Malcolm's position by King and his plans for a 
Poor People's campaign were based on making future protest on 
a class, rather than a racial, basis. Malcolm's ideas also 
developed, and the gap between their positions was further 
reduced. Having already diagnosed the problem, he was unable 
to find a base from which to search for a solution. He wanted. 
to work in closer association with the civil rights movement, 
but the racis.t stance of his Black Muslim days made him 
unacceptable to the more moderate civil rights groups. It was 
unrealistic to suppose that tl1e entrenched and established 
blacks in the older organizations would endanger their own 
power bases, by allying themselves with such a charismatic 
and unpredictable figure as Malcolm. However, despite the 
fact that they could not join forces, King's and Malcolm's 
analyses became increasingly similare 
Both leaders flirted with the rhetoric of the left 
towards the end of their livese Malcolm said, people, 
"are linking the problem of racism in Mississippi 
with the problem of. racism in the Congo, and also 
the problem of racism in South Vietnam. I·t' s all 
racism. It's all part of the vicious .racist system 
that the Western powers have used to degrade and 
exploit and oppress the people in Africa and Asia 
and Latin Ame-ricr.:l\ di:rri:rrg; recent: centuries a·" 11 
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King said of the Chicago slums, that there was a system of 
"internal colonialism ••• not unlike the exploitation.of the 
Congo by Belgium1• • 12 His goal would be 1'to cripple the 
operations of an oppressive society11 , until it listened to 
13 the cries of the poor. While it might be tempting for 
(1) 
some authors to suggest that this was the beginning of a 
new analysis by Malcolm and King, such judgements are 
necessarily speculative. What is clear is that the two men 
were getting closer to agreement. There were still large 
stumbling-blocks, such as the use of self-defence, but the 
newspaper images of one as a violent, rabid racist, and the 
other as simply a liberal disciple of peace, a.re patently 
misguided. 
Finally, one further myth that has been fo:rwarded in 
liberal analyses of black problems in Arrerica, concerns the 
South. The South is sometimes still described in a manner 
that suggests little change from the segregationist times 
of the late 1950's and early 1960's. A picture can be 
conjured up of the monolithic face of Southern racism, still 
cloaked in Klan robes, guiding theactions of politicians and 
city officials. The reality of the situation is that the 
South has probably changed more than the North, in this respect, 
(1) For instance, G. Breitman, H. Porter and B. Smith in 
The Assassination of Malcolm X, (1976, Pathfinder Press, 
New York) and Ruby M. & E .M. Essien-Udom in 1'lVlalcom X: 
An International Man~ in John Henrik Clarke (ed) Malcolm X: 
The Man and His Times, (1969 , Collier, Toronto). 
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during the last twenty years. Few elected. officials today 
can ignore the black vote in the South.. In November 1982, 
George Wallace, was again returned to the governorship of 
Alabama, but this time with considerable Negro backing, which 
reflected the change in his policies •. In the North, however, 
while blacks also have electoral success and importance~ 
(witness the election of a black mayor in Chicago in April, 
1983), de facto segregation in education and housing, has 
hardly changed at all. The neglect that the Negro still 
suffers in the North,means that segregation is at least as 
overt in the North as it was in the South in the 1960's. 
The American Negro struggle for equality remains a 
half--finished battle.. ;Black cons·titutional rights were 
af:Eirmed, and a new racial pride, completely unknmvn twenty-
five years ago, has remained a lasting achievement. The 
civil rights movement inspired millions at home and abroad. 
It awoke the "sleeping giant" of America and stirred it to 
action, bringing a new realization of the depth of the problems 
facing blacks in American society. Against immense odds, the 
fence of the segregationist system was dismantled, piece by 
piece.· The source of frustration and hopelessness, exhibited 
during the long, hot summers, and again in more recent 
disturbances, was that behind the fence was a brick wall of 
economic inequality. It was thus, only after the long,. hard 
battle for legislative action, that many activists realized 
the intractable nature of the problems that remained. 
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The civil rights movement was both a success and a 
failure. It had almost complete success in securing for 
blacks the constitutional and legal rights, which were already 
enjoyed by the white population. But the end of de jure 
segregation, and the acquisition of the vote, did not transform 
the socio-economic position of American blacks. Civil rights 
leaders had, for the most part, simply tried to force white 
Americans to respect the legal rights of blacks. The 
struggle for economic advancement wa;s bound to be more 
difficult. No longer could an appeal be made to constitutional 
principle, or even to traditional American values. Thus, 
the campaign for economic rights, for re-distributive economic 
policies and for a:Efirmative action, took the civil rights 
movement outside the conventional, orthodox channels of 
.American politics.. Given the fate of white socialist groups 
in America, it is · hardly surprising that the increasingly 
radical appeals of civil rights activitists in the late 
1960's, fell on deaf ears. 
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